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CONSTITUTIONALISM WITH CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS: EXTRA-JUDICIAL DETENTION 
AND THE CHINESE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
Larry Catá Backer† and Keren Wang †† 
Abstract: China is developing its own distinctive path towards socialist 
constitutionalism and rule of law, one that reflects China's history and its unique 
circumstances but also conforms to the general principles of transnational 
constitutionalism.  The Chinese constitutional order is grounded on a principal of 
separation of powers that distinguishes between an administrative power assigned to the 
government and a political authority assigned to the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”).  
This constitutional order is reflected in two related but distinct legal contexts—laojiao 
(the system of administrative detentions, re-education through labor, or “劳动教养”) and 
shuanggui (the system of intra-CCP discipline of its cadres, “双规”).  This article 
develops a theory of Chinese socialist constitutionalism though an examination of these 
structures for extra-judicial detention.  On the basis of this reading of Chinese socialist 
constitutionalism, it will suggest why laojiao is constitutionally problematic, but 
shuanggui is constitutionally sound under the current Chinese constitutional framework.  
Laojiao deals with general conduct obligations of individuals imposed through, and fully 
subject to, the administrative order established under the leadership of the CCP, 
elaborated through the State Constitution.  Deviation therefrom breaches both the State 
Constitution and the CCP’s mass line.  Shuanggui deals with political rather than 
administrative breaches that touch on the integrity of the role of the CCP as Party in 
Power.  It is in this sense beyond the competence of the administrative authorities 
represented by the government apparatus and relates to the constitution of the CCP rather 
than the constitution of the state and its administrative authority over the people.  As a 
consequence, the shuanggui system is not subject to the same constitutional difficulties as 
laojiao.  Legitimacy is not perfection, and the article ends with a consideration of the 
ways in which shuanggui might be reformed to better conform with the CCP’s own 
organizational line and its constitutional principles. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Extra-judicial or administrative detention by the state, laojiao,1 has 
raised important issues of constitutionalism in China.  The related practice of 
extra-judicial detention by the CCP, shuanggui, 2  have raised equally 
important issues about the relationship between the CCP, the state, and the 
nature of  constitutionalism in China.  In both cases, the issues can be 
understood as focusing on two principal questions.  The first goes to the 
constitutional legitimacy of laojiao and shuanggui. Legitimacy implicates 
the ways in which Chinese constitutionalism itself fits within emerging 
global notions of constitutional legitimacy, that is, whether China is a 
legitimately constitutional state.  The second assumes the constitutional 
legitimacy of each practice, but considers whether the implementation of 
each system sufficiently conforms to Chinese constitutional requirements.  
Constitutional implementation implicates the way in which Chinese 
normative principles can constrain the practices of important political 
institutions.  
The issues of the constitutional legitimacy and constitutional 
implementation of laojiao and shuanggui provide an important window for 
understanding the normative structures of Chinese constitutionalism and its 
distinct basis for the organization of administrative and political power.   It is 
well understood now that China is developing its own distinctive path 
toward socialist constitutionalism and rule of law. 3  Socialist 
constitutionalism with Chinese characteristics reflects China’s history and its 
unique circumstances, but also conforms to the general principles of 
                                                      
1  “Laojiao” (劳动教养) originated in the CCP’s 1955 campaign against counter-revolutionaries. 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR (RTL): A SUMMARY OF REGULATORY ISSUES 
AND CONCERNS, 1 (2001), available at http://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdfs/hric-
rtl.pdf.  Current legislation dates from 1957, when the NPC Standing Committee authorized the State 
Council to administer reeducation through labor.  Id. at 2; see infra Part II.  For discussion of the Anti-
Rightist Campaigns of 1957-59, see, e.g.,  René Goldman, The Rectification Campaign at Peking 
University: May-June 1957, 12 THE CHINA Q. 138, 138-163 (1962) (China); Frederick C. Teiwes, The 
Purge of Provincial Leaders 1957-1958, 27 THE CHINA Q. 14, 14-32 (1966) (China). 
2  Shuanggui is the name by which the system of intra-CCP discipline of CCP cadres, or 双规, is 
known.  It has existed as a means of disciplining CCP cadres since 1927.  In its current form, it has become 
part of the structures through which politics has been institutionalized in post-Revolutionary China.  Thus 
institutionalized, Shuanggui is now commonly understood as a Chinese anti-corruption term, translated as 
“double designations,” which is used to question Party members being investigated for violating Party 
discipline.  The plain meaning of the words, according to Gan Yisheng, secretary-general of the CCDI, 
suggests that Party members are requested to attend questioning sessions at a designated place and for a 
designated duration.  See infra Part III through Part V. 
3  RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 532 (2002). 
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transnational constitutionalism. 4  The core premise of the Chinese 
constitutionalist order is the relationship between CCP and the state 
institutions. 5   The principle of scientific development, solidified as an 
important part of the core of the CCP Line, is grounded in the premise that a 
successful constitutionalist system not only needs to adhere to core 
substantive constitutional principles and norms, but also needs to be a 
“living constitution”—one that both reflects socio-political realities present 
at hand in order to avoid personification, and also adheres to the CCP’s 
foundational mass line.6  In Western political terms, the mass line might thus 
be understood as including characteristics of the core democratic principles 
of the political organization of the state. 
China, like the vast majority of states since the eighteenth century,7 
has adopted a written constitution. 8   Like the majority of states, the 
legitimacy of its government and governmental actions is assumed to be 
judged by or through their conformity to the provisions of that document.9  
However, China is also organized on the basis of Marxist-Leninist 
principles, which are accorded constitutional effect. 10   Its principal 
organizing effect is evidenced in a distinctive approach to separation of 
powers.  While Western constitutions are grounded in the amalgamation of 
all administrative and political authority in a government, whose combined 
powers are separated among executive, legislative, and judicial functions,11 
the Chinese constitutional order is grounded on a principal of separation of 
powers that distinguishes between an administrative power assigned to the 
                                                      
4  See generally, Jiang Shigong, Written and Unwritten Constitutions: A New Approach to the Study 
of Constitutional Government in China, 36 MODERN CHINA 12, 12-46 (2010). 
5  See Backer, Party, People, Government, and State: On Constitutional Values and the Legitimacy 
of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System, 30 B.U. INT’L L. J. 331, 331-408 (2012); Jiang Shigong, 
supra note 4, 12-46.  
6  Jiang Shigong, supra note 4, 12-46. 
7  See, e.g., ZACHERY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 36-64 (2009); 
see generally, HENC VAN MAARSEVEEN & GER VAN DER TANG, WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS: A 
COMPUTERIZED COMPARATIVE STUDY (1978). 
8   See XIANFA (1982) (China), available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/ 
constitution.html (last visited March 8, 2014); see also Pu Zengyuan, A Comparative Perspective on the 
United States and Chinese Constitutions, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 867, 869 (1989) (stating that:  “The 
current Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was adopted in 1982.  Although labeled a revised 
constitution, it is actually a newly drafted one.  It reflects the new development of socialist democracy.  For 
the first time, the new Constitution provides that the building of a high level of democracy is one of the 
basic tasks of the state.”). 
9  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1789, 1789-
1851 (2005). 
10  Zhao Qian, A Thought of Taking CPPCC as Chinese Professional Supervisory Institution of 
Unconstitutional Behavior in Applying Law, 7 CAN. SOC. SCI. 71, 71 (2011). 
11  Bruce A. Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, HARV. L. REV. 633, 691 (2000). 
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government and a political authority assigned to the Chinese Communist 
Party.12  Administrative constitutional power is organized within the State 
Constitution; the CCP is vested with a leadership through which the political 
authority of the people is expressed.13  Western critics sometimes err by 
suggesting that the Chinese approach to constitutionalism is not legitimate 
constitutionalism, because the Chinese constitutional system does not 
conform to the organizational forms of Western states.14  Chinese academics 
sometimes commit the same Western style error in reverse by conceding to 
the West the control of the definition of constitutionalism, suggesting that 
constitutionalism is itself incapable of universalization because its forms are 
grounded in ideological values unique to Western states.  Some argue that 
any alternative form of constitutionalism, including socialist 
constitutionalism, is impossible because these variants do not imitate 
Western forms precisely.15  
China’s distinctive separation of powers template reflects a normative 
foundation for government different from that embraced in Western states.  
In Chinese separation of powers approaches, the principles of democracy 
and popular sovereignty, understood through the principle of the “mass 
line,”16 are divided between an institution with political leadership authority 
                                                      
12  Larry C. Backer, Towards a Robust Theory of the Chinese Constitutional State: Between 
Formalism and Legitimacy in Jiang Shigong’s Constitutionalism, (Consortium for Peace and Ethics, 
Working Paper No. 5-1, 2013) at 16, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2262555. 
13  Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party] 
(Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), preamble 
(China), available at http://english.CCP.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188089.html, (stating that 
“[l]eadership by the Party means mainly political, ideological and organizational leadership.”).  
14  See generally Tom Ginsburg, Constitutionalism: East Asian Antecedents, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV.  
11 (2012); but see Michael W. Dowdle, Of Comparative Constitutional Monocropping: A Reply to Qianfan 
Zhang, 8 INT. J. CON. L. 977 (2010). 
15  Yang Xiaoqing, Xianzheng yu renmin minzhuzhidu zhi bijiao yanjiu (宪政与人民民主制度之比较研究) 
[A comparative study of constitutional democracy and the people], 2013 HONGQI WENGAO ISSUE 10, 4 – 10 
(May 21, 2013),  available at  http://www.qstheory.cn/hqwg/2013/201310/201305/t20130521 
_232618.htm. 
16  The “mass line” is a principle with constitutional dimensions.  It has been inscribed in the Chinese 
State Constitution since 1954.  XIANFA art. 17 (1954) (China) provided:  “[a]ll organs of state must rely on 
the masses of the people, constantly maintain close contact with them, heed their opinions and accept their 
supervision.”  In its current form it is found in XIANFA art. 27 (1982) (China):  “[a]ll state organs and 
functionaries must rely on the support of the people, keep in close touch with them, heed their opinions and 
suggestions, accept their supervision and work hard to serve them.”  The scope is now focused on all 
organs of government.  The preamble to the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party provides: “[t]he 
Party follows the mass line in its work, doing everything for the masses, relying on them in every task, 
carrying out the principle of ‘from the masses, to the masses,’ and translating its correct views into action 
by the masses of their own accord.”  Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of 
the Communist Party] (Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 
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(the CCP) and an institution with administrative authority (the government).  
Both government and CCP are organized in accordance with their own logic 
and within the limits of their authority and function.  The government is 
organized on the basis of the State Constitution.  The State Constitution 
provides for the organization of government, 17  commonly understood as 
exercised at its highest levels through the State Council and National 
People’s Congress (“NPC”) organs and the regulation of the use of 
government power, including in relation to the people of China.18  For a long 
time, the government, through police officials, has appropriated for itself the 
power to administratively detain individuals through a process that bypasses 
the standard provisions of criminal and civil law.  This laojiao system targets 
all citizens, bypasses both prosecutor and court, and is used to police anti-
social behaviors, some of which are political in character and some of which 
have been criminalized under appropriately authorized action of the NPC.  
Laojiao is often referred to as the “Chinese labor camp system” in the West, 
and not without good reason.19  
The authority of the CCP is acknowledged in the Constitution,20 but is 
framed by the ideological premises on which the political order is founded21 
—under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng 
Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of “Three Represents,” and the 
concept of scientific development.22  These describe the normative limits of 
                                                                                                                                                              
14, 2012), preamble (China).  Xi Jinping recently relied on the mass line as a critical support for anti-
corruption efforts.  See  Raymond Li, Xi looks to legacy of Mao for inspiration to solve corruption, SOUTH 
CHINA MORNING POST (June 19, 2013), available at http://www.scmp.com /news/china/article/1263927/xi-
looks-legacy-mao-inspiration-solve-corruption. 
17  Michael W. Dowdle, Realizing Constitutional Potential, 23 CHINA BUS. REV. 31 (1996). 
18  See Tong Zhiwei (童之伟), Ruhe caineng jiang quanli guanjin zhidu de longzili (如何才能将权力关进
制 度 的 笼 子 ) [How to Restrict Power in the Cage of Regulations], JUSTICE NETWORK LEGAL 
MICROBLOGGING (Feb. 27, 2013), http://libertyzw.fyfz.cn/b/735339 (last visited Feb. 22, 2014), translated 
in LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (May 3, 2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/part-
xxviiizhiwei-tong-series-how-to.html#more (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
19  Andrew Jacobs, Opposition to Labor Camps Widens in China, N.Y.TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/world/asia/opposition-to-labor-camps-widens-in-china.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=1& (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
20  XIANFA art. 1 (1982) (China). 
21  Larry C. Backer, The Rule of Law, the Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: 
Sange Daibiao (the “Three Represents”), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism, 
16 J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 929636.  
22  All but the last are expressed in the State Constitution.  See XIANFA preamble (2004).  All are 
acknowledged in the Communist Party Constitution.  See Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党
章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party] (Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 
14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012) GEN. PROGRAM (China). 
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the powers of government and CCP,23 and suggest the structures of deep rule 
of law within Chinese constitutionalism, one that is acknowledged as not 
fully realized.24  The CCP is organized on the basis of its own constitutional 
instrument, and its constitutional role is not specified within the State 
Constitution.25  The leadership role of the CCP includes the authority to 
organize itself and to exercise authority over its members.26  This authority 
also includes a power to detain CCP members suspected of corruption or 
other breaches of discipline, under the shuanggui system. 27  This is 
administered almost completely outside the system of government 
established through the State Constitution, but within the institutional 
framework of the organization of the CCP itself.28  
Both laojiao and shuanggui have come under increasing criticism in 
China as well as in the Western press.29  Laojiao has been criticized as 
irremediably in conflict with both constitutional protections accorded 
individuals and with a number of general laws adopted by Chinese state 
administrative organs. 30   Shuanggui has been criticized as extra-
constitutional because state organs do not administer it.31  It is also criticized 
as failing to conform to the protections afforded individuals under the 
                                                      
23  See Backer, supra note 21; Tong Zhiwei, Abandoning RTL a Critical Step Toward Complete Rule 
of Law, SINA.COM (Feb. 5, 2013), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6d8baa340101drap.html (last visited Feb. 
24, 2014). 
24  Hu Jintao, Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at 18th Party Congress, Part XII, XINHUA (Nov. 17, 
2012), http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27137540.htm (last visited 
March 8, 2014). 
25  Tong Zhiwei, supra note 18; Jiang Shigong, supra note 4, at 12. 
26  See Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party] 
(Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012) GEN. 
PROGRAM (China). 
27  See id. art. 37-42.  
28  Larry C. Backer, Communist Party and State Discipline in China: Exploring Shuanggui (双规) 
and Shuang kai Part I, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Aug. 2, 2011), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot. 
com/2011/08/communist-party-and-state-discipline-in.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014); see also  Larry C. 
Backer, Communist Party and State Discipline in China Part II: Brief Introduction to Shuang Kai and Pix 
Inside Shuang gui Facility, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Sept. 17, 2011), 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/communist-party-and-state-discipline-in.html (last visited Feb. 
24, 2014).  
29  The most notorious criticism of laojiao was an article by the Chinese language magazine, Lens, 
which is part of a chain of magazines that includes the well-known business magazine, Caijing.  See Adam 
Taylor,  ‘Tiger Bench’ and Other Horrific Torture Methods Reportedly Used at Chinese Work Camp, 
BUSINESS INSIDER: MILITARY AND DEFENSE (April 9, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/alleged-
torture-in-chinas-laojiao-2013-4 (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).  Shuanggui generates substantial coverage in 
the Western press.  See Jonathan Kaiman, “Fears for China’s Shuanggui detainees After Wenzhou Official 
Dies,” THE GUARDIAN (UK) (April 12, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/12/fears-china-
shuanggui-detainees (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).  
30  See infra Part II. 
31  See infra Part III. 
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Chinese constitution and otherwise applicable law.32   Recently, Chinese 
authorities have indicated an intention to reform or perhaps abolish the 
laojiao system.33  There has been no indication of any intention to change 
the shuanggui system, though it remains subject to censure especially with 
respect to the way in which it is applied.  Laojiao and shuanggui represent 
both an expression of constitutional authority within a system in which 
power is separated between administrative and political functions, and a 
useful means for examining the character and structures of Chinese 
constitutionalism.   
The article seeks to scientifically develop34 a way of understanding 
the form and character of the Chinese constitutional system by examining 
laojiao and shuanggui in the context of the Chinese State-Party 
constitutional system. 35   Part II analyzes laojiao within the Chinese 
constitutional system.  It starts with a formal description of laojiao from 
within China, continues with an analysis of the constitutional critique of 
laojiao, and argues that under the scientific development of Chinese 
constitutionalism, laojiao no longer accords with Chinese constitutional 
norms.  In addition, laojiao no longer accords with the political guidance of 
the CCP, and especially the “mass line.”  Together with the “mass line” and 
under the guidance of the CCP, a state apparatus must be formed and 
maintained for the people.  Laojiao targets the masses, and in that sense 
duplicates and to some extent subverts the administrative order created 
through the governmental system founded on the Chinese Constitution, 
which itself reflects the CCP Line. As an extra-judicial form of 
administrative discipline directly against the masses, the laojiao system not 
only violates constitutional principles, but it is also contrary to the CCP's 
                                                      
32  See infra Part III. 
33  Liu Yuanhui, Abolition of Re-Education Through Labor a Milestone, CRI ENGLISH (Nov. 15, 
2013), http://english.cri.cn/6909/2013/12/28/2561s805553.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (noting that 
“[o]n Nov 15, 2013, the Third Plenum of the 18th Communist Party of China Central Committee issued its 
resolutions to implement a long list of comprehensive reforms. Among the reforms is the abolition of the 
controversial ‘re-education through labor’ policy, abbreviated as laojiao in Chinese. The move has been 
hailed, both at home and abroad, as a milestone in the development of China's legal sector.”).  
34  This is a deliberate reference to the Chinese constitutional principle of scientific development, put 
forward at the Third Plenary Session of the 16th CCP National Congress in 2003.  See XIANFA preamble 
(1982) (China); Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist 
Party] (Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), 
preamble (China); Scientific Concept of Development & Harmonious Society, COMMUNIST PARTY OF 
CHINA, 17TH NAT’L CONG., (2007) (China), http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/227029.htm (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
35  Cf. Michael W. Dowdle Constitutional Listening, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 115, 135 (2012). 
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mass line.  It is unnecessary and poses a major roadblock to the development 
of a CCP-led harmonious socialist society under the guidance of rule-of-law. 
Shuanggui is different from laojiao, and the article then turns to a 
consideration of shuanggui within Chinese constitutionalism.  Parts III 
through V thus focus on the basis for that difference between shuanggui and 
laojiao, and then develop the basis for a constitutional defense of shuanggui 
and its critical importance to understanding Chinese constitutionalism from 
out of that difference.  Though some of the techniques associated with Intra-
Party discipline may be similar to the laojiao system, shuanggui serves a 
very different purpose. Shuanggui deals with political rather than 
administrative breaches that touch on the integrity of the role of the CCP as 
Party in Power.  It is in this sense beyond the competence of the 
administrative authorities represented by the government apparatus and 
relates to the constitution of the CCP rather than the constitution of the state 
and its administrative authority over the people.  As a consequence, the 
shuanggui system is not subject to the same constitutional difficulties as 
laojiao, but may benefit from scientific development under China’s rule of 
law constitutional system.  
This application serves as the means through which we elaborate our 
theory of the Chinese characteristics of constitutionalism:  the Chinese 
constitutional order is founded on a separation of powers framework that is 
quite distinct from that embraced in the West.  In place of the allocation of 
all political and administrative authority in a government, the powers of 
which are then divided among executive, legislative and judicial branches, 
the Chinese constitutional system separates power among a political order, 
defined by the CCP’s constitution, conventions and practices vested in the 
CCP, and an administrative order, defined by the State constitution, laws, 
regulations and practices, and vested in this more narrow sense in the 
government of China.  
Part III starts with a formal description of the shuanggui system from 
within.  It then considers critically the constitutional attacks on the 
legitimacy of shuanggui, and its conventional justification under or around 
the State Constitution.  Part IV then elaborates our theory of Chinese 
constitutionalism within the context of shuanggui. It considers the 
difficulties of defending shuanggui on the basis of conventional analysis  
without fully considering the place and legitimacy of the CCP within 
Chinese constitutionalism.  The paper will suggest, ultimately, that it is quite 
plausible to understand laojiao as no longer falling within the administrative 
limits of the government as expressed in the State Constitution, but that 
shuanggui as legitimate and falling within the legal limits of scientifically 
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developing Chinese constitutionalism.  Both conclusions are possible only 
when one understands Chinese constitutionalism in its comprehensive and 
systemic context.  That understanding, in turn, is based on an appreciation of 
the constitutional role of the CCP and of Marxist Leninist and Mao Zedong 
thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, and the Three Represents in providing the 
substantive basis of the Chinese constitutional system.36  In this context, 
shuanggui is essential for the performance by the CCP of its own 
constitutional obligations according to the premises of its own constitution 
and thus subject to law under the State Constitution.   
Once the legitimacy of shuanggui is thus properly understood, one 
can move from the false issue of its legitimacy (embedded within the larger 
issue of the legitimacy of the current Chinese constitutional system itself) to 
the far more important one of the appropriate construction of shuanggui and 
its implementation as a device of Party discipline in light of Chinese 
constitutional principles, but outside the jurisdiction of any government 
ministry or court.  That is the object of Part V.  It begins a preliminary 
consideration of the issue of the constitutional obligations of the CCP in the 
construction and implementation of shuanggui.  The path to understanding 
the real character of the Chinese constitutional system lies in an 
understanding of laojiao and  shuanggui.  
II. LAOJIAO AND THE STATE CONSTITUTION 
In 2012, reports began circulating of an intention by the NPC to 
consider the elimination of the laojiao system.37  For example, China Daily 
reported that: 
Ying Yong, president of Shanghai High People’s Court 
. . . noted in a proposal submitted during this year’s NPC 
session, held in March in Beijing, that the system has 
contributed greatly to social order and improved economic 
development.  Even so, the country finds itself amid different 
circumstances than were present fifty years ago and has 
established a legal system.  Laojiao should therefore be 
modified, he said.38   
                                                      
36  See generally Backer, supra note 21; Backer, supra note 5. 
37  Zhao Yining, Lawyers Calling for Reform of Laojiao System,  CHINA DAILY (Aug. 16, 2012), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-08/16/content_15679394.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
38  Id. 
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Indeed, public criticism of the system had been increasing, especially in light 
of recent cases of abuse of the administrative detention provisions by local 
officials. 39   Recently released detained persons have begun to seek 
compensation for their detention, though to date unsuccessfully.40  Almost a 
year later, the Communist Party, through its Third Plenum of the 18th Party 
Congress, indicated that laojiao would be phased out and eventually 
eliminated.  The movement from strong institutional support in the 1950s 
through eventual elimination suggests a significant scientific development of 
the Chinese constitutional system. 41   We will suggest here that laojiao 
seriously contradicts the basic CCP line as it is currently operated, and on 
that basis alone it must either be abolished or reformed.  Section A of this 
Part II will briefly consider recent developments in the organization and 
deployment of laojiao.  Section B will then turn to an examination of the 
laojiao system itself.  Section C then considers the constitutionality of 
laojiao within the parameters of Chinese socialist constitutionalism. 
 
A.  Recent Developments 
  
By the end of 2013, there appeared to be a political consensus that the 
laojiao system was to be abolished.42  This was not the first time that the 
laojiao system has been on the brink of abolition.  In 2003 at the start of Hu 
Jintao’s first term, “127 people’s representatives to the National People’s 
Congress proposed motions to reform laojiao, and the NPC Legislative 
Affairs Commission began to produce a draft law titled ‘Law for the 
Education and Correction of Illegal Conduct’ (weifa xingwei jiaozhi fa) that 
would have eliminated laojiao as an administrative punishment.”43  But by 
                                                      
39  Deng Shasha, China to reform Re-Education Through Labor System, XINHUA (Jan. 7, 2013),  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-01/07/c_132086402.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
40  In one case involving a woman detained after seeking greater punishment for the people who 
abducted, raped, and prostituted her eleven-year-old daughter, an intermediate People’s Court refused to 
award compensation.  Zhao Yining, supra note 37.  In another case, the city's laojiao committee turned 
down Tang's previous request for compensation of CNY 2,400, arguing the decision “was withdrawn not 
because it was wrong, but out of humanitarian concerns.”  Id. 
41  Yang Yi, China Focus: China’s ‘Laojiao’ site to change role after abolishment, XINHUA (Nov. 
17, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/17/c_132895129.htm (last visited Feb. 2014) 
(quoting Wang Qiliang, associate dean of Law School in Yunnan University, stating that “[t]he reeducation 
through labor system has accomplished its historical mission. China has a much improved legal system 
now”).  
42  China Issues Detailed Reform Roadmap, XINHUA (Nov. 15, 2013), http://news. 
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/15/c_132891922.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
43  Jerome A. Cohen, Reforming China’s Criminal Procedure: An Introduction to This Symposium, 
24 COLUM. J. OF ASIAN L. 213, 218 n. 8 (2011). 
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the end of 2003, momentum for abolition had stalled on the opposition of the 
Ministry of Public Security.44  
The Chinese authorities again signaled the possible abolishment of its 
controversial laojiao system during the National Conference on 
Procuratorial, Judicial, and Public Security Affairs that took place in Beijing 
earlier in 2013.  According to several major Chinese news sources, Meng 
Jianzhu, Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Commission, 
announced during the National Conference that “the re-education through 
labor system will be terminated by the end of this year upon approval from 
National People’s Congress Standing Committee. 45   In addition, “[i]n 
October, Zhou Qiang, President of the Supreme People’s Court, China’s top 
judicial body, urged courts nationwide to “take concerted action” in aiding 
laojiao reform by streamlining court hearing procedures for minor offenses 
and promoting the use of community correction to better rehabilitate 
criminals.”46 
Secretary Meng’s comment signaled a critical development.  It comes 
at a time when the laojiao system is receiving increasing public scrutiny 
following several well-publicized scandals relating to the use of extra-
judicial detention by local governments against “contumacious” 
individuals.47  Although the Xinhua news agency later replaced terminate 
with further reform the laojiao system in its official report of the National 
Conference,48 subsequent development nonetheless supports the speculation 
that China’s central government is committed to phasing out its half-century 
old labor camp system. 49   On February 5th, the Yunnan provincial 
government announced that Yunnan Province would no longer approve cases 
in which people are sent to re-education labor camps on grounds of 
                                                      
44  Id. 
45  Quanguo Zhengfa Gongzuo Huiyi: Jinnian Tingzhi Shiyong Laojiao Zhidu (全国政法工作会议:今年
停止使用劳教制度) [National Conference on Procuratorial, Judicial and Public Security Affairs: Terminating 
Laojiao System This Year], CHINA.COM (Jan. 7, 2012),  http://news.china.com/domestic 
/945/20130107/17618589.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
46  Yin Pumin, Ending an Outdated System, BEIJING REVIEW, (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/nation/txt/2013-12/02/content_580796_2.htm  (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
47  Lilian Lin, Mother’s Labor-Camp Sentence Sparks Fury, THE WALL STREET J. (Aug. 6, 2012), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/08/06/mother%E2%80%99s-labor-camp-sentence-sparks-fury/ 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (describing a case where “[t]he plight of a mother sentenced to a labor camp for 
demanding tougher punishment for those who allegedly raped and forced her daughter into prostitution has 
rallied China’s online community — and even prompted an official rebuke from the Communist Party’s 
main mouthpiece.”). 
48  Tong Zhiwei, supra note 23.  
49  Id. (noting that “although a Xinhua news dispatch later that day replaced ‘stop using’ with ‘further 
advance the RTL system reform’ it did not deny that recently the central government has decided to go 
with the historical trend and popular wish for the gradual discard of the RTL system”). 
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threatening national security, petitioning by causing unrest, and smearing the 
image of officials.50  The Secretary of Yunnan’s Politics and Law Committee 
told reporters that the laojiao approval process has been suspended for all 
cases within the province.51  It is probable that other provinces will follow 
the lead of Yunnan and Guangdong provinces in abolishing the use of 
laojiao and repurposing those facilities.  The extent of those changes will 
depend, in turn, on the direction and scope of reform that is finally set as 
state policy by the CCP and as law by the NPC.  
That direction and scope became clearer in November 2013.  On 
November 15th, 2013, the CCP released a key policy document 
summarizing the economic and political reforms approved by the Third 
Plenary Session of the eighteenth CCP Central Committee.52  The document 
specifically mentions judicial reforms, calling for a “fair, efficient and 
authoritative socialist judicial system” for the purpose of “safeguarding the 
rights and legitimate interests of the people.” 53   It stresses the need to 
“uphold the constitution and laws, deepen reforms in administrative law 
enforcement, and ensure independence and fairness in prosecuting bodies 
and courts.” 54   Most significantly, the document announced the plan to 
abolish the laojiao system as a part of the major effort to improve judicial 
practice and protection of human rights.55   
On the basis of this CCP policy document, the NPC system has also 
begun to move forward on reform.  At its bi-monthly session in December 
2013, the NPC began consideration of a bill to eliminate laojiao.56  The bill 
                                                      
50  Chen Weijun, Guangdong and Yunnan Announce the Abolition of Forced Labor Camps (Laojiao), 
ASIANEWS.IT (July 2, 2013), http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Guangdong-and-Yunnan-announce-the-
abolition-of-forced-labor-camps-%28laojiao%29-27072.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
51  Yunnan Zanting Sanzhong Xingwei Laojiao Shenpi: Chouhua Lingdaoren Xingxiang Buzai 
Laojiao (云南暂停三种行为劳教审批: 丑化领导人形象不再劳教) [Yunnan Suspends Three Types of Laojiao 
Approval, Including Smearing the Image of Political Leaders], XINHUA (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2013-02/07/c_124332693.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
52  China Issues Detailed Reform Roadmap, supra note 42.   
53  Id. 
54  China to Overhaul Judicial System: Communique, XINHUA (Nov. 15, 2013), http://news. 
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/12/c_132882473.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
55  China to Abolish Reeducation Through Labor, XINHUA (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/15/c_132891921.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) 
(quoting Wang Gongyi, former senior researcher with the Ministry of Justice, as stating “in practice there 
are no rigid procedures to regulate how the committee should decide the criminal facts and the application 
of punishment.”); see also China Issues Detailed Reform Roadmap, supra note 42.  For the original Xinhua 
report, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/15/c _132891922.htm. 
56  NPC Addresses Laojiao System at Bi-Monthly Session, WANT CHINA TIMES (Dec. 24, 2013) 
(Taiwan), http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20131224000134&cid=1101 (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
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was sponsored by the Chinese State Council.57  It calls for the elimination of 
laojiao in its current form because it was no longer necessary.58  It was also 
reported that:  “[o]nce laojiao is abolished, relevant laws, judicial 
interpretations, and documents will be adjusted accordingly.  The State 
Council will organize departments to administer the annulment of the 
system, including setting free those still in labor camps, reassigning police in 
charge of laojiao, and changing the function of locations to other 
purposes.”59 
It is important to note that although the laojiao system is markedly 
coming to an end, the future role of existing laojiao facilities across China 
and their personnel remain uncertain.  Western commentators have also 
suggested caution, noting that the Article 73 Revised Criminal Procedure 
Law continues to permit house arrest under a set of broad criteria and that 
detention in places other than the home will still be permitted for “crimes 
endangering state security, crimes of terrorism and particularly serious 
crimes of bribery.” 60   In addition, it is not clear that related detention 
measures, laogai (reform through labor), juiye (forced job placement),  
hourong shencha (shelter and investigation), custody and repatriation laws, 
juvenile offender camps, and psychiatric hospitals laws will be reformed.61  
Moreover, the resolution of the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress 
indicated that it was also imperative to “enhance the community correction 
system.”62 
Despite these concerns, the conventional architecture of the laojiao 
system appears to be on the brink of reform.  Shortly after the 
                                                      
57  Id. 
58  Id. (noting that “[t]he bill holds that constant improvement to the legal system has made laojiao 
superfluous to the nation’s current legal setup”). 
59  Id. 
60  Stanley Lubman, Will Re-Education Through Labor End Soon?, THE WALL STREET J. (Feb. 4, 
2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/02/04/will-re-education-through-labor-end-soon/ (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
61  For a short description of these measures, see LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, LAOGAI 
HANDBOOK 16-23 (2008), available at http://laogai.org/system/files/u1/handbook2008-all.pdf. 
62  See Community Correction Expands as RTL Contracts, DUI HUA HUM. RTS. J. (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.duihuahrjournal.org/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (explaining that the Ministry of Justice is 
drafting a new Community Correction Law that will serve as a means of undertaking the supervision of a 
host of former prisoners in China); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan, Gonganbu, 
Sifabu Guanyu Yinfa ‘Shequ Jiaozheng Shishi Banfa’ de Tongzhi’ (最高人民法院、最高人民检察院、公安部、司
法部关于印发《社区矫正实施办法》的通知) [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Justice Regarding Issue of Implementation 
Measures for Community Correction] (Jan. 10, 2012), translated in Community Correction Expands as 
RTL Contracts, DUI HUA HUM. RTS. J. (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2013/12/ 
community-correction-expands-as-rtl.html (last visited March 24, 2014). 
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announcement, the official Xinhua news reported that laojiao institutions 
across China are seeking new roles after the  decision to abolish the 
reeducation through labor (“RTL”) system. 63   For instance, the former 
laojiao center of reeducation through labor in Xishuangbanna Dai 
Autonomous Prefecture in southwest Yunnan is set to be transformed into a 
drug rehab center.64  According to the Director of the Justice Bureau of 
Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, the key to the functional 
transformation of the former laojiao institutions is “to advocate a greater 
role for the local society, based on the existing infrastructure.”65  These 
recent developments provide important background for the abolishment and 
ongoing reforms of the laojiao system. 
 
B.   The Laojiao System in a Legal Context 
 
The term “laojiao” is an abbreviation of “laodong jiaoyang (劳动教
养 ),” which literally translates as “reeducation through labor.” Laojiao 
targets those individuals who have committed “minor offences” that do not 
amount to criminal liability. 66   It is a compulsory administrative penal 
system that seeks to “reform and correct” those individuals through forced 
labor and detention.67  Professor Tong emphasizes the administrative nature 
of the laojiao system and its avoidance of the constitutional safeguards for 
criminal prosecutions and bypass of the judicial system and its safeguards.68  
This is ironic, especially when it has been reported that “RTL detainees are 
mostly treated just like prisoners in the criminal justice system, although 
now, unlike in the past, they are generally segregated from inmates 
convicted of criminal offenses.”69  Moreover, according to “reports from 
political detainees and others, conditions in RTL camps are generally 
abusive, with overcrowded, unsanitary living conditions; inadequate food; 
endemic violence; and excessive working hours being among the major 
                                                      
63  Yang Yi, supra note 41; see also Petitioner's Account of RTL Reforms, DUI HUA HUM. RTS. J. 
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://www .duihuahrjournal.org/2013/11/petitioners-account-of-rtl-reforms.html (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
64  Laojiao site to change role after abolishment, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 17, 2013), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/17/content_17111104.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (noting 
that Xishuangbanna borders on Myanmar and Laos, as well as the Golden Triangle—one of the world’s 
major sources of drugs.  The geographic location of Xishuangbanna may play a significant role in the 
decision to transform the former laojiao camp into a drug rehab center.).  
65  Id. 
66  LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 61.  
67  See generally, Tong Zhiwei, supra note 23. 
68  Id. 
69  HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 1.  
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concerns.”70  Indeed, some have suggested that the prison enterprises might 
be incompatible with the market economy and might hinder modernization.71 
Nationwide, there are now close to 300 RTL centers, according to official 
statistics.72   
 Laojiao received its present name from the 1957 ordinance titled 
“Resolution on Approving the Decision of the State Council on the Issue of 
the Reeducation through Labor.” 73   The 1957 resolution remains the 
principle document providing the legal basis for the laojiao system, 
stipulating as its objective:  “[i]n accordance with Article 100 of the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, for the purpose of reforming 
those idling, law-breaking, discipline-breaching, duty-neglecting but work-
capable individuals into self-reliant people of new work ethic.”74 
 Paragraph V of the 1957 regulation provides that laojiao authorities 
are established by the provincial level governments, and the entire laojiao 
process is handled by the local civil affairs and public security 
departments. 75   This was modified in 1979 when the NPC Standing 
Committee approved “Supplementary Provisions by the State Council on 
Reeducation through Labor” in 1979. 76   The Supplementary Provisions 
established Reeducation Through Labor Management Committees (劳动教
养管理委员会) as the sole organ responsible for reviewing and approving 
laojiao cases.77  The regulations do not require these committees to release 
                                                      
70  Id.   
71  Yang Liangqing & Wang Yijun, interview with Liu Shien, Jianqi fenkai hou jianyu shengcha 
dingwei de sikao, (司法部部长谈监狱体制改革：让监狱告别营利) [Some Thoughts on Prison Production after the 
Separation of Prison and Enterprise], SOUTHCN.COM (Dec. 5, 2003),  http://www.southcn.com 
/news/community/shzt/prison/outline/200405101067.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014), cited in LAOGAI 
RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 61. 
72  HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 1, at 31-33.  
73  BUREAU OF REEDUCATION-THROUGH-LABOR ADMIN., Zhongguo Laodong Jiaoyang Zhidu Jianjie 
( 中 国 劳 动 教 养 制 度 简 介 ) [Introduction to China’s Reeducation Through Labor System] (2002) 
http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/moj/ldjyglj/2003-05/28/content_19622.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).  Some 
trace the origins of the system to the 1954 “Regulations on Reform Through Labor.”  See LAOGAI 
RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 61. 
74  Guowuyuan guanyu laodongjiaoyang wenti de jueding (国务院关于劳动教养问题的决定) [Resolution 
on Approving the Decision of the State Council on the Issue of the Reeducation through Labor] (approved 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong., Aug. 1, 1957), section 1 [hereinafter Resolution].  Article 10 
of the Ministry of Public Security’s 1982 trial practices on re-education through labor listed six categories 
that refine those of the 1957 Resolution, lumping labor insubordination together with counterrevolutionary 
activity and pretty criminality.  See HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 1. 
75  Resolution, supra note 74.   
76   LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 61. 
77   Guowuyuan guanyu laodongjiaoyang de buchong jueding (国务院关于劳动教养的补充规定) 
[Supplementary Provisions by the State Council on Reeducation through Labor] (approved by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong., Nov. 19, 1979). 
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written opinions to explain how decisions in individual cases were made.78  
Neither the courts nor the People’s procuratorate are involved in the laojiao 
process. 
Laojiao appears to have been developed as a tool of the political, 
social, and economic reorganization of China in the first decades after the 
establishment of the People’s Republic.  It served as a means of political 
control of non-Party members, especially during the period of the Anti-
Rightist Campaigns,79 as well as to discipline the labor force during an initial 
period of Soviet style collectivization.80  But it also had some connection to 
political notions underlying the people’s democratic dictatorship at the heart 
of the Socialist Party-State. 81   Laojiao eventually evolved to serve four 
principal functions:  controlling political dissidents, maintaining public 
order, facilitating police criminal investigations, and suppressing drug use by 
addicts.82  It thus combined political and social order elements that have 
since clouded its scope and function as the Chinese state apparatus 
developed, especially after the end of the Cultural Revolution.  Thus, as the 
political control elements of laojiao became less prominent, the public 
security departments further expanded the scope of the laojiao system to 
include drug addicts, prostitutes, and compulsive gamblers. 83   Habitual 
offenders became an important element in the 1970s, as were suspects 
                                                      
78  Jaime A. FlorCruz, Reforming China’s Controversial Labor Camps, CNN (Oct. 18, 2012, 10:48 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/18/world/asia/china-forced-labor-camps/ (quoting a Beijing lawyer, that 
“current regulations do not require the laojiao management committees to release a written verdict to 
explain how their decisions were made, so it is difficult to know if a decision was fair”).  
79  See Resolution, supra note 74, section 1; see also, Amy Li, ‘Not a single person’ persecuted in the 
Anti-Rightist Movement, says vice director of CASS, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 14, 2013), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1237558/not-single-person-persecuted-anti-rightist-movement-
says-vice-director (last visited March 6, 2014) (explaining that “[t]he Anti-Rightist Movement, which 
lasted from 1957 to 1959, consisted of campaigns to purge alleged rightists within the Communist Party 
both in China and abroad. The term “rightists” was largely used to refer to intellectuals accused of favoring 
capitalism over collectivization.”).  
80  Fu Hualing, Dissolving Laojiao at 2 (University of Hong Kong, Working Paper, April 27, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1395552. 
81  In 1987, Deng Yuzhen wrote:  “[a] socialist state’s Laogai facilities . . . as an important 
component of the people’s democratic dictatorship, Laogai facilities of all levels are established- prisons, 
Laogai camps, Laojiao camps, and juvenile criminal camps, all of them are tools representing the interests 
of the proletariat and the masses exercising dictatorship over a minority of hostile elements originating 
from exploiter classes.”  LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 61. 
82  Id. 
83  Wang Yijun, Laojiao zhidu gaige zaina (劳教制度改革难在哪) [What are the Difficulties for Laijiao 
Reforms], CHINA YOUTH DAILY 11 (September 6, 2012) available at http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2012-
09/06/nw.D110000zgqnb_20120906_2-11.htm. 
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against which insufficient evidence could be accumulated, and since the 
1980s, drug users.84 
Before 1979, detention was for an indefinite period, with some reports 
of detentions for several decades.85  The Supplementary Provisions provided 
for detention of individuals in laojiao labor camps for up to four years.  
Currently, detentions are fixed at one to three years with a possible 
additional year extension, with extensive regulations developed by the 
Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Justice covering the 
operation of the system.86  
 
C.   The Constitutionality of Laojiao 
 
The policy shifts and criticism of the laojiao system suggest the value 
of considering its legitimacy, as formally developed, under the constraints of 
the Chinese constitutional system.  This section examines laojiao from a 
constitutional perspective.  It starts with an analysis of the conformity of the 
law of laojiao to the obligations imposed on the state apparatus under the 
Chinese constitutions as adopted from 1954.  It suggests that while the 
objectives of the laojiao system fall clearly within the constitutional 
authority of the state apparatus, there is no direct authority for the means 
chosen to operationalize the laojiao system as adopted.  The administration 
and implementation of the laojiao system became more constitutionally 
problematic after the adoption of the 1982 State Constitution.  The section 
then considers the possibility that laojiao can be defended as a species of the 
controversial doctrine of constitutional necessity.  But that argument is 
rejected as incompatible with the Chinese constitutional system itself and 
increasingly viewed as illegitimate as a constitutional device.  The 
contradictions between necessity and the rule of law premise built into the 
1982 State Constitution is explored.  But this traditional Western style 
constitutional analysis does not end the matter.  Under core premises of 
Chinese Constitutionalism, the interpretation of the legitimacy of laojiao is 
also dependent on an analysis of that system for its conformity to the CCP 
line—that is, the fundamental principles of political leadership through 
which the CCP undertakes its leadership role. A review of Chinese 
                                                      
84  Fu Hualing, supra note 80, at 3.  For useful statistics on this last point, see id. at 4.  Fu notes 
further that the reform of Laojiao was to some extent tied to the efforts to reform Chinese drug laws.  Id. at 
4-5.  Fu argues that with the reform of the drug laws the utility of Laojiao has been substantially eroded, 
thus the opening for reform.  Id. at 6. 
85  HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 1, at 2. 
86  Id. at 3. 
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constitutional principles—scientific development, the mass line, and the 
principles of people’s democratic dictatorship—suggests that laojiao 
seriously contradicts the basic CCP line as it is currently articulated. 
The 1957 Resolution formalizing the laojiao system was supposedly 
adopted “in accordance with Article 100 of the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China.”87  That Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 
enacted in 1954,88 was subsequently revised in 1975, 1978, and 1982.89  
Article 100 of the 1954 Constitution provides that:  “[c]itizens of the 
People’s Republic of China must abide by the Constitution and the law, 
uphold discipline at work, keep public order and respect social ethics.”90  
Article 100 became Article 53 in the current 1982 version of the 
Constitution, and the language of the article remains substantially 
unchanged. 91   Article 53 describes the basic duties of citizens; and it 
suggests a basis for the legitimacy of many of the objectives of laojiao.  But 
it does not explicitly provide authority for exercise of the means by which 
the state may exercise authority to ensure compliance with these citizen 
obligations. The means for such exercise of authority, then, if exercised by 
the state apparatus, must be found in other provisions of the State 
Constitution.  But it is unlikely that any such support can be found.   
Indeed, in the absence of interpretive gap-filling, there is little by way 
of direct authority for the means chosen to operationalize laojiao in its 
current form.  The 1954 State Constitution characterizes work as a “matter 
of honor,” and the State is empowered to encourage citizens to “take an 
active and creative part in their work.” 92   More importantly, while the 
principles of people’s democratic dictatorship might have found expression 
in the 1954 State Constitution’s authorization of the State organs to 
“suppress all treasonable and counter-revolutionary activities” 93  and to 
                                                      
87  Resolution, (promulgated by the 78th meeting of the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Aug. 1, 1957), available at http://www.hrichina.org/chs/jue-ding/guo-wu-yuan-guan-yu-lao-dong-jiao-
yang-wen-ti-de-jue-ding. 
88  XIANFA art. 100, 17 (1954) (China), available at http://www.hkpolitics.net/database/chicon/1954 
/1954ae.pdf. 
89  See, e.g., William C. Jones, The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 63 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 707, 711-14 (1985), available at http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=2203&context=lawreview.  
90  See XIANFA art. 17 (1954) (China).  
91  See XIANFA, art. 53 (1982) (China), available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution 
/constitution.html (requiring citizens to abide by the constitution and the law, keep state secrets, protect 
public property, observe labour discipline and public order, and respect social ethics.). 
92  XIANFA, art. 16 (1954) (China). 
93  Id. at art. 19. 
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deprive certain classes of individuals of political rights,94 “at the same time it 
provides them with a way to earn a living in order to enable them to reform 
through work.”95 However, Article 89 of the 1954 State Constitution also 
prohibited arrest “except by decision of a people’s court or with the sanction 
of a people’s procuratorate.”96   
Thus, while it might have been possible to develop a laojiao system 
within constitutional norms, such efforts would necessarily fall within the 
scope of Article 89, something to which the laojiao regulations failed to 
conform.  By citing Article 100 (now 53) of the 1954 State Constitution, the 
1957 Regulation implies that the administrative apparatus may forcefully 
deprive a citizen’s personal freedom for the purpose of enforcing work 
discipline or promoting social ethics, even when the given individual is 
without any criminal liability or has committed a minor offense that does not 
amount to incarceration under the criminal code.  Such disciplinary system 
is markedly problematic, as both 1954 and 1982 versions of the Chinese 
Constitution offer protection from arrest and detention without judicial 
process for Chinese citizens.  Article 89 of the 1954 Constitution provides 
that:  “[f]reedom of the person of citizens of the People’s Republic of China 
is inviolable.  No citizen may be arrested except by decision of a people’s 
court or with the sanction of a People’s Procuratorate.”97  Article 37 of the 
1982 Constitution also confirmed the due process requirement.98  Moreover, 
Article 19 of the 1954 State Constitution was reformed and appears now as 
Article 28 of the 1982 State Constitution, limiting the power to punish 
political actions through the criminal law.99  Yet Article 1 of the 1982 State 
                                                      
94  Id. (specifically designed to deprive feudal landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists of certain rights). 
95  Id. 
96  Id. at art. 89. 
97  Id. 
98  See XIANFA, art. 37 (1982) (China), available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution 
/constitution.html (providing that “[t]he freedom of person of citizens of the People's Republic of China is 
inviolable. No citizen may be arrested except with the approval or by decision of a people's procuratorate or 
by decision of a people's court, and arrests must be made by a public security organ. Unlawful deprivation 
or restriction of citizens' freedom of person by detention or other means is prohibited; and unlawful search 
of the person of citizens is prohibited.”). 
99  Article 28 of the 1982 State Constitution originally provided that the “[s]tate maintains public 
order and suppresses treasonable and other counter-revolutionary activities; it penalizes actions that 
endanger public security and disrupt the socialist economy and other criminal activities, and punishes and 
reforms criminals.” XIANFA, art. 28 (1982) (China).  This article was amended in 1999 to provide that the 
“[s]tate maintains public order and suppresses treasonable and other counter-revolutionary activities; it 
penalizes actions that endanger public security and disrupt the socialist economy and other criminal 
activities, and punishes and reforms criminals.”  In either case, it appears clear that these political acts, 
when undertaken by individuals other than members of the CCP are to be treated under the criminal law 
and the regular structures for the institutionalization thereof through the State Constitution and the laws 
enacted thereunder.  See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa xiuzhengan (中华人民共和国宪法修正案) 
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Constitution still speaks to a blanket prohibition against political subversion 
of the socialist system, though there is no indication that this  prohibition 
would be treated differently from other forms of criminality, including 
treason.100  
Against the explicitly written language from Article 37 is the fact that 
the entire reeducation through labor process is without judicial review and 
completely bypasses all judicial organs of the state, such as the People’s 
Court and People’s Procuratorate.101  Furthermore, Article 5 of the State 
Constitution imposes strict duty for state organs to adhere to constitutional 
principles.102  Equally important, to the extent that the laojiao system is 
grounded in political discipline of the people, for example through the 
original focus on anti-social and counter-revolutionary elements, it falls 
outside the powers of state organs and implicates the authority of the CCP, 
except to the extent it is transposed into law through the procedures 
specified in the State Constitution.103  In the absence of a designation as an 
administrative offense under the civil or criminal law, the government itself 
under the State Constitution would be obligated to defer to the CCP, but 
would be unable to reach individuals directly, consistent with Article 37 of 
the 1982 State Constitution. 
In addition, a number of administrative and personal abuses have been 
reported.  Beyond its extra-judicial administration of avoiding procedural 
protection afforded under the criminal law, critics have suggested that the 
scope of laojiao is unacceptably vague.104  It is broad enough to provide 
                                                                                                                                                              
[Amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China], (adopted by Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress, 1999), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=433 (last visited 
March 1, 2014). 
100  XIANFA, art. 1 (1982) (China) available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution 
/constitution.html (providing that “[t]he socialist system is the basic system of the People's Republic of 
China. Sabotage of the socialist system by any organization or individual is prohibited.”). 
101  See, e.g., LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 61; cf. Lin Min, An Archaic Form of 
Justice, SHENZHEN DAILY (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.szdaily.com/content/2012-
08/13/content_7069313.htm (last visited March 1, 2014). 
102  See XIANFA art. 5 (1982) (China) available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution 
/constitution.html (stating that “[n]o law or administrative or local rules and regulations shall contravene 
the constitution. All state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all 
enterprises and undertakings must abide by the Constitution and the law. All acts in violation of the 
Constitution and the law must be investigated. No organization or individual may enjoy the privilege of 
being above the Constitution and the law.”). 
103 XINFA art. 28 (1982) (China), available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution 
/constitution.html.  
104  See generally, KLAUS MÜHLHAHN,  CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA: A HISTORY  216-17 (2009); cf. 
John Givens, Laojiao Terrorism of China, BEFORE IT’S NEWS (June 11, 2013), 
http://beforeitsnews.com/international/2013/06/laojiao-terrorism-of-china-2459950.html (last visited March 
1, 2014);  Lin Min, supra note 101. 
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local officials with cover to punish anyone, the penalties under laojiao are 
harsher than those provided for similar crimes under the criminal law, local 
authorities have added their own regulations making the rules incoherent, 
and the facilities and treatment of laojiao detainees are worse than those in 
penal facilities.105  More troubling is the essence of laojiao administration—
it is operated by the local police without oversight by the procurate or the 
courts.106  In effect, the laojiao system itself is essentially beyond any power 
granted to any administrative organ established within the government 
established through the State Constitution.  Laojiao effectively creates a 
penal system that bypasses the careful structures of constitutional restraints 
and in the process also breaches the basic separation of powers at the heart 
of Chinese constitutionalism.  
Even if one were inclined to accept this line of reasoning, it might still 
be possible to construct a constitutional argument supporting laojiao based 
on a species of the controversial doctrine of constitutional necessity, one 
which justified subordinating rule of law to action necessary to preserve the 
political and social order.107  Necessity would have to be framed around the 
need to establish the power of the state and to ensure that the ruling ideology 
was not subject to undermining by people dedicated to regime change within 
a state only recently emerging from nearly a century of turmoil,108 a state 
which still faced substantial opposition from militarily powerful states 
inalterably opposed to the political premises on which the new government 
was established,109 and to its territorial ambitions.110  In that context, it might 
be essential to treat citizens as potential enemy combatants and to move 
                                                      
105  HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 1. 
106  Mark Magnier, China Thinks of Closing its Reeducation Prisons, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Mar. 5, 
2007), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/05/world/fg-reeducate5. 
107  Leslie Wolf-Phillips, Constitutional Legitimacy: A Study of the Doctrine of Necessity 1 THIRD 
WORLD Q. 97, 110 (1979).  On the tension between perceived rule of law and necessity in constitutional 
states, see generally Gerard N. Magliocca, The Gold Clause and Constitutional Necessity, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
1243 (2012).  
108 See, e.g., LI  CHIEN-NUNG, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF CHINA 1840-1928 8-11 (Ssu-Yu Teng & 
Jeremy Ingalls trans., 1956).  
109 See, e.g., CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, 113TH CONG., ANNUAL REPORT 138-42 (Comm. Print 
2013), available at http://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/AR13DJ.PDF; cf. Kristen 
A. Stilt, Constitutional Authority and Subversion: Egypt's New Presidential Election System, 16 IND. INT'L 
& COMP. L. REV. 335, 336 (2006) (observing “[m]ost recent scholarship on constitutional change is 
grounded in an evolutionary model...in which nations proceed from authoritarian forms of government to 
democracy.”). 
110 See, e.g., Bonnie Glaser, Armed Clash in the South China Sea: Contingency Planning 
Memorandum No. 14, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 2012), http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-
clash-south-china-sea/p27883 (last visited March 6, 2014); see also Michael Ivanovitch, China and Japan 
Trading Goods and War Threats, CNBC.com (Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101300548 (last 
visited March 1, 2014).  
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decisively against them in ways that might have otherwise violated 
principles on which the relationship between citizen and state are founded.  
This would be similar to the argument recently made by the U.S. 
government to support extreme measures, including extra-judicial killing,111 
against international opposition.112  The fact that the 1957 Resolution targets 
“counter-revolutionists and anti-socialism reactionaries” implies that the 
laojiao system emerged as a political device to consolidate the power of the 
incipient Chinese government during the tumultuous early years of the 
People’s Republic.  More importantly, the early political focus of laojiao 
was consistent with the class struggle principles inscribed in the 1954 State 
Constitution.113  
Yet what might be framed as a constitutional necessity—the need to 
protect the state against domestic counterrevolutionary insurgents—can also 
easily be used to undermine rule of law development. Indeed, the 
revolutionary conditions of the 1950s can hardly serve to support extra 
constitutional measures more than half a century later when conditions had 
changed substantially.  To be sure, the problem associated with the laojiao 
system is not unique to China.  The United States, too, has been criticized 
for violating the due-process requirement—most notably for the Japanese-
American interment during WWII and the more recent Guantanamo Bay 
controversy. 114  Similar to the Japanese internment camp and the 
Guantanamo Bay prison, China’s labor camp system was also created in 
                                                      
111  U.S. Justifies Drone Attacks, Says it’s Lawful, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-10-23/us/43323901_1_drone-attacks-civilian-casualties-
obama-administration (last visited March 1, 1014) (quoting White House Press Secretary, Jay Carney, as 
saying “[t]he U.S. counterterrorism operations are precise, they are lawful, and they are effective.”); see 
also Owen Bowcott, The Legal Dilemma Over Drone Strikes: Justified Killings or War Crimes?, THE 
GUARDIAN (UK) (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/02/drone-strikes-thorny-
legal-questions (last visited March 1, 2014). 
112  Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Experts Urge U.S., Yemen, to Explain Erroneous Drone Strikes, 
REUTERS (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/26/us-yemen-strike-un-
idUSBRE9BP0EV20131226?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews (last visited March 1, 2014); see 
also Peter Magulies, The Fog of War Reform: Change and Structure in the Law of Armed Conflict After 
September 11, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1417, 1471-85 (2012). 
113 See, e.g., XIANFA art. 10 (1954) (China) (providing that “[t]he policy of the state towards capitalist 
industry and commerce is to use, restrict and transform them. . . . The state prohibits capitalists from 
engaging in any unlawful activities which injure the public interest, disturb the social-economic order, or 
undermine the economic plan of the state.”); id. at art. 19 (providing that “[t]he state deprives feudal 
landlords and bureaucrat capitalists of political rights for a specific period of time according to law”). 
114 See, e.g., Symposium, The Long Shadow of Korematsu, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1998); David Luban, 
The War on Terrorism and the End of Human Rights, in WAR AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 51 (Verna V. Gehring 
ed., 2002); Editorial, Bagram: A Legal Black Hole?, L.A. TIMES (May 26, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/26/opinion/la-ed-bagram-20100526 (last visited March 1, 2014); 
Editorial, Backward at Bagram, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2010/06/01/opinion/01tue1.html (last visited March 1, 2014). 
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response to unique exigencies that arose during unusual periods.  Laojiao, 
then, appears to serve as the “civilian” counterpart to shuanggui.  Just as 
shuanggui was to discipline CCP cadres, 115  laojiao was to discipline 
bourgeois elements as a means of establishing the people’s democratic 
dictatorship116 now fundamental to Article 1 of the State Constitution.  This 
was possible only by basing the protections of citizenship on designations of 
membership in specific economic classes, which was itself implied within 
the 1954 State Constitution with its emphasis on class struggle.117  As a 
revolutionary party, the CCP-led government in its early years adopted 
harsher measures against its political opponents, justified by necessity and 
the revolutionary character of the socialist state building project.118  Yet the 
comparisons to the now discredited necessity-based actions of the United 
States and Japan should be telling,119 and one that if accepted would suggest 
the illegitimacy of laojiao within globally accepted parameters of 
constitutional principles already embraced in China.  
Thus, a traditional Western style  of constitutional analysis produces a 
strong case against the legitimacy of laojiao under the State Constitution.  
But that analysis is not entirely true to the analytical framework that reflects 
the separation of power and constitutional structures of China.  As suggested 
above, under principles of Chinese constitutionalism, the constitutional 
analysis does not end at the text of the State Constitution—it is also 
necessary to determine whether laojiao is illegitimate as inconsistent with 
the fundamental principles of political leadership expressed through the 
CCP.  That determination requires an analysis of the conformity of laojiao to 
the CCP line with constitutional dimension.  As a consequence, the only 
possible way to defend the constitutionality of laojiao is to show that it is a 
proper expression of political will that can be harmonized with the 
governance principles to which the CCP adheres.  
A review of Chinese constitutional principles leads to the strong 
conclusion that laojiao seriously contradicts the basic CCP line as it is 
currently articulated, and on that basis alone it must either be abolished or 
reformed.  The key to reform under the CCP constitutional line would be to 
                                                      
115  See infra Part III. 
116  Mao Zedong, The People’s Democratic Dictatorship: In Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary 
of the Communist Party of China (June 30, 1949), in SELECTED WORKS, VOL. 5 411-23, available at 
http://www.fordham.edu /halsall/mod/1949mao.html. 
117  XIANFA art. 1, 10, 19 (1954) (China); see generally Mao Zedong, supra note 116, at 411-23.   
118  Mao Zedong, supra note 116, at 411-23. 
119  See, e.g., Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its 
Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1811 (2010). 
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incorporate laojiao within the Penal Code through invocation of NPC 
legislative processes and administration by the procurate and courts.  To 
rephrase this in the style of Western constitutional discourse, it is important 
to note that even if laojiao appears to conform to the letter of the State 
Constitution, it may violate the fundamental constitutional principles on 
which the state is organized, as these are elaborated by the CCP in 
accordance with its role within the Chinese constitutional system.120  On that 
basis, laojiao is an unconstitutional assertion of state power.  For this 
purpose, the analysis turns from the State Constitution and law to the 
constitutionally significant principles of governance developed by the CCP 
in its role as the party in power, under whose leadership the political 
parameters of the administrative apparatus of the state is supposed to be 
undertaken.121 
The analysis necessarily starts with the CCP principle of scientific 
development. 122   The constitutional questions about laojiao within the 
framework of Chinese socialist constitutionalism itself serves better as a 
reminder of the utility of action grounded in the constitutional principle of 
scientific development.123  Both the State Constitution and the Constitution 
of the CCP have progressed beyond a focus on narrowly defined class 
struggle. 124   In comparison with its Western counterparts, the Chinese 
constitutional development is only in its nascent stage—it is still 
rudimentary and suffers from many shortcomings.  It can be said that the 
most critical deficiency for the Chinese constitutional system is the 
unbridgeable gap between “form” and “reality.”  The laojiao system clearly 
reflects such deficiency—a conspicuously unconstitutional penal system has 
                                                      
120  The nearest analogy is to an interesting facet of German constitutional jurisprudence that accepts 
the premise that constitutional principles embedded within the Basic Law may trump specific provisions 
therein.  See generally, Gerhard Leibholtz, The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany and the 
“Southwest Case,” 46 THE AM. POL. SCI. REV. 723 (1952). 
121  Backer, supra note 12, at 11. 
122  XIANFA, general program (1982) (China) (providing that “[i]t is an important guiding principle for 
China's economic and social development and a major strategic thought that must be upheld and applied in 
developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.”). 
123 COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, 17TH NAT’L CONG., SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT & 
HARMONIOUS SOCIETY (2007), CHINA.ORG http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/227029.htm (last 
visited March 1, 2014) (stipulating that “[t]he Scientific Concept of Development means putting people 
first and aiming at comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development. To put people first, we should 
take people's interests as the starting point and foothold of all of our works, make continuous efforts to 
meet various needs of the people and promote an overall development of the people.”). 
124 Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party] 
(Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), preamble 
(China) (providing that “[o]wing to both domestic circumstances and foreign influences, class struggle will 
continue to exist within a certain scope for a long time and may possibly grow acute under certain 
conditions, but it is no longer the principal contradiction.”). 
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managed to persist for more than half-a-century in spite of the clear intent of 
CCP line articulated through the Party and State Constitution.  The success 
of the project of Chinese socialist constitutional construction directly affects 
the legitimacy of the Chinese government under CCP leadership. 125 
Constitutionalism, at its core, is grounded in a precise set of fundamental 
principles with constitutional effect.126  Constitutionalism can only function 
through the internalization and normalization of its principles into the public 
memory.127  The discipline and internalization of a constitutional ideal is 
achieved through a prolonged process of consolidation that involves both 
institutional design and increasingly strict compliance with constitutional 
principles in administrative practice. 128   The failure of constitutional 
development, whether Western or socialist, whether created on the American 
or Chinese model, opens the door to delegitimation and the rise of 
opposition movements whose object is to replace the existing order.129  It 
follows that the rule of law is in fact a rule of norms, and it is impossible to 
promote constitutional norms without consistent adherence to both written 
and unwritten constitution.130  
Laojiao functions as a pervasive administrative penal system that 
targets the general public.  It bypasses formal judicial and prosecutorial 
power in a way that is similar to the disciplinary techniques of shuanggui, 
                                                      
125 The General Program of the CCP Constitution makes this clear.  Though socialist modernization 
privileges economic development, it remains committed to the Four Cardinal Principles as the basis for 
building the state.  To that extent, the CCP  “leads the people in promoting socialist democracy. It 
integrates its leadership, the position of the people as masters of the country . . . builds a socialist country 
under the rule of law, consolidates the people's democratic dictatorship, and builds socialist political 
civilization.”  Id.  That requires that it “strengthens state legislation and law enforcement so as to bring all 
work of the state under the rule of law.”  Id. 
126  See Backer, supra note 21. 
127  See Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND DEMOCRACY 3 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993), available at 
http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/courses/LA207_Public_Law_1/Readings/la207_murphy.html (noting that “a 
constitutional text that requires its officials to swear to support it can forge a moral bond. Much of the text 
may thus become part of the nation's customs. Children may learn about it in school as the "proper" way of 
politics, and later, as adults, internalize its provisions; mature citizens may come to look on it as prescribing 
rules for a just society; and officials may habitually put most of its command into practice.”).  See generally 
Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 5, 6-7 (2002). 
128 Cf. Moritz Hartmann, Administrative Constitutionalism and the Political Union, 14 GERMAN LAW 
J. 695 (2013) (describing a construction of a constitutional administrative union in the EU).  This notion of 
progress and temporality is made explicit in both the CCP and State Constitutional texts, which contain 
strong suggestions of the process of scientific development of political and administrative structures toward 
the socialist ideals expressed therein.  
129 Cf. Tom Ginsburg et al., When to Overthrow Your Government: The Right to Resist in the World’s 
Constitutions, 60 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1184 (2013).  
130 The object is to avoid what is now better understood as abusive constitutionalism.  See David 
Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189 (2013); cf. Jiang Shigong, supra note 4, at 
12-46.   
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which is only applied to CCP members.131  But shuanggui ought to apply 
only with respect to the obligations that come from membership in the CCP, 
obligations that are beyond the jurisdiction of the State Constitution. 
Ordinary citizens, the target of laojiao, do not bear a special relationship to 
the State; CCP cadres are in a vastly different position.  Indeed, the scientific 
development of the Chinese constitutional system from its 1954 to its current 
framework suggests that the political disciplining of citizens must now occur 
within the State Constitution rather than beyond it.   That notion is now a 
basic part of the CCP line expressed through the State Constitution itself.132  
As the CCP has transitioned from its role as a revolutionary party into a 
ruling party that represents the will of the masses, a system that was 
designed in the Revolutionary Period and justified as necessary to promote 
stability is itself increasingly becoming a major source of instability, and is 
criticized as such.133  As such, laojiao appears to contradict the political 
settlement evidenced by the adoption of the 1982 State Constitution itself.  A 
fundamental principle of Chinese constitutionalism derived therefrom is that 
the political leadership of the CCP is effectuated through the government 
and that the structures of that implementation are set out in the State 
Constitution.  The CCP’s political leadership of the masses, then, is 
government work.  To conform to the State Constitution is a necessary 
consequence of conformity to the CCP’s political leadership and the basic 
expression of the principle of the people’s democratic dictatorship enshrined 
in Article 1 of the State Constitution. 
It follows, then, that being an extra-judicial form of discipline directly 
against the masses, the laojiao system not only violates constitutional 
principles, but it is also contrary to the CCP’s “mass line.”  The “mass line” 
is a foundational principle for the CCP134—it expresses the need for the 
                                                      
131  See infra Part III; see also Larry C. Backer, Abolishing Laojiao 劳动教养 in China; is Shuanggui 
Next?, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Jan. 7, 2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot .com/2013/01/abolishing-
laojiao-in-china-is.html (last visited March 1, 2014). 
132  XIANFA art. 28 (1982) (China). 
133  See infra Part III; see also Backer, supra note 131. 
134  The theory of the mass line is probably the strongest part of the legacy of Maoist “populism.”  It is 
now deeply implanted in CCP ideology, and it would be difficult to reject it without altering the ideology as 
a whole.  The legitimation of populism means that it has been accepted as a fundamental principle of the 
Chinese political system—that is, it has acquired an aura of “constitutionality.” James R. Townsend, 
Chinese Populism and the Legacy of Mao Tse-tung, 17 ASIAN SURVEY, 1011 (1977).  Its importance was 
reaffirmed in 2013 when China's leadership called on local officials to promote the “mass line” education 
campaign to boost development and people's livelihoods.  See Officials Urged to Promote ‘Mass line’ 
Campaign, NEWS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (July 17, 2013), 
http://english.CCP.people.com.cn/206972/206976/8329485.html (last visited March 1, 2014) (explaining 
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party to stay connected with the general public by both adequately serving 
and representing the interest of the masses.135  It forms part of the general 
program of the CCP Constitution.136  It is central to the idea of the so-called 
Party’s style of work—the integration of theory with practice, the forging of 
close links with the masses, and the practice of self-criticism.137  The CCP 
maintains its proper role by leading, advising, and pointing the way forward, 
and by ensuring that the state organs would adhere to the constitutional 
principles, which reflects the Party line for a government that best serves the 
people.138  In this respect it is useful to remember Deng Xiaoping’s remarks 
made in 1957: 
 
The Party’s leadership position is stipulated in the Constitution. 
If the Party wants to exercise good leadership, it should 
constantly overcome subjectivism, bureaucratism and 
sectarianism, accept supervision and expand democracy within 
the Party and the state.  If we do not accept supervision or work 
to expand democracy within the Party and the state, we shall 
surely cut ourselves off from the masses and make big 
mistakes.139 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
that “[m]ass line” refers to a guideline under which CCP officials and members are required to prioritize 
the interests of the people and persist in representing them and working on their behalf.”).  
135 See COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, 11TH CENTRAL COMMITTEE, GUANYU JIANGUO YILAI DANG DE 
RUOGAN LISHI WENTI DE JUEYI (关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议) [RESOLUTION ON CERTAIN HISTORICAL 
ISSUES FACING THE PARTY SINCE THE FOUNDING OF THE STATE], sec. 30, para. 2 (June 27, 1981), available 
at http://CCP.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/65374/4526448.html.  
136 Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party] 
(Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), GEN. 
PROGRAM (China) (providing that “the Party follows the mass line in its work, doing everything for the 
masses, relying on them in every task, carrying out the principle of "from the masses, to the masses," and 
translating its correct views into action by the masses of their own accord.”). 
137 Mao Zedong, On Coalition Government, Speech before the Seventh National Congress of the Party 
(Apr. 24, 1945) available at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-
3/mswv3_25.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).  This was reinforced and approved during the leadership of 
Deng Xiaoping.  See Deng Xiaoping,  Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles, Speech at a forum on the 
principles for the Party’s theoretical work (Mar. 30, 1979) available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ 
dengxp/vol2/text/b1290.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
138  Larry C. Backer, Thoughts on Emerging Trends in Chinese Constitutional Thought on the Eve of 
the 18th Party Congress, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Nov. 06, 2012), 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/thoughts-on-emerging-trends-in-chinese.html (last visited March 
6, 2014). 
139  Deng Xiaoping, The Communist Party Must Accept Supervision, Speech delivered at a meeting of 
cadres in Xi’an (Apr. 8, 1957), in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING VOL. 1 1957 available at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol1/text/a1310.html. 
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The current CCP leadership has confirmed the fundamental obligation to 
adhere to the mass line.140  This was noted by Xi Jinping, who  recently 
wrote that:  “[t]o fully utilize the Party’s advantage in connecting with the 
masses, the most important is the need to adhere to our party’s basic 
principles, thoroughly implement party’s general policies for the masses, so 
that all the works of the Party may reflect the will and interest of the 
people.” 141   Xi also described the connection between the principle of 
scientific development and the mass line:  “[w]e shall maintain and develop 
the progressiveness and pureness of the party through our work ethic and 
style.”142  Taken together, this suggests the CCP’s understanding that the 
mass line itself obligates both state apparatus and CCP to adhere to its basic 
principles, including necessarily the State Constitution, to the extent it 
applies to the rules for making and enforcing law based systems. 
It follows that through the principle of adherence to the mass line, the 
CCP is obligated to form a government for the people, which has been 
accomplished through the promulgation of a written constitution.  The 
Chinese constitution therefore reflects the official Party Line.143  The CCP is 
bound by its own party line—a fundamental tenant of the legitimacy of the 
CCP as the party in power.  As an extra-judicial form of administrative 
discipline directly against the masses, the laojiao system not only violates 
constitutional principles, but it is also contrary to the CCP’s mass line.  The 
continuing presence of the reeducation through labor system poses a major 
roadblock to the development of a CCP-led harmonious socialist society 
under the guidance of rule of law.  What may be seen from the analysis is a 
system designed in the Revolutionary Period to promote stability 
increasingly becoming a major source of instability as China continues to 
develop under CCP leadership.  The CCP’s scientific development principle 
itself suggests that when an administrative discipline system becomes a relic 
from the past, it is time for it to go. 
Because Laojiao can be understood as the civilian equivalent of the 
shuanggui (Party discipline) system, it is possible that these moves may 
portend at least some revisions to the current form or operation of the 
                                                      
140  CCP’s Mass Line Campaign Not a Short Term Movement, NEWS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF 
CHINA (July 15, 2013), http://english.CCP.people.com.cn/206972/206976/8325279.html (last visited Mar. 
1, 2014). 
141  See Xi Jinping, “Shizhong jianchi he chongfen fahui dang de hute youshi (习近平：始终坚持和充分发
挥党的独特优势) [Always uphold and fully exercise the unique advantages of the CCP] NEWS OF THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (Aug. 1, 2012), http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/0801/c83846-
18644456.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
142  Id. 
143  Backer, supra note 5, 331-408.  
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shuanggui system, and perhaps even its abolition.  What it will replace it is 
unclear. On the other hand, even though the techniques are similar, 
shuanggui serves very different purposes and is targeted to a group of people 
with substantial political obligations as members of the Party in 
Power.  Laojiao, on the other hand, targets the masses, and in that sense 
duplicates and to some extent subverts the administrative order created 
through the governmental system created through the Chinese Constitution.  
It is unnecessary.  Shuanggui deals with political, rather than administrative, 
breaches that touch on the disciplinary functions of the Party.  It is in this 
sense beyond the competence of the administrative authorities represented 
by the government apparatus.  This constitutional framework may demand 
some refinement in the shuanggui system, but not necessarily its 
elimination.  
III. SHUANGGUI: SYSTEM IN CONTEXT AND THEORIES OF LEGITIMACY 
One of the more interesting issues of Chinese state institutional 
organization is the relationship between the Communist Party and the 
state.  The previous section suggests that although the CCP does not enjoy 
an extra-constitutional role in Chinese political organization, it does exist 
autonomously from the state and its organs.144  Indeed, under the constitution 
that established them and defined their powers, state organs are understood 
to be required to accept the leadership role of the CCP.145  This is basic to the 
understanding of constitutional fidelity of state organs under the Chinese 
state constitution.146   
The leadership role of the Communist Party within the Chinese 
constitutional framework has a number of important effects for the 
construction of Chinese constitutionalism.  Many of these roles remain 
insufficiently explored.147  Of particular interest is the relationship between 
the CCP and the organizing framework of government through the State 
Constitution.  The nature of the CCP’s autonomy within that structure, or the 
extent to which that autonomy is connected at all with the framework 
                                                      
144  See generally, id.  
145  XIANFA preamble, art. 1 (1982) (China). Central to this argument is the notion of people’s 
democratic dictatorship ensconced within the Chinese constitutional order in Article 1. 
146 Larry C. Backer, A Constitutional Court for China within the Chinese Communist Party: Scientific 
Development and the Institutional Role of the CCP, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 593 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1308598. 
147 Cf. Zhu Suli, Political Parties in China’s Judiciary, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L LAW 533 (2007); 
see generally, The essays of Tong Zhiwei, in LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY, available at 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot. com/2012/02/zhiwei-tong-on-criminal-law-and-justice.html (last visited Mar. 
1, 2014). 
280 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 2 
 
developed through the State Constitution, remains an object of study with 
substantial importance to an understanding of the division of political and 
administrative authority within the State.148  
One of the lesser known of these issues grounded in the role of the 
CCP within the Chinese constitutional system, particularly because it has 
few analogues and therefore little resonance in the West, is the institutional 
power of the CCP to discipline its members.  CCP discipline is something 
quite different from the sort of intra-group discipline of Western political 
parties or (outside of Islam perhaps) the disciplining of members within 
religious communities.149  Because  CCP members wield substantial political 
power as members of the political organ that retains the authority to set and 
protect the political framework within which the state government operates, 
member discipline becomes an intensely political issue.  It is bound up in the 
primary requirement of the Party to lead by example,150 and it affects the 
legitimacy of the institution of the Party to preserve its leadership role within 
the Chinese constitutional system.  But because CCP members also serve as 
officials within the state apparatus, CCP discipline has a significant 
connection to the operation of the government.  That connection may bring 
the institutions of the state and law into play, especially in the context of 
disciplinary investigations that are grounded on what are shown to be 
violations of national law.  But if the process and protections afforded 
individuals in state prosecution and CCP discipline are distinct, how are 
these two important mechanics of legitimating actions—one focused on the 
integrity of the CCP in its leadership role, the other focused on the 
government in its administrative role—to be harmonized? 
This section starts with a description of shuanggui in its institutional 
context.  The object is to give the reader a general overview of shuanggui:  
                                                      
148 See generally, Backer, supra note 5.  
149 The literature on political party discipline in the U.S. and Europe is voluminous.  See, e.g., Jon X. 
Eguia, Voting Blocs, Party Discipline and Party Formation, 73 GAMES AND ECON. BEHAVIOR 111-135 
(2011); William B. Heller & Carol Mershon, Dealing in Discipline: Party Switching and Legislative Voting 
in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000, 52 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 910 (2008); Joseph M. Colomer, 
Policy Making in Divided Government: A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline, 125 PUB. CHOICE  
247 (2005);  GARY COX & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN (1993); Krehbiel, Keith, 
Where’s the Party?, 23 BRIT. J. OF POL. SCI. 235 (1993). 
150 One example is the report on Xi Jinping’s 2013 speech during a CCP Central Committee meeting.  
See Duizhao jiancha zhongyang baxiang guiding luoshi qingkuang taolun yanjiu shenhua gaige zuofeng 
jucuo (对照检查中央八项规定落实情况讨论研究深化改进作风举措) [Review and inspect the implementation of the 
eight new provisions of the Central Committee and discuss research initiatives to deepen improve the 
governance style],  PEOPLE’S DAILY (June 26, 2013), available at http://politics.people.com.cn 
/n/2013/0626/c1024-21971250.html; see also Russell Leigh Moses, Xi Jinping’s Rare Scolding of Top 
Party Leaders, CHINA REAL TIME (June 26, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/06/26/xi-
jinpings-rare-scolding-of-top-party-leaders/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
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what is shuanggui, how it was created, who enforces it, the procedural 
framework of shuanggui investigations, and the manner in which cases can 
be transferred between different government organs and party discipline 
inspection organ.  It then turns to the issue of shuanggui and its legitimacy 
issue, considering the state of the literature about the practice.  The question 
of its application, specifically of the failures of local officials to adhere to 
the official rules and the implications of that failure, are taken up later.151 
A. The Shuanggui System 
What, precisely, is shuanggui?  To answer that question it is important 
first to distill its operation in theory and as it is elaborated in official 
sources.152  In general, shuanggui is commonly understood to refer to a 
specific procedure for cadre discipline under regulations adopted by the 
CCP.153  It is commonly seen as a measure that was first used in its current 
form in Liang Xiangyin’s embezzlement investigation in 1989.154  At that 
time, due to Liang’s position as governor of Hainan province, a special 
investigation group was established by the Central Commission of 
Discipline Investigation (“CCDI”) and the Ministry of Supervision of the 
People’s Republic of China (“MOS”).155  The investigation did not proceed 
smoothly because one key witness refused to release any useful information 
and her confinement was about to expire.156  It was obvious that in order to 
avoid any potential liabilities, the key witness planned to collude with the 
suspect to make identical confessions and ruin the investigation.  At that 
                                                      
151  See infra Part V. 
152  These official sources represent the distillation of investigations conducted by my research 
assistant Gao Shan.  To make the analysis more realistic, sources consulted are those routinely available to 
the common Chinese citizen.  The object is to “see” shuanggui from within the legal-constitutional 
perspective of Chinese constitutionalism, rather than from the perspective of a privileged official or an 
outside researcher.  
153  See Zhongguo gongchandang jilü jiancha jiguan anjian jiancha gongzuo tiaoli (中国共产党纪律检查
机关案件检查工作条例) [Investigation Regulations for the Discipline Inspection Organ of the Communist 
Party of China] (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party 
of China, Mar. 25, 1994) [hereinafter Investigation Regulations], translation by Keren Wang, 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited March 
6, 2014).  “Shuanggui” can be roughly translated as “double-designated,” which refers to Article 28, 
section 3 of the Regulations of CCP on Discipline Regulations that provides CCP disciplinary organs the 
right to detain cadres suspected of party rule violations by demanding “relevant individuals appear at a 
designated time and place to provide explanations regarding all aspects of the case.”  Id. at art. 28.   
154 Flora Sapio, Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China, 22 CHINA INFORMATION 7, 7-37 (Feb. 
19, 2008), (describing the history of detentions of officials in historical context and linking the practice, at 
least as to form, with those going back to prior regimes), available at 
http://cin.sagepub.com/content/22/1/7. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
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point, the minister of MOS, Wei Jianxing, instructed the investigation group 
to detain the key witness until the necessary information was obtained.157  
Later in an internal meeting of MOS, this procedure was 
institutionalized as the “designated duration and designated place” rule.158  
During the 1990s, the rules of the CCP on disciplinary regulations 
incorporated this rule, which began to be understood in the popular mind as 
“shuanggui.”159  The term itself is a “contraction of the two ‘specifics’ as 
spelled out in the Rules on Investigation.”160   Shuanggui as a detention 
procedure is contrasted with the similar procedures of liangzhi (两指 ).  
Shuanggui only applies to the CCP member. 161  For non-CCP members who 
work for governments or state owned enterprises and violate administrative 
disciplines, the rule of liangzhi will apply.162  Shuanggui was based on the 
CCP’s internal disciplinary regulations.163  Liangzhi is authorized through 
the PRC Law on Administrative Supervision and approved by the NPC.164  
MOS enforces this rule and the law of administration and supervision.165  
Thus, in theory, the rule of shuanggui is more like an internal auditing rule 
of a corporation, and liangzhi is a public rule that applies to the whole 
society.  Although shuanggui and liangzhi are different systems based on 
different authorities, in the real world their boundaries are very vague.166  
The reason for the ambiguity arises from the fact that in practice, 
MOS and CCDI are actually administrated by the same group of people 
                                                      
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 10-11. 
159 Id. at 11-12. 
160 Id. at 11. 
161 Id. at 15. 
162  Article 20, Section 3 of the Law on Administrative Supervision provides: “[i]n investigating 
violations of the rules of administrative discipline, a supervisory organ may adopt the following measures 
in light of actual conditions and needs: . . . (3) to order the persons suspected of violating the rules of 
administrative discipline to explain and clarify questions relevant to the matters under investigation at a 
designated time and place; however, no such persons may be taken into custody or detained in disguised 
form.”  This “designed time and place” is what people called liangzhi.  Thus, for officials who are party 
members, they subjected to the rule of Shuanggui; for all officials irrespective of their party membership, 
they may subject to the rule of liangzhi.  See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng jianchafa (中华人民共
和国行政监察法) [People’s Republic of China Law on Administrative Supervision] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 9, 1997) (China). 
163  See Backer, supra note 153. 
164  See Sapio, supra note 154.   
165  Id. 
166  Ye Zhusheng, Shuanggui: Between Discipline and the Law, SOUTH REVIEWS (June 10, 2013) 
reprinted in Corruption, Shuanggui and Rule of Law, DIU HUA HUM. RTS. J. (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2013/06/corruption-shuanggui-and-rule-of-law.html (last visited Mar. 6, 
2014) (noting that “[i]n 1993, the Central Commission on Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the Ministry of 
Supervision came to operate under one roof, so that in practice it is generally difficult to distinguish 
between shuanggui and liangzhi.”). 
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under two different titles. 167   Moreover, the institutions also share 
administrative and support functions; they share even the same website 
portal.168  The merged administration is no accident.  On February 17, 1994, 
the CCP’s Central Committee and the State of Council agreed to the merger 
of MOS and CCDI with a sharing of functions.169  MOS remains an organ of 
and under the control of the State of Council, and CCDI remains an organ of 
and under the control of the CCP’s Central Committee. 170   Thus, for 
example, MOS’s minister at each level served as the deputy secretary of 
CCDI.171   But effectively they operate together as a single unit, though 
formally distinct, with the CCDI taking the lead in most cases.172  
This connection has grown since 2012.  In September 2013, the new 
anti-corruption web site was unveiled,173 effectively merging the operations 
of CCDI and MOS.  The website for CCDI and MOS has included 
procedures for popular complaints against official corruption, whether by 
Party cadres or officials.  There are four ways of reporting or filing a case:   
personally visit the headquarters; write letters to report a case; make a phone 
call; or report a case on the website.174 
Because most of the government officials are also CCP members, this 
arrangement might well be considered reasonable and practical.175  But the 
result also substantially increased the jurisdictional reach of both organs.  As 
                                                      
167  Id. 
168  See, e.g., The Emerging Forms of Chinese Anti-Corruption Institutions, LAW AT THE END OF THE 
DAY (Oct. 10, 2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/10/the-emerging-forms-of-chinese-anti.html 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
169  On its website, CCDI has a detailed description on the development of MOS and CCDIC, see 
Lishi Yange ( 历 史 沿 革 ) [Historical Background], CCDI.ORG (last updated Aug. 8, 2013), 
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/lsyg/201308/t20130826_9195.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
170  Id. 
171  See Zhou Yu, Quanli Zhiyue De Zhongguo Yujing (权力制约的中国语境) [Power Restriction in the 
Chinese Context], in JINAN: SHANDONG PEOPLE’S PRESS 151 (2007).  
172  See Ye Zhusheng, supra note 166.  The article notes that “[i]n 1998, the CCDI and Ministry of 
Supervision issued the Notice on Several Questions Regarding the Use of Liangzhi and Shuanggui 
Measures by Discipline Inspection and Supervision Organs, which stipulated that shuanggui facilities could 
neither be set up in offices of judicial organs, places of detention, or facilities for custody and 
repatriation . . . nor could dedicated liangzhi or shuanggui facilities be built.”  Id. 
173  Wang Qishan, Zhongyangjiwei Jianchabu Wangzhan Zhengshi Kaitong Wang Qishan Zhao 
Hongzhu Dao Wangzhan Daoyan (中央纪委监察部网站正式开通 王岐山赵洪祝到网站调研) [Wang Qishan and 
Zhao Hongzhu Inspect the Newly Opened Webiste of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and 
Ministry of Supervision] CNTV (Sept. 2, 2013), http://news.cntv.cn/2013/09/02/ARTI1378088781220166 
.shtml (last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
174 Larry C. Backer, The Emerging Forms of Chinese Anti-Corruption Institutions, LAW AT THE END 
OF THE DAY (Oct. 10, 2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/10/the-emerging-forms-of-chinese-
anti.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
175  Id.  This is evidenced in practical terms, including the merging of reporting to both Party and State 
policing agencies on the same website.  See id. 
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a result of the merger, party members are subject to CCDI’s investigation 
when they violate either the party or administrative disciplines.176  Thus, 
when one considers shuanggui, one must understand that at times it refers 
not merely to the investigation of CCP offenses, but also of violations of 
duty imposed on the Party member in his or her administrative role.177  
Shuanggui might be viewed as an efficient way against officers’ 
violation of discipline, especially relating to official corruption.178  But it can 
also be viewed as an appropriate means of disciplining individuals with 
heightened political authority.179  This is true despite notions that the system 
as effectuated may impact its legitimacy under the Chinese constitutional 
system.180  Government officers are said to be afraid of shuanggui because 
of the application of two of its principal characteristics.  First, shuanggui is a 
serious investigation that is conducted in a very secret way.181  Second, there 
is a sense that the methods of interrogation can be effective and dangerous to 
the health and safety of the subjects under investigation.182 
CCDI agents are responsible for receiving complaints, filing cases, 
conducting investigations, and making punishment decisions.183  Each agent 
                                                      
176  Id. 
177  On the merger of function and jurisdiction, see infra Part V. 
178  Policing the Party, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21561895 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014).   
179 See Official Fear: Inside a Shuanggui Investigation Facility, DIU HUA HUM. RTS. J. (July 5, 2011), 
http://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2011/07/official-fear-inside-shuanggui.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) 
(Noting that there are “[t]wo reasons likely contribute to such support.  First, shuanggui detainees are 
commonly accused of unpopular acts of corruption and graft. Second, shuanggui is almost exclusively used 
against Party members, who are part of an elevated socioeconomic group that comprises only 6 percent of 
Chinese citizens.”) 
180  See Ye Zhusheng, supra note 166.  Ye writes that “[t]here are mainly two occasions when this 
word comes into public view.  The first is when relevant authorities announce that some official is 
‘suspected of a serious breach of discipline and undergoing investigation by the [party] 
organization.’ . . . . The second is whenever an official under shuanggui dies for whatever reason and the 
official’s relatives, scholars, and lawyers raise all sorts of questions, but the public’s attitude ranges 
somewhere between “he got what he deserved” to “complete disregard.”  Id.  
181  Andrew Jacobs, What do the Rukers of China Fear? ‘Shuanggui,’ HERALD TRIBUNE (June 15, 
2012), http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20120615/ARCHIVES/206151023 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
182  Referring to a story published in South Review, a magazine based in Guangzhou, China, a 
Western reporter wrote: “[l]ittle is known of how investigators go about extracting the confessions which 
frequently emerge. Suicides and mysterious deaths while under shuanggui are not uncommon. Former 
detainees report being subjected to simulated drowning, beatings, and cigarette burns. In recent months, 
several cases of extreme brutality under shuanggui have appeared in the public domain.” Natalie Thomas, 
How the Communist Party Weeds Out Its Delinquents, THE ATLANTIC (June 21, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/how-the-communist-party-weeds-out-its 
delinquents/277116/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014)  (discussing the cases of Yu Qiyi and Jia Jiuxiang).  
183 Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of 
the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), translation by Keren Wang, 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited Mar. 6, 
2014).   
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functions effectively like a combination of a police officer and a prosecutor.  
As the principal organ for the operation of the CCP’s internal anti-corruption 
mechanism, CCDI works under the Party Central Committee.184 The local 
discipline inspection commission works under the dual leadership of the 
CCP committees at the same level and discipline inspection commissions at 
the next higher level. 185  The term of office of discipline inspection 
commissions is the same as that of the Party committees.186  In practice, the 
secretary of CCDI also serves as the member of CCP’s standing committee 
at the same level.187    
At the CCP’s top level, since the re-establishment of the CCDI, four 
out of five secretaries of CCDI have also served as a politburo members of 
the CCP.188  The formal location of the CCDI within the CCP organization 
structure indicates its importance within the highest level of the CCP 
organization.189  At the provincial level, the organization might look like 
this:190 
                                                      
184  For detailed explanation on the structure of CCDIC and Party Committee, see “Lianggui” De 
Youlai (“两规”的由来) [The Origin of the “Lianggui”], QIUZHI (求知) [SEEK KNOWLEDGE] 1, 42 (2004), 
available at http://www.cqvip.com/QK/81994X/200401/9087094.html; for a detailed chart illustrating the 
organization structure, see Organization Chart of the 18th CCP Central Leadership, PEOPLE’S DAILY 
ONLINE, http://english.CCP.people.com.cn/206972/207121/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
185  See Joseph Fewsmith, Promoting the Scientific Development Concept, 11 CHINA LEADERSHIP 
MONITOR 1, 5 (2004), available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-
monitor/article/6226.  Joseph Fewsmith believed this arrangement, started since the beginning of Hu’s 
presidency designed to improve the authority of CCDI, is, in his opinion, not working well.   
186  Backer, supra note 28. 
187  Id.  
188  See Lianggui De Youlai, supra note 184.    
 
189 Id.  
190 Id.  Chart prepared by Gao Shan for this article. 
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General office 
 
[in charge of the 
general 
administration of 
the department] 
Legislation office Responsible for research and outreach, explanation of 
CDI policy 
Education office Educate party members and officials against the violation 
of discipline and evils of corruption 
Party’s integrity 
office 
Responsibility for the conduct of local CCP meetings and 
study groups focused on the discipline system 
Prevention office Incorporated with the branches of MOS and worked 
together against misconduct in the workplace.  
Operation office 1, 
2, and 3 
Investigation of CCP member in state owned enterprises 
and other organizations 
Archive  Records keeping function 
Reception Office Receive the complaints from the public  
Organization 
office 
Human resources functions at the local level for CDI 
Reviewing Office Charged with the review of investigations and 
examinations of those under suspicion  
 Enforcement 
Office 
Responsible for the conduct of investigations throughout 
the district   
General Inspection 
Office 
In charge of general inspection tasks and responsible for 
the election of the district’s special inspector 
 
The place of shuanggui within the Chinese legal system, and the 
political and constitutional implications of its character as extra-legal, 
provides a base from which one can consider the relationship between law, 
legal process, the state, and the Party apparatus, under the umbrella of the 
Chinese constitutional system.  If, indeed, shuanggui exists outside the law, 
then its legitimacy and methods are subject to question within the framework 
of the law system developed through the NPC system, which Western and 
some internal criticism consider important for the legitimacy of the system.   
But is it possible to consider shuanggui as within the legal system, 
even if beyond the reach of the legal process and rule systems derived from 
actions of the NPC and the state constitution? More precisely, if lawfulness 
can derive from sources outside or beyond the State Constitution, might 
those serve as a basis for understanding the normative framework within 
which shuanggui can exist within the structure of Chinese constitutionalism? 
The source of constitutional authority, and its democratic institutionalization, 
might be found within the constitution of the CCP itself.  Reliance on the 
CCP Constitution would also have to rest on the idea that the CCP 
Constitution itself forms a part of the constitutional structure of China.  If 
that is the case, then shuanggui cannot be understood without an 
understanding of the construction of Chinese constitutionalism.  That is, an 
understanding of the relationship between State and Party Constitution in the 
formation of the Chinese constitutional system—not grounded in a single 
document constituting a state apparatus, but instead based on a dual set of 
constituting actions.  One action is directed to the formation of the state 
apparatus while the other is directed to the constitution of the political 
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superstructure of the nation.  Within this context, the debate about shuanggui 
and its application can take on a substantially distinct character.   
B. Shuanggui and the Legitimacy Issue 
The issue of shuanggui raises a number of legal issues that touch on 
the relationship between government, CCP, and the organizing 
methodologies of sovereign power (through a constitution or otherwise).  
The context in which these issues currently arise tends to be corruption 
among CCP cadres and the way it may be dealt with legitimately within their 
Chinese constitutional order.191  But by its very nature, shuanggui poses a 
question about that constitutional order—shuanggui may be necessary, but 
its techniques and the authority under which it is implemented appear 
nowhere in the instruments that define state power, and only in those that 
constrain the powers of the CCP.  To what extent does that framework render 
shuanggui illegitimate or non-constitutional?  Does the fact that shuanggui 
exists outside the parameters and constraints of the State Constitution mean 
that shuanggui is extra-constitutional and therefor illegitimate, or does it 
suggest that the State Constitution does not entirely contain the Chinese 
constitutional instruments?  This section considers the state of the academic, 
and to some extent popular, debate on these issues.  It starts with a brief 
analysis of the Western approach and then considers the more nuanced 
Chinese debates.  
 
1.  Western Theories of Shuanggui Legitimacy 
 
 For Westerners, the legitimacy of the mechanics of Party discipline, 
like the role of the CCP itself, is difficult to properly understand for lack of 
legitimating institutional analogies from which to draw.  The actual process 
of discipline is not analogous to the process systems that are at the heart of 
Western practice.  A typical exchange, reflecting the distinct perceptions of 
Chinese officials and Western media, is reflected in the contrast between 
Western reports of shuanggui investigations and CCP responses to those 
                                                      
191 Since 2004, there have been long discussions about the legitimacy of shuanggui in relation to 
Constitutional Order among Chinese academics.  Views are varied, but the majority expressed their 
concerns on the constitutionality of Shuanggui.  See Wang Jingui, “Shuanggui” Yu Zishou: Hefaxing Wenti 
Yanjiu (“双规”与自首:合宪性问题研究) [Study on the Constitutionality Problems of “Shuanggui” and 
Confession], 8 LEGAL SCIENCE MONTHLY 60, 62 (2005); See also Yu Zhong, Lun ‘Shuanggui” Zai Woguo 
Quanli Jiandu Tizhi Zhong De Diwei (论“双规”在我国权力监督体制中的地位) [On “Shuanggui” in the 
Power Supervision System in China], 6 J. OF SOCIALIST THEORY GUIDE 19 (2006). 
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reports.  A Financial Times story from a few years ago well illustrates the 
Western approach in the popular press.192  Mitchell writes:  
 
Like so many cadres before him, Mr. Xu disappeared into the 
jaws of the Chinese Communist party’s disciplinary inspection 
commission. . . . In theory, officials caught up in this extra-
judicial twilight zone are merely making themselves available 
to party investigators and can be released later without stain.  In 
reality, the commission’s targets are routinely handed over to 
government prosecutors months or even years later, all but gift-
wrapped for summary show trials and sentencing.193 
Mitchell described another shuanggui proceeding in similar terms: 
 
In a more famous example of shuanggui in action, in 2003 the 
head of Bank of China’s Hong Kong subsidiary disappeared for 
two years before resurfacing in a courtroom in Changchun, a 
city in the country’s far north-east.  There he was convicted for 
a corruption spree that had allegedly begun nine years earlier in 
Shanghai.  When it comes to “renditioning” suspects from one 
jurisdiction to another, the disciplinary inspection commission 
appears to be as accomplished as the CIA.194 
 
The CCP refused to make any substantive comment other than a 
confirmation that the shuanggui system was invoked, a typical response to 
media stories about shuanggui,. 195   
 On the one hand,  there is a suspicion of arbitrariness and abuse 
through the application of a procedure that usurps the role of the State and 
the application of law in the prosecution of criminal offenses, by labeling 
them offenses against Party discipline.196  On the other hand, there is a 
suspicion of political criticism directed at the leadership role of the CCP 
                                                      
192 Tom Mitchell, The Case of the Chinese Mayor who Wasn’t There, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 12, 
2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/220818fa-8765-11de-9280-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qyQktiMl. (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
193 Id.   
194 Id. 
195 Id. For a typical official response to media inquiries about shuanggui, see  Xiao Qiang, CCP 
Official Explains “Double Designations,” PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Sept. 26, 2006), 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200609/26/eng20060926_306561.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).  The 
CCP official discussed simply responded that shuanggui “means Party members are requested to attend 
questioning sessions at a designated place and for a designated duration.” 
196  Policing the Party, supra note 178.  
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directed to its internal and process driven methods of internal Party 
discipline, which is separate from the criminal prosecution role of the state.  
At the heart of these differing perceptions is the problem of 
corruption. 197   Corruption can be understood as both a political and a 
criminal act.  The difficulty for the West is the inability to separate the 
political from the criminal element inherent in corruption.198  This is inherent 
in Western constitutional separation of powers notions in which political and 
governmental power are also conflated within a state apparatus.  But where 
political and administrative power is separated, as it is formally developed in 
China, it is possible to view corruption by individuals with political 
authority (within the CCP) as distinct from the financial corruption of abuse 
of office within the administrative apparatus of the state.  Consequently, it is 
difficult for Westerners to comprehend a disciplinary organization that treats 
the political (breaches of CCP discipline and threat to the political order and 
its aspirations) and criminal elements (perversion of administrative system 
for personal gain) of corruption through distinct institutional organs.  It 
sometimes follows that the West tends to applaud Chinese anti-corruption 
efforts,199 but to criticize those efforts that are not undertaken through an 
institutional model, grounded in criminal regulation, which is central to 
Western notions of appropriate divisions of functions in the organization of 
government and the assertion of political power.200   
That difficulty explains the contradiction in Western popular press 
coverage of shuanggui.  The contradiction is made more difficult because of 
the popular support in China for anti-corruption efforts in any form.201  The 
illegitimacy issue, then, arises from a Western unwillingness to concede the 
                                                      
197  See generally Yunhai Wang, Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy in Today’s China, 33 
HITOTSUBASHI J. OF L. AND POL. 1, 1-5 (2005); Gillian Wong, China Drops Death Penalty for some 
Economic Crimes, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022500889.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
198  In effect, by defining corruption as the use of public power for private gain, modern approaches to 
corruption tends to conflate both political action and criminality.  Thus for example, the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption “introduces a comprehensive set of standards, measures and rules that all 
countries can apply in order to strengthen their legal and regulatory regimes to fight corruption. It calls for 
preventive measures and the criminalization of the most prevalent forms of corruption in both public and 
private sectors.”  Kofi A. Annan, Forward in United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 
55/61, U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/ 
UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
199 See, e.g., Celia Hatton, How Real is China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign, BBC NEWS (Sept. 4, 
2013) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-23945616 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
200 Sometimes the issue is posed as a cultural one.  See Lilja Zhang, Op-Ed., Author: In China, 
‘Everyone is Guilty of Corruption,’ CNN (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/23/opinion/china-
corrution-lijia-zhang/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
201  Policing the Party, supra note 178. 
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possibility of the division of power between an administrative structure and 
a political structure, each operated under its own system, but bound together 
by a common ideological framework.202  Thus, while the Western press tends 
to find the methodologies of shuanggui unsettling, at the same time, the 
Western press appears to favor stories that confirm the vigor of CCP 
responses to corruption and its extirpation.203   
The Western press pays less attention to the processes or systems used 
to effectuate these anti-corruption campaigns unless it touches on other, 
politically sensitive matters, usually centered on the legitimacy of the 
Chinese State-Party system.204  For example, the Washington Post reported 
the following: 
 
“The big obstacle, I think, is corruption.  Because there still is a 
very strong sense that corrupt officials must die among the 
Chinese population at large,” said Joshua Rosenzweig, research 
manager for the U.S.-based human rights group Dui Hua 
Foundation.  “The revulsion for that offense is so strong that 
there would be a potential political cost to eliminating the death 
penalty for corruption.”205   
 
Shuanggui, then, brings into stark focus the connection between Party 
discipline, criminality, corruption and the legitimacy of the organization of 
the state.  
For all the interest of the institution of shuanggui in the Western 
popular media, there are few studies of the practice in the West.  Among the 
best was a piece published by Flora Sapio first as an article206 and then in a 
monograph.207  Professor Sapio ultimately argues that:  
 
                                                      
202 See Backer, supra note 21. 
203  See, e.g., Jaime A. FlorCruz, Chinese Communists, 90 Years Later, Still Fighting Corruption, 
CNN (June 25, 2011), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/06/25/china.corruption/index.html 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (reporting the 2011 CCP anti-corruption campaign largely in a positive light). 
204 Gillian Wong, China Drops Death Penalty for some Economic Crimes, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022500889.html (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
205 Id. 
206 See Sapio, supra note 154.  Professor Sapio cites only two studies of the practice undertaken in the 
West.  Id. at 26, n.3.  See Graham Young, Control and Style: Discipline Inspection Commissions since the 
11th Congress,” 97 THE CHINA Q. 24 (1984); Chang I-Huai, An Analysis of the CCP’s Role in Mainland 
China’s State Supervisory Systems, 34 ISSUES & STUDIES 38–78 (1998). 
207 FLORA SAPIO, SOVEREIGN POWER AND THE LAW IN CHINA (2010).   
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Shuanggui is nothing new:  it is just solitary confinement under 
a different name. Therefore it could be labeled as a 
“neotraditional” practice the regime is unable to suppress.  
Coupled with other factors, shuanggui could eventually cause 
the regime to collapse. . . . The standardization of Party norms 
on detention has not changed the nature of shuanggui, which 
remains a form of extralegal detention and should therefore be 
abolished.208   
 
She remains critical, suggesting that shuanggui detainees do not enjoy any 
of the protections offered defendants under the State Constitution and may 
therefore be more vulnerable to human rights abuses.209 
Sapio has argued that the Chinese Party apparatus itself has taken the 
position that shuanggui exists outside the law and requires justification 
through an appeal to exceptional circumstances.210  This position mirrors 
those of Chinese scholars who have argued for the legitimacy of shuanggui 
by necessity. 211  Furthermore, Sapio notes that: 
 
The CCDI has openly stated that shuanggui is an extra legal 
measure.  The official position on this measure has never denied 
the existence of serious legislative conflicts between regulations 
on shuanggui and the Constitution of the CCP, the Constitution 
of the PRC, the Criminal Procedure Law, and the Law on 
Legislation.212   
 
Citing Professor Han and Professor Tang, Professor Sapio characterizes the 
principal argument justifying shuanggui as relating “to the presence of 
extraordinary circumstances, as officials’ power to obstruct investigation, the 
launch of anti-corruption campaigns, and the difficulty that complex forms 
of corruption pose to investigations.”213  As a consequence, there appears to 
be a space beyond law within which certain activities of state and Party 
organs may function.214 
                                                      
208 See Sapio, supra note 154 at 24-25.  
209  Kaiman, supra note 29.  
210 Sapio, supra note 154 at 23. 
211 SAPIO, supra note 207, at 96. 
212 Id.  
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 20-26 (distinguishing between law and sovereign power). 
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Prominent Western scholars of China also have noted the potential 
tensions in a system in which the Communist Party invokes a rule system 
not derived specifically from or managed through the laws enacted under the 
umbrella of the State Constitution and its NPC legislative structure:  
Shuanggui poses a challenge to our understanding of the 
Chinese legal system.  It is frankly admitted by just about 
everyone involved to be unlawful—in the Chinese system, all 
forms of detention must be authorized by law passed by the 
National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee, and 
shuanggui has no such authorization.  Yet it is open—the 
existence of the system itself is not a state secret—and 
pervasive.  Thus, it cannot be dismissed as a mere aberration; a 
proper understanding of the system has to account for 
shuanggui as a constitutive element, not a mistake.215 
These criticisms should not be dismissed, but rather, as attempted below, 
they may be reframed and thus better understood within the Chinese 
constitutional context.  From that context, arguments for reform of the sort 
noted by these scholars might be strengthened.  
 
2.  Chinese Theories of Shuanggui Legitimacy 
  
 Within China, there is “[o]pposition and struggle between ideas.”216  
This arises because shuanggui has been viewed as an important method of 
disciplining corruption, but there is also substantial criticism when the 
method itself appears arbitrary or excessive. 217  Chinese scholarship on 
shuanggui might be usefully grouped into three categories.  The first include 
those who defend shuanggui on acquiescence and utilitarian theories.  The 
second include those scholars who might be understood as shuanggui 
reformers.  The last include scholars who consider the constitutional 
dimensions of shuanggui directly.  Each is discussed briefly in turn.   
                                                      
215 Donald Clarke, Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China, CHINA LAW PROF. BLOG (Mar. 1, 
2008), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2008/03/shuanggui-and-e.html (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2014).  
216 MAO ZEDONG, ON CONTRADICTION (1937), reprinted in SELECTED READINGS FROM THE WORKS 
OF MAO TSETUNG 85, 93 (1971) (explaining that “[o]pposition and struggle between ideas of different 
kinds constantly occur within the Party; this is a reflection within the Party of contradictions between 
classes and between the new and the old in society.  If there were no contradiction in the Party and no 
ideological struggles to resolve them, the Party’s life would come to an end.”) . 
217 See, Ye Zhusheng, supra note 166 (noting that shuanggui can be deployed not only an anti-
corruption weapon, but also as a tool for political infighting). 
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 The majority of the scholarly work considered below takes a neutral 
approach, which has produced a number of distinctive analytical approaches.  
Most concede the efficacy of shuanggui and avoid constitutional issues, 
suggesting a constitutional approach similar to the Western notion of 
legitimacy through acquiescence.218  Among these variations, an important 
line of thought suggests that shuanggui is a special measure necessitated 
under the current realities of the Chinese political situation.  These scholars 
look to the effectiveness of the process or its utility.  The justification of 
shuanggui is grounded on a variety of functional grounds, for example, 
history, the characteristics of the CCP, the less developed state of the legal 
system, and the reality of corruption.  
The historical justification of shuanggui is, at its base, comparative in 
nature.219  This combines elements of constitutional necessity and appeals to 
the sui generis nature of the Chinese constitutional project.220  Some scholars 
analyze the history background of the CCP’s birth and make a comparison 
between China, Russia, and Western countries.221  They start with the insight 
that the CCP is not organized like Western political parties.  As a 
revolutionary party, both the powers and functions of the CCP must be 
understood as different from those of Western political parties.  In Western 
countries, the political party’s main activity is election.  As a revolutionary 
party, the CCP faces a different struggle that justifies harsher measures, 
especially against internal opponents.  Those harsher measures have been 
institutionalized as shuanggui as the CCP evolved from revolutionary to 
administrative roles.222   
                                                      
218 The role of acquiescence and tradition in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence is venerable.  See Larry 
C. Backer, Elements of Law 3.0 Notes and Readings IV-E (The Role of the Courts: Constitutional 
Interpretation; A Special Case?), LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Nov. 24, 2013),  
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/elements-of-law-30-notes-and-readings.html (last visited Mar. 6, 
2014) (discussing McColloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)). 
219  Yang Tao, “Shuanggui” Bianqian De Sikao (“双规”变迁的思考)[Examining the Transformation 
of “Shuanggui”], 6 DEMOCRACY & SOCIETY 15, 15-17 (2006), available at http://www.cqvip.com/QK/ 
82838X/200606/23577874.html. 
220 Id. at 15. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 16. In shuanggui, under the view of CCP’s transformation from Revolutionary Party to 
Administration Party, Yang Tao states that “considering the history background of China at the time when 
the CCP was built, similar to the situation of CPSU, CCP needed a violent revolution to win the battle. This 
means, CCP had to possess the power of depriving its member’s right to life and liberty by the party 
discipline.  Although, shuanggui could be traced to practices that predated the rise of the CCP to a 
leadership position, it has been part of the architecture of the CCP since its founding.  That pedigree is its 
claim to legitimacy.”  Id. 
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Another school accepts shuanggui as a temporary aberration.223  It 
suggests that as time goes by, as a result of the development of the society 
and the CCP itself, shuanggui may be optimized or even replaced in the 
future.  The “special measures” justification is also grounded in a 
comparative approach.  Its advocates argue that unlike Western political 
parties, which are only in charge of the government operations, the CCP has 
an absolute power over the whole of society and the nation.224  Using harsh 
internal discipline is necessary in maintaining the party’s polices and 
limiting the abuse of power.225  Other scholars in this camp argue that due to 
the special arrangement of power allocation in China, the CCP needs to 
assert a crude process of internal discipline.226  Moreover, China’s current 
special political arrangement determines the fact that the prosecution only 
amount to a small portion of the accountability of the state power.  In most 
cases, enforcement is achieved through other measurements, such as 
shuanggui.227  
A group of Chinese scholars justify shuanggui on the basis of the less-
developed state of the Chinese legal system and tend to argue that the lack of 
appropriate legislation and the less developed state of the legal system 
render special measures like shuanggui both popular and necessary.228  Zhu 
Weijiu, consultant of the State Council, nicely illustrates this perspective.229  
She suggests:  
 
In countries where the legal system is less developed, the 
supervision of the state power is normally informal.  The legal 
                                                      
223 Liu Heng, Discussion on the Justification of Shuanggui on the Reality Ground, 5 ACAD. J. OF 
SHANXI PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE PARTY SCH. OF C.P.C 33, 33-34 (2006). 
224 Id.; cf. XIANFA preamble (1982) (China) (stating that “[t]he system of multi-party cooperation and 
political consultation led by the Communist Party of China will exist and develop in China for a long time 
to come”). 
225 Liu Heng, supra note 223. 
226 Wang Yixing, Zhongguo Gongchandang Dangnei Zeren Yanjiu (中国共产党党内问责制研究) 
[Researches on CCP’s Internal Accountability System], CNKI.NET (May 2005), 
http://lib.cnki.net/cdmd/80000-2009116952.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (noting that “[i]n western 
countries the governing power is at the hand of the party’s core member, who works in the framework of 
the government structure.  However, unlike the western party, CCP’s non-core members possess enormous 
power after CCP assumed a leadership role in governing China. Because such power projects absolute 
influence on the government’s administration, CCP needs stronger internal discipline to regulate party 
member in the current government structure.”). 
227 Id. 
228 Yang Tao, supra note 219. 
229 See Zhu Weijui, Zhuanbian Fazhi Guannian Tuijin Yifa Xingzheng (转变法治观念 推进依法行政) 
[Transform the Rule of Law Concept and Push Forward Governance According to Law], THE 
REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE KUOMINTANG (Oct., 10 2008), 
http://www.minge.gov.cn/minge/txt/2008-10/10/content_2511995.htm  (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
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liability is always replaced by other liabilities.  Such as in 
China, the CCP’s discipline fills in the vacancy of the 
insufficient public law regulations.230   
 
They point out that during the social transformation from command 
economy to market economy, the society was in lack of law, and the judicial 
department was in lack of technique or experience to defeat corruption.231  
Under such reality, CCP authorities needed access to measures like 
shuanggui.232   
Lastly, some scholars elaborate variations of a “transformation 
theory,” combining elements of arguments from the other justificatory 
schools. 233   The arguments are also grounded on the basic premise that 
shuanggui is a special measure.  Scholars who advance the “transformation 
theory” parallel the arguments of constitutional necessity made in defense of 
laojiao.  First, they argue that shuanggui was a reasonable reaction to harsh 
historical and institutional realities.234  They also argue that regardless of its 
constitutionality, shuanggui has proven to be an efficient special measure for 
a society still undergoing a process of social transformation.235  During this 
reformatory period, Yang posits, the State Constitution is under the process 
of reform itself.  Thus, it is reasonable and acceptable to have some 
conscious flaws in the regulations that violate the Constitution until the 
process of reform is completed.236  
Arguments from history and necessity also point to the temporary 
nature of shuanggui and the likelihood of its reform to better conform the 
theory of Chinese constitutionalism with the applied realities of the practice.  
For these Chinese scholars, shuanggui will be optimized and follow the rule 
of law or even be replaced by an alternative legal regime.  This replacement 
theory takes one of three forms.   
                                                      
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 The argument suggests something like a living constitution theory—that the constitution, and its 
permissible limits, must be understood within the historical context in which it is applied.  See, e.g., Yang 
Tao, supra note 219, at 16. The notion has been contentious among high level American judges.  Compare 
William J. Brennan, Jr., Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2 (1985), with William H. 
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 401 (2006). 
234  Yang Tao, supra note 219. 
235  Id. 
236  Id. 
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The first of these emphasizes the “work in progress” aspect of 
shuanggui.237  Some scholars analyze the reason why shuanggui will be 
optimized in the future.238  They point out modern political theory suggests 
that the government has to win the support of the people by democracy and 
rule of law.239  Although CCP developed from a violent revolution, it cannot 
follow its old routine forever.  Thus, as an administration party, CCP shall 
emphasize the cooperation of the different classes of society, especially the 
importance of democracy and cooperation.  The CCDI’s issuance of detailed 
regulations240 on the time and procedural issues relating to the conduct of 
shuanggui investigations is the best evidence to suggest that the CCP is 
attempting to reform shuanggui so that it follows a rule of law framework, 
even if the law followed is that of the organization of the CCP.241  Such 
opinion is not isolated because most of CCP’s official publications had 
emphasized the importance of internal party democracy and ethical 
education in maintaining CCP’s policies and its discipline.242   
The second looks to developing parallel administrative structures for 
shuanggui outside the government.243  One article in the CCP Party School’s 
journal suggests that the CCP will reform its shuanggui process to 
harmonize more explicitly with parallel proceedings authorized for criminal 
matters under NPC legislation.244  In effect, one might view this as a means 
of recasting shuanggui  as the political process that might run parallel to the 
administrative process against suspects who are also Party cadres.    
The third argues that shuanggui should eventually be replaced by a 
judicially administered system.245  Some scholars, for example, argue that 
Shuanggui ought to eventually be replaced with judicial measures.  Zhou 
                                                      
237 See, e.g., Cai Xia, The Maintaining of CCP’s Constitution, STUDY TIMES (Aug. 2009), 
http://www.china.com.cn/xxsb/txt/2006-08/09/content_7066378.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Cent. Comm’n for Discipline Inspection of the 
Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), arts. 7 and 28, translation by Keren Wang, 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited Mar. 6, 
2014).   
241 Cai Xia, Weihu Dangzhang De Jichu Gongzuo (维护党章的基础工作) [The Maintaining of CCP’s 
Constitution], STUDY TIMES (Aug. 2006), http://www.china.com.cn/xxsb/txt/2006-08/09/content 
_7066378.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
242  Id. 
243  Cao Shenbing, Discussion on How to Make CCP Internal Regulation in Coordinate with the Law, 
LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Feb. 2002), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2011_09_01_ archive.html 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
244  See id. 
245  Zhou Yezhong, Fanfu Changlian Jidai Shixian Sange Zhuanxing (反腐倡廉亟待实现三个转型) [Three 
Transformations that are Urgently Needed for Anti-corruption], LEGAL DAILY (Aug. 25, 2000), 
http://www.cqvip.com/QK/81128X/200101/15029911.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
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Yezhong has developed a theory of shuanggui “transformation from 
discipline leading to law.”246   These approaches may also provide for a 
remedial mechanism that also incorporates this last position, providing a 
basis for the establishment of a reviewing office inside CCP.247 
While most articles concede the efficiency of shuanggui and avoid the 
constitutional issue, groups of scholars confront the constitutional issue 
directly.  The first line of scholarly argument asserts that shuanggui violates 
the Chinese Constitution.248  The violation arguments are grounded in a 
sense of the deficiencies of shuanggui to follow or apply the procedural 
protections afforded through the Chinese Constitution. 249   One critique 
suggests that shuanggui directly violates the State Constitution, and in 
particular, the provisions of equal protection, personal freedom, and due 
process.250  The constitutional argument starts with the normative effect of 
the State Constitution’s Preamble, which states that the State Constitution 
provides the basic norm of conduct.251  Thus, theoretically, the CCP and its 
internal discipline ought to comply with the Constitution.  However, in 
practice, shuanggui investigations violate Articles 33252  and 37253  of the 
Constitution.  During Shuanggui investigations, investigators may violate 
due process and personal freedom by confining the suspect in the premises 
for inquiries.254  Such inquiries may constitute an illegal detention without 
                                                      
246 Id. 
247 Cf. Backer, supra note 146. 
248  Wang Jingui, supra note 191, at 61, 62. 
249 Two articles share this minority view.  One is from YAN YUANG CHUN QIU, a journal published by 
an old general and former senior CCP officials.  See Shao Yanxiang, “Shuanggui” De Banfa Yaobuyao 
Gaiyigai (“双规”的办法要不要改一改) [Shall we Reform the Shuanggui?], 2009 YAN HUANG CHUN QIU 77, 
77-79 (Mar. 2009).  The second article was published in LEGAL SCIENCE, a well-known law journal 
published by East China University of Political Science and Law.  See Wang Jingui, supra note 191, at 62. 
250 See Wang Jingui, supra note 191, at 62. 
251 The preamble of the state constitution provides that “[p]eople of all nationalities, all state organs, 
the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and undertakings in the 
country must take the Constitution as the basic norm of conduct, and they have the duty to uphold the 
dignity of the Constitution and ensure its implementation.”  XIANFA preamble (1982) (China). 
252 Id. at art. 33 (providing that [a]ll persons holding the nationality of the People's Republic of China 
are citizens of the People's Republic of China . . . equal before the law. Every citizen enjoys the rights and 
at the same time must perform the duties prescribed by the Constitution and the law.”).  
253 Id. at art. 37 (providing that “[t]he freedom of person of citizens of the People's Republic of China 
is inviolable. No citizen may be arrested except with the approval or by decision of a people's procuratorate 
or by decision of a people's court, and arrests must be made by a public security organ. Unlawful 
deprivation or restriction of citizens' freedom of person by detention or other means is prohibited; and 
unlawful search of the person of citizens is prohibited.”); id. at art. 38 (providing that “[t]he personal 
dignity of citizens of the People's Republic of China is inviolable. Insult, libel, false charge or frame-up 
directed against citizens by any means is prohibited.”). 
254 See Wang Jingui, supra note 191, at 62. 
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the participation of judicial departments.255  Moreover it has been suggested 
that shuanggui is used as a tool for plea bargaining—especially to avoid 
prosecutions under law. 256   For example, the Commission of Discipline 
Investigation (“CDI”) or CCDI may use shuanggui as a plea bargain in order 
to get cooperation from the suspects.  This practice, it has been argued, 
violates the constitutional equal protection rule, which requires that “all 
citizens of the People’s Republic of China are equal before the law.”257 
A second line of constitutional critique posits that shuanggui created 
an extrajudicial procedure, which has harmed the judicial and political 
system, and created a zone of illegitimacy that ultimately harms the state.258  
The illegitimacy argument is also grounded on the idea that shuanggui 
operates within an extrajudicial zone whose existence harms the judicial and 
political systems. 259   Shuanggui cannot replace the investigation of law 
enforcement departments.  It would follow under this critique that to keep 
this special measure creates a mechanism for the assertion of power without 
constraint, and that, constructed as a power system beyond or outside law, 
may ultimately reduce protections to the suspect and damage the legal 
system.  The constitutional critique is unusually strongly worded.260 
But there are also scholars who take the opposite view about the 
constitutionality of shuanggui, especially in its relation to Articles 33 and 37 
of the State Constitution.  One of the more interesting critiques is that of Liu 
Zhigang  who responds directly to the arguments made by Wang Jingui.261  
Liu provides three reasons to explain why shuanggui does not violate the 
Constitution.  First, Liu argues that shuanggui applies to the relationship 
between the CCP and each member. 262   This relationship is a “special 
relationship” that is not covered by the Constitution.  Second, denying the 
application of shuanggui is ideologically illegitimate, an expression of 
romanticism and radical-left thinking that disregards the reality of Chinese 
                                                      
255  Id. 
256  Id. 
257  Id. 
258  See Shao Yanxiang, supra note 249, at 78-79. 
259  See id.  
260  See Shao Yanxiang, supra note 249, at 79.  Shao Yanxiang writes, “[t]he measurement of 
Shuanggui is identical to illegal detention. CCDI cannot replace the judicial departments and CCDI have no 
right to confine the freedom of the people. No one or entity shall exceed the Constitution. The argument of 
keeping shuanggui involves the position of CCP in relation with law and politics. Moreover, the orientation 
of shuanggui will affect the reform of nation’s politic system and legal system.”  Id. 
261 Liu Zhigang, “Shuanggui” De Hexianxing – Jianyu Wang Jingui Xiansheng Shangque (“双规”的合
宪性——兼与王金贵先生商榷) [Responses to Wang Jingui, The Constitutionality of “Shuanggui”], 11 LEGAL 
SCIENCE 9, 11-14 (Nov. 2005). 
262 Id. 
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society.263  Third, Liu suggests that “[i]nsisting on the leadership of CCP” is 
a basic principle of the State Constitution.264  Without the CCP’s strong 
leadership, there is no basis for the protection of people’s right.  Thus, even 
though shuanggui may violate someone’s rights, in order to protect the 
interest of maintaining the CCP’s leadership, shuanggui might be entitled to 
special treatment.  He adopts an interest analysis in which he concludes that 
the interest of maintaining a strong CCP leadership role is more important 
than the niceties of constitutional provisions ostensibly protecting individual 
rights.265  
Another scholar seeks to transpose Western constitutional notions of 
special measures in defense of the extra constitutional legitimacy of 
shuanggui.266  Liu justifies his argument that shuanggui will survive as a 
constitutional exception by citing the example of Taiwan and Germany to 
prove that reserving an exception for special measures is reasonable.267  
Taken together, most scholarship suggests discomfort with the 
institutional structures and practices of shuanggui.  This scholarship 
advances the proposition that shuanggui is illegitimate or unconstitutional, 
flawed but necessary, a transitional vehicle in post-Revolutionary times, or 
that it is exceptional, but still a legitimate expression of power.  More 
importantly, these approaches agree on the centrality of the Chinese State 
Constitution to the analysis of the role of shuanggui, and, through the device 
of shuanggui itself, of the role of the CCP in the Chinese constitutional 
order.  Relying implicitly on the two fundamental principles of 
constitutionalism—1) the identity of the entirety of state power within a 
constitution, and 2) the premise that constitutional ideology marks the limits 
of constitutional discourse—the standard analyses start from the 
presumption of the Chinese State Constitution’s primacy and measure 
everything from that base.   
The reality of shuanggui suggests something more subtle than 
evidence of the willingness of an extra-constitutional institution, the CCP, 
implementing extra-legal measures.  Liu Zhigang comes closest to arguing 
                                                      
263 Id. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
266 Liu Heng Shilun Shuanggui De Xianshi Zhengdangxing. (试论双规的现实正当性) [On the 
Substantive Legitimacy of Shuanggui], 2006 J. OF THE PARTY SCHOOL FOR THE DEPARTMENTS DIRECTLY 
UNDER SHANXI PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE OF THE CCP, 1674-76 (May 14, 2006). 
267Id. Particularly interesting is the argument that “special relationship” is an important German 
administrative law theory and being adopted and developed in Taiwan and Japan. Under this theory, first, it 
excludes the application of constitution; second, it excludes the application of law; third, it excludes the 
judicial review.  This theory is in fact creating an extrajudicial region. 
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this, but even he ultimately returns to the characterization of shuanggui as a 
justifiable exception, and essentially extra-constitutional, measure. 268  
Indeed, these explanations, critiques, and defenses are to some extent 
unsatisfying precisely because they do not appear to start from a deeper 
understanding of the foundational premises of the Chinese constitutional 
state.  It is to a consideration of shuanggui within what this paper would 
argue the appropriate way of understanding the basis of distinctive Chinese 
constitutionalism that we turn next.  
IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF SHUANGGUI WITHIN THE CHINESE 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
The authority of CCP officials to enact and enforce shuanggui does 
not derive from an authority vested in state officials under the State 
Constitution.   As a consequence, some question shuanggui because it was 
neither enacted by action of the NPC nor does it conform to laws enacted 
under the State Constitution that apply to government criminal actions and 
investigations.  It follows that scholars, especially in the West, are inclined 
to suggest that the disciplinary processes of shuanggui exist outside the 
Chinese constitutional system and that it violates rule of law requirements.269  
Some scholars further suggest that the CCP exceeds its constitutional role by 
enacting and enforcing shuanggui, and it is to that extent acting 
unlawfully.270   These scholars then argue that CCP and shuanggui must 
conform both to the rules of the Constitution and the laws enacted through 
the NPC system.  The nonconformity to these legal norms leads some to 
question the legitimacy of shuanggui,271 and, more broadly, the role of the 
CCP in the Chinese constitutional system.272  
This line of thinking, and its conclusions about the position of CCP 
and shuanggui in relation to the state, arises from an emerging global 
consensus about the relationship of states to the legitimacy of their 
governmental systems.273  That consensus is grounded on two very simple 
principles.  The first is one state—one constitution: many people have come 
to accept this principle as the basis of all legitimate constitutional theory, 
                                                      
268 Liu Zhigang, supra note 261, at 12. 
269 See supra Part III. 
270 See supra Part III. 
271 Sapio, supra note 154, at 20-21. 
272 See generally Backer, supra note 21. 
273 See generally Larry C. Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for 
Legitimate Public Power Systems, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 671 (2009). 
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though it has been questioned by Chinese scholars.274  Many theorists add a 
corollary principle, derived in part from ideas made popular by Italian 
fascists in the 1930s275 and then reworked for the needs of Marxist Leninist 
states in the 1960s: 276  within the constitution, everything; outside the 
constitution, nothing.  It is possible to posit that much of what now 
constitutes the foundations of constitutionalism is grounded on these 
principles—the constitution provides all of the basic rules for the 
organization of the state and the substantive principles on which its people 
are organized.  Any action, organization, or principle outside of, or 
inconsistent with, the constitutional framework is necessarily illegitimate.  
The legitimacy of the construction of government, the limits of distribution 
of power to this government, the means by which the government may use 
its power, and the persons against whom such authority may be asserted are 
all judged from within the organizing framework of these principles.  
Most governments have subscribed to these basic rules implicitly.  
Virtually all states have developed a written constitution that serves as the 
expression of the political will of the people and the highest law of the 
land. 277   Those states without written constitutions, including, most 
prominently, the United Kingdom, rely instead on a series of important 
political settlements, agreements, and juridical principles, which together 
constitute the constitution of the nation.278  Most theorists, relying on these 
principles and the acquiescence of states in their authority expressed through 
consensus discernable by their actions, judge the legitimacy of governments 
and the validity of law or policy enforced by such governments by their 
relationship to constitutions. 
The basic principles of traditional constitutionalist analysis have been 
misapplied to the Chinese constitutional context.  To that extent, the 
                                                      
274 Jiang Shigong, supra note 4, 12. 
275  See BENITO MUSSOLINI, THE DOCTRINE OF FASCISM (1932), reprinted in THE SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 164-68 (Michael J. Oakshott ed., 1939), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/tyr/mussolini.htm (stating “tutto nello Stato, niente al di fuori dello Stato, nulla 
contro lo Stato,” which translates to “[e]verything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against 
the State.”). 
276  See Fidel Castro Ruz, Discurso Pronunciado como Conclusión de las Reuniones con los 
Intelectuales Cubanos, DEPARTMENT OF VERSIONS (June 1961), http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/ 
1961/esp/f300661e.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (stating “esto significa que dentro de la Revolución, 
todo; contra la Revolución, nada,” which translates to “[w]ithin the revolution, everything; against the 
revolution, nothing.”). 
277 See, e.g., ELKINS ET AL., supra note 7, 36-64.  
278 See, e.g., Mark D. Walters, The Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta 
as Fundamental Law, 51 U. TORONTO L. J. 91 (2001); Jo E.K. Murkens, The Quest for Constitutionalism in 
UK Public Law Discourse, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (2009).  For an interesting discussion of the 
evolution of this concept in the 21st century, see DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW (2006). 
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conclusions about both CCP and shuanggui are erroneous.  The conventional 
analysis, whether applied by Chinese or Western theorists, ignores the 
distinct features of the Chinese constitutional system by mistaking the State 
Constitution for the Chinese constitutional system.  The State Constitution is 
merely a part and not the whole of China’s constitutional system.  Put 
simply, the Chinese constitutional system is in the aggregate grounded in an 
unwritten constitution.279  Like the traditional U.K. system, it “includes all 
rules which directly or indirectly affect the distribution or exercise of the 
sovereign power in the state.”280  This unwritten constitution is made up of a 
combination of important written documents and a core of unwritten 
principles that are noted in the core set of written documents.  The 
fundamental documents that form the Chinese constitutional system include 
the State Constitution and the CCP Constitution.  Its principles, inscribed in 
the preamble of the State Constitution and the General Program of the CCP 
Constitution, include Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought, Deng 
Xiaoping theory, and the important thought of “Three Represents.”  
Together, these instruments can be understood to serve as the whole of the 
constitution of the People’s Republic.  Separately, each of these fundamental 
documents and principles describes an important component part of that 
constitution:  the State Constitution focusing on the organization of the 
administrative apparatus and its direct relationship to the people;  the CCP 
Constitution serving as the umbrella through which the political apparatus of 
the nation is organized through the institution of the Communist Party;  and 
the political principles serving to define the substantive framework within 
which the CCP and the administrative apparatus of state must undertake 
their respective roles.281  
Understood in this way, both the CCP and the system of discipline 
under the system of shuanggui take on a substantially different character.  
The focus of analysis moves from issues of legitimacy grounded in the 
extra-constitutional character of shuanggui and of the CCP itself, to a focus 
on the conformity of both to their respective obligations and the norms on 
which the Chinese constitutional system is based.  Shuanggui, in effect, is 
extra-constitutional precisely because shuanggui falls outside the 
                                                      
279 See generally Jiang Shigong, supra note 4. 
280ALBERT VENN DICEY, OUTLINE OF SUBJECT: THE TRUE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 
(1915) (noting that constitutional systems “. . . include[] (among other things) all rules which define the 
members of the sovereign power, all rules which regulate the relation of such members to each other, or 
which determine the mode in which the sovereign power, or the members thereof, exercise their 
authority.”). 
281 See generally Backer, supra note 5; see also Jiang Shigong, supra note 4. 
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competence of the Constitution, whose role is to administration of the state 
apparatus and the relationship of that apparatus to the people.  Instead, 
shuanggui falls within the legitimate competence of the CCP to be 
administered under its line, which necessarily includes the principles 
through which the State Constitution was structured.  
If the issue of legitimacy becomes irrelevant, then the analysis shifts 
to the conformity of shuanggui to the constitutional principles that frame the 
organization and operation of the CCP.  The discussion of both, then, like the 
discussion of the governmental system and its disciplinary mechanisms in 
other constitutional states, can be analyzed for conformity to the organizing 
principles enshrined in its constitution and the effectiveness of its 
implementation.  This is the natural result of the application of both Deng 
Xiaoping and Western constitutional theory.   
To understand the connection between shuanggui, the State 
Constitution, and the Chinese constitutional system, it might be useful to go 
back to the first principles.  The object of this exposition is not to engage in 
pedantic historicism, but rather to extract and apply its principles, principles 
that still strongly influence the character of Chinese constitutionalism and 
the framework structures of Chinese separation of powers doctrine.  It is also 
to suggest that a generation of scholarship that ignores this fundamental 
understanding of the structural framework of Chinese constitutionalism may 
not understand correctly the character of the constitutional framework that 
prevails in China.   
A useful place to start is Deng Xiaoping’s 1980 speech “On the 
Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,”282  discussed and 
endorsed by the Politburo on August 31, 1980.  The speech is ostensibly 
about changes in the leadership of the State Council.  But Deng uses the 
issue of State Council membership to raise a number of important issues that 
demonstrates a conception of the relationship of State and Party, and of the 
role of the State Constitution within the constellation of higher principles, 
which together describe the approach to the construction of Chinese State-
Party constitutional system in its modern form. Deng describes four 
principal issues with the pre-1980 constitutional organization of State and 
Party apparatus:  1) over-concentration of power hindering the practice of 
socialist democracy by state organs and the CCP’s democratic centralism; 2) 
bureaucratism and formalism evidenced by the practice of permitting cadres 
                                                      
282 Deng Xiaoping, On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership, Speech Before the 
Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Aug. 18, 1980), available at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1460.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
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to hold too many positions or acquire too many deputies;283 3) the failure to 
adequately distinguish between the responsibilities of the CCP and those of 
the government apparatus;284 and 4) a failure to institutionalize leadership 
succession within the Party, requiring a greater willingness of older cadres to 
cede front line positions to younger members and for younger members to 
accept guidance and leadership from older cadres.285 
In order to achieve the core objectives of a socialist state, Deng felt it 
was critical to separate the administrative functions of the state from the 
leadership functions of the CCP.286  That separation, in turn, was not meant 
to create a hierarchical relationship between State and Party, with the State 
Constitution in a privileged position as against the CCP.  Rather, the object 
was to apply a principle of separation of functions which in the aggregate 
would define the Chinese constitutional system.   That becomes clear in 
Deng’s vision for changes both in the State Constitution and in the 
development of the Commission for Discipline Inspection.287  With respect 
to the Constitution, Deng focused on the relationship between the 
administrative function of the State, the construction of government, and the 
                                                      
283  Id. Deng described the complex character of bureaucratism: “[b]ureaucracy remains a major and 
widespread problem in the political life of our Party and state. Its harmful manifestations include the 
following: standing high above the masses; abusing power; divorcing oneself from reality and the masses; 
spending a lot of time and effort to put up an impressive front; indulging in empty talk; sticking to a rigid 
way of thinking; being hidebound by convention; overstaffing administrative organs; being dilatory, 
inefficient and irresponsible; failing to keep one's word; circulating documents endlessly without solving 
problems; shifting responsibility to others; and even assuming the airs of a mandarin, reprimanding other 
people at every turn, vindictively attacking others, suppressing democracy, deceiving superiors and 
subordinates, being arbitrary and despotic, practicing favoritism, offering bribes, participating in corrupt 
practices in violation of the law, and so on. Such things have reached intolerable dimensions both in our 
domestic affairs and in our contacts with other countries.”  Id.  
284  Id. Deng justified distinguishing government and party responsibilities by stressing that “[t]hose 
principal leading comrades of the Central Committee who are to be relieved of their concurrent government 
posts can concentrate their energies on our Party work, on matters concerning the Party's line, guiding 
principles and policies. This will help strengthen and improve the unified leadership of the Central 
Committee, facilitate the establishment of an effective work system at the various levels of government 
from top to bottom, and promote a better exercise of government functions and powers.”  Id.  
285  Id.  Deng noted “[i]t is of great strategic importance for us to ensure the continuity and stability of 
the correct leadership of our Party and state by having younger comrades take the ‘front-line’ posts while 
the older comrades give them the necessary advice and support.”  Id.  
286 Id.  Deng noted “[i]n the political sphere, to practice people's democracy to the full, ensuring that 
through various effective forms, all the people truly enjoy the right to manage state affairs and particularly 
state organs at the grass-roots level and to run enterprises and institutions, and that they truly enjoy all the 
other rights of citizens; to perfect the revolutionary legal system; to handle contradictions among the people 
correctly; to crack down on all hostile forces and criminal activities; and to arouse the enthusiasm of the 
people and consolidate and develop a political situation marked by stability, unity and liveliness.”  Id.  
287  Id. at part V.  Deng explained that “the Central Committee has already set up its Commission for 
Discipline Inspection, and is now considering the establishment of an advisory commission . . . Together 
with the Central Committee itself, these commissions are to be elected by the National Congress of the 
Party, and their respective functions and powers are to be specified.”  Id.  
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role of the people in these institutions. 288   Popular participation was 
understood to be focused on the state organs and organized through the 
provisions of the State Constitution. 289   The state organs, in turn, were 
understood as defining the administrative sector, but not the totality of the 
constitutional system.290    
That division between administrative and political organs was made 
clear by Deng’s emphasis on the fundamentally distinctive character of 
separation of powers under principles of Chinese constitutionalism.  
Separation of powers, at the fundamental level of Chinese constitutionalism, 
was not between the legislative, executive, and judicial power of the state 
apparatus, which in turn serves as the repository of all political and 
administrative power.  Rather, as this essay seeks to demonstrate, the 
fundamental separation of powers, on which the Chinese constitutional 
system rests, was meant to be between the administrative organs, 
represented by the State Council, and the political organs, represented by the 
Central Committee.  Deng has discussed the relationship between the CCP 
and the state apparatus in following terms: 
…[A] truly effective work system will be set up for the State 
Council and the various levels of local government.  From now 
on, all matters within the competence of the government will be 
discussed and decided upon, and the relevant documents issued, 
by the State Council and the local governments concerned.  The 
Central Committee and local committees of the Party will no 
longer issue directives or take decisions on such matters.  Of 
course, the work of the government will continue to be carried 
out under the political leadership of the Party.  Strengthening 
government work means strengthening the Party’s leadership.291 
Thus, Deng does not appear to suggest that the construction of a state 
apparatus grounded in the provisions of a State Constitution would come to 
define and regulate, through its substantive and organizational provisions, 
                                                      
288  Id. Deng noted “[o]ur Constitution should be made more complete and precise so as to really 
ensure the people's right to manage the state organs at all levels as well as the various enterprises and 
institutions, to guarantee to our people the full enjoyment of their rights as citizens, to enable the areas 
inhabited by minority nationalities to exercise genuine regional autonomy, to improve the system of 
people's congresses, and so on. The principle of preventing the over-concentration of power will also be 
reflected in the revised Constitution.”  Id.   
289 Cf. XIANFA art. 2 (1982) (China). 
290  Cf. id. at arts. 2, 5, 10 and preamble (the preamble provides that “[t]he system of multi-party 
cooperation and political consultation led by the Communist Party of China will exist and develop in China 
for a long time to come”). 
291  Deng Xiaoping, supra note 282.   
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the practices and exercise of leadership by the CCP itself.  Nor was it meant 
to impose norms on the organization and functioning of the CCP, especially 
in its internal workings.  Instead, Deng sees “[t]he purpose of reforming the 
system of Party and state leadership is precisely to maintain and further 
strengthen Party leadership and discipline, and not to weaken or relax 
them.”292  For this purpose, Deng assumed the power of the Party over its 
own organization and discipline within the logic of the State-Party system—
a matter for the Party rather than for the State, and thus one necessarily 
beyond the ambit of the State Constitution.293 
Thus, Deng’s theory might appear to be grounded in a distinction 
between political and administrative power, which he understood in the form 
of the division of authority between State Council—the chief administrative 
authority of the state apparatus (its government) 294 —and the Central 
Committee, the highest authority within the CCP.  Each is understood to be 
ordered in accordance with the logic of its own role-function, and both 
together must represent the entirety of the exercise of the sovereign power of 
the people.   
This is made clear, perhaps, in Deng’s famous speech, “Uphold the 
Four Cardinal Principles,” delivered in 1979 at a forum on the principles for 
the Party’s theoretical work.295  For the state and its organs, there is the 
constitution and law.  For the political and its apparatus, there is socialist 
democracy which operates within its own governance framework.  Both 
adhere to the same set of substantive principles from which deviation is not 
possible.  Within that framework, both the administrative and the political 
organs may establish their operational systems.  Of principal interest in that 
regard are the last three principles—to uphold the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party under the constraining 
                                                      
292  Id. Deng further explains that “[i]n a big country like ours, it is inconceivable that unity . . . could 
be achieved among our several hundred million people . . . in the absence of a Party whose members have a 
spirit of sacrifice and a high level of political awareness and discipline, a Party that truly represents and 
unites the masses of people and exercises unified leadership.” Id.  
293 See id. Deng observed that “[t]his work should be performed by Party committees and leading 
cadres at all levels, as well as by all other Party members . . . the decisive condition for success is that all 
Party members, especially those in leading positions, be the first to do what they expect the masses to do. 
Thus, for our ideological and political work to be successful, it is necessary to improve the leadership 
provided by the Party and to improve its leadership system.”  Id.   
294  Deng’s use of the term State Council is now perhaps better understood as a shorthand reference to 
the complex of State Council and NPC as the legislative and executive arms of the administrative organs of 
the State whose work, and whose relationship with the masses and democratic principles is the object of the 
State Constitution.   
295  Deng Xiaoping, supra note 137 (describing the four cardinal principles, a foundation of the 
modern Chinese state: keep to the socialist road; uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat; uphold the 
leadership of the Communist Party; and uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought). 
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ideological framework of Marxism-Leninism, and Mao Zedong thought.  
The first two suggest the distinctive approach to issues of democracy that are 
coherent only in the context of a division of competence between 
government and Party.296  Indeed, for Deng, it is the connection between the 
masses and the CCP, and not between the people and the government, that is 
the essence of democratic organization and the direct line for political power 
delegation.297 Specifically, the relationship between the CCP and the masses 
reflects the way in which the state undertakes its administrative program 
under the leadership of the CCP, which is responsible for formulating the 
political direction of the state apparatus. 298   The last suggests the 
fundamental political constraints on the CCP itself—a CCP that does not 
develop and advance communism in China is itself illegitimate.     
Deng Xiaoping theory, then, provides a useful starting point for the 
construction of Chinese constitutional systems, one that is built into both the 
State and CCP Constitutions themselves.  It requires the development of the 
logic of the Chinese situation within the theoretical framework of the 
realities confronting China, but also the avoidance of the petrification of 
theory and practice at some fictional “golden age.”299  But it is grounded on 
                                                      
296 Id.  Deng justified the dictatorship of the proletariat by stressing that “…we must recognize that in 
our socialist society there are still counter-revolutionaries, enemy agents, criminals and other bad elements 
of all kinds who undermine socialist public order, as well as new exploiters who engage in corruption, 
embezzlement, speculation and profiteering. And we must also recognize that such phenomena cannot be 
all eliminated for a long time to come. The struggle against these individuals is different from the struggle 
of one class against another, which occurred in the past (these individuals cannot form a cohesive and overt 
class). However, it is still a special form of class struggle or a special form of the leftover, under socialist 
conditions, of the class struggles of past history.”  Id.  
297 Id.  Deng explained that “[i]n reality, without the Chinese Communist Party, who would organize 
the socialist economy, politics, military affairs and culture of China, and who would organize the four 
modernizations? In the China of today we can never dispense with leadership by the Party and extol the 
spontaneity of the masses. Party leadership, of course, is not infallible, and the problem of how the Party 
can maintain close links with the masses and exercise correct and effective leadership is still one that we 
must seriously study and try to solve. But this can never be made a pretext for demanding the weakening or 
liquidation of the Party's leadership.”  Id.   
298 Id.  On the leadership role of the CCP, Deng explained that “[i]t is quite obvious that under these 
circumstances extensive readjustment may be accompanied by small or big disturbances. We can avoid 
them only if we have strong, centralized leadership and a strict sense of organization and discipline, only if 
we strengthen our efforts to maintain public and political order and to educate people in this regard, and 
only if we firmly improve the style of work in the Party and take further steps to restore its fine traditions of 
seeking truth from facts, following the mass line and working hard.”  Id.   
299 Id.  Deng warned against ideological fundamentalism, stressing that “[w]e will not, of course, 
backtrack from scientific socialism to utopian socialism, nor will we allow Marxism to remain arrested at 
the level of the particular theses arrived at as long as a century ago. This is why we have often repeated that 
it is necessary to emancipate our minds, that is, to study new situations and solve new problems by 
applying the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.”).  Id.  
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the political premises of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 300  and the 
leadership of the Communist Party.  Those principles make no sense  
overlaid on Western notions of separation of powers within a government 
into which all political power of the people is vested and for which one 
constitution is developed to organize this power.  
Applying the insights of Deng Xiaoping theory helps to better 
understand the universe of the Chinese constitutional system.  China is 
governed under a constitution, but that constitution is not the State 
Constitution.301  The State Constitution itself points to that conclusion.302  To 
reject that position is to ignore the realities of the fundamental basis for the 
organization of the State and to subvert the core organizational feature of the 
government—a separation of powers between the administrative apparatus 
in the State Council-NPC and the political apparatus in the Central 
Committee and CCP apparatus.  Post-revolutionary China has long rejected 
the idea that the State Constitution alone defines the full extent of the power 
organization in China, rather than defining the administrative powers of the 
state and providing gateways to extra-administrative power, the sources of 
which lays with the people.303  In Western states, the whole of the sovereign 
power of the people is organized through a single constitution that then 
divides this power among three branches of the government that embody 
that power and manage its use in accordance with the ruling ideology.  In 
China, the fundamental division of power is organized differently.  It starts 
with a division between administrative and political functions, and creates 
two sets of organs for their respective administration.  Each is governed in 
accordance with its own constitution, and both embody only that power only 
to the extent permitted under the ruling ideology—Marxist Leninist and Mao 
Zedong thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, the important theory of the Three 
Represents, and scientific development.  To treat the State Constitution as 
the embodiment of the whole of the Chinese constitutional order, then, is to 
transform the Chinese constitutional system into something it is not.  
As a consequence, the basis of the legitimacy of the shuanggui system 
is not to be found in the State Constitution, but rather in the constitution of 
the CCP.  The fact that shuanggui is not grounded in the provisions of the 
State Constitution, or that it is not subject to the provisions of law required 
to implement the administrative obligations of the state toward all of its 
                                                      
300  Now understood more broadly as the peoples’ democratic dictatorship. See XIANFA art. 1 (1982) 
(China). 
301  Jiang Shigong, supra note 4, at 40-43.  
302  See supra Part II, regarding the constitution’s application to Laojiao and the mass line. 
303  See, e.g., XIANFA  arts. 1, 17, 27 (1954); cf. Jiang Shigong, supra note 4, at 12. 
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citizens does not affect its constitutional legitimacy.  Shuanggui is 
necessarily extra-constitutional in the same way that the constitutional role 
of the CCP is also beyond the State Constitution’s competence—one limited 
to ordering the administrative responsibilities of the government and its 
relationships and obligations to all Chinese citizens.  But to call it extra-
constitutional is to fail to understand the scope of the Chinese constitutional 
system itself.  In this case, it may fall within the Chinese constitutional 
order, but outside the constitutional competence of the government formed 
under the State Constitution.  
Consequently, the legitimacy of the shuanggui system must be 
grounded in meta-constitutional principles applicable especially to the CCP 
and its activities.  This follows from two core premises of the Chinese 
constitutional system.  The first is that the State Constitution does not 
provide the legal basis for the regulation of Party activities, including its 
internal discipline procedures under the shuanggui umbrella.  The second is 
that the CCP necessarily adheres strictly to its own line, including the 
political principles on which the provisions of the State Constitution are 
based.  But where are these constraining principles to be found?  The answer 
has already been suggested:  those constitutional principles are found in the 
superior constitutional principles of Marxist Leninist, Mao Zedong theory, 
Deng Xiaoping theory, and the important thought of the Three Represents, 
referenced in the State and CCP Constitutions.304  Because those overarching 
constitutional principles apply in equal measure to the interpretation of the 
State Constitution and its provisions, the result is a tendency to harmonize 
the basic operating rules of administrative and CCP detention systems.  But 
the source of authority for each derives from different sources—
administrative systems through the State Constitution, and Party systems 
through the constitutional principles of the political organization of society.  
Shuanggui provides a framework for deriving those principles as applied.  It 
also provides the context for the improvement and development of these 
systems in line with constitutional principles.  Legitimacy is preserved, and 
the “epistemological basis for analysis”—the knowledge base that allows 
one to develop an analytical framework in the first place—is uncovered.  It 
is in this sense, perhaps, that one can understand. 
                                                      
304  See XIANFA preamble (1982) (China); Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) 
[Constitution of the Communist Party] (Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 
2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), general program (China).  The latter adds the scientific outlook on 
development as an important principle of governance. 
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This also suggests the last issue relating to the constitutional 
legitimacy of shuanggui—one that touches on the relationship between the 
CCP and the State Constitution and that requires the constitutionalization of 
the role of the CCP and its separation from State organs. 305   As a 
consequence, then, a better way to understand the relationship is based on 
connection rather than hierarchy.306  The Constitution has developed under 
the leadership of the CCP and reflects the ideology central to the CCP’s 
political mission.  It is an important expression of the application of ideology 
in the articulation of the structures of the administrative apparatus and of the 
proper relationship between state officials and the people they serve, so that 
both will work toward the ultimate political goals of the nation.  
As a consequence, the CCP must follow the principles of the 
constitution because it precisely reflects and is the product of the political 
work of the Party.  But the CCP is not obliged to follow the letter of the State 
Constitution itself precisely because it is meant for the regulation of the 
administrative and not the political sphere.  Theoretically, then, there can be 
little space between the Party and the Constitution.  The Constitution and the 
Party exist in a harmonious and reciprocal relationship rather than in a 
vertical one.  Likewise, the state and the Party must be understood as 
working in a harmonious and reciprocal relationship, each sensitive to the 
role of the other.  It is in this sense that one can understand Xi Jinping’s 
recent reminder that “all must act in conformity with the Constitution and 
the laws,” while also noting his remarks to the Politburo in February 2013 
that “the rule of law and the rule of virtue must go hand in hand, and the rule 
of law must be better observed in social management.” 307   To act in 
conformity with the Constitution and the law means that the administrative 
organs must act in accordance with the law and within the jurisdictional and 
political constraints imposed under the leadership of the CCP through the 
State Constitution.  But it also means that all individuals must conform their 
behavior to the law.   
                                                      
305  Cf. Tong Zhiwei, Bujin Yao Kending “Dahei,” Yeyao Fouding “Heida” (不仅要肯定 “打黑,” 也要否
定 “黑打”) [We must not only Affirm the “Anti-crime” Campaign, but also deny the use of “Black 
Methods”], FALU WEIBO (Apr. 19, 2011), http://libertyzw.fyfz.cn/art/966841.htm, (last visited Mar. 1, 
2014), English translation available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/part-ixzhiwei-tong-
series-we-must-not.html.  
306  Backer, supra note 138. 
307  Xi Jinping Says all must Act in Conformity with Constitution, Laws, XINHUA (Feb. 24, 2013),   
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-02/24/c_132189143.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
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Most importantly, it requires the CCP to adhere to its own line.308  Xi 
Jinping has emphasized recently that this means applying the mass line to 
the work of the CCP, including shuanggui.309  But it is also expressed in the 
principles implemented through the State Constitution as an expression of 
the Mass Line.  The Constitution begins, “[t]his Constitution affirms the 
achievements of the struggles of the Chinese people of all nationalities and 
defines the basic system and basic tasks of the state in legal form; it is the 
fundamental law of the state and has supreme legal authority.”310  Note how 
the meaning may appear clearer when critical words are stressed.  The object 
of the Constitution is more modest than its Western counterparts—it means 
only to define the system and tasks assigned to the state and then only to the 
extent it is to apply in legal form.  It has nothing to say about the political 
system and the tasks assigned it, except, perhaps through Article 1 and its 
reference to the people’s democratic dictatorship, 311  to which form of 
political structure the constitution must serve in the legal sphere.  The 
Constitution likewise reinforces the limited scope of its application, and its 
administrative-legal character, by emphasizing its supremacy within the 
legal sphere (in the construction of those rules  through which to organize 
the state and arrange for the fulfillment of the state’s obligations, there 
defined, to the people).  Within that sphere, the Constitution has supreme 
legal authority, though not political authority.  Indeed, notwithstanding that 
all power in the PRC belongs to the people,312 “[t]he organs through which 
the people exercise state power are the NPC and the local people’s 
congresses at different levels.”313 To determine the constitutional framework 
                                                      
308  On this point, the CCP Constitution states that “[t]he Communist Party of China takes Marxism-
Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents and 
the Scientific Outlook on Development as its guide to action. . . . All Party members must cherish the path, 
the theories and the socialist system that the Party has explored and created after going through all the 
hardships; and they must keep to them all the time and continue to develop them.  Zhongguo 
Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party] (Promulgated by the 
Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), GEN. PROGRAM (China). 
309 Raymond Li, supra note 16 (reporting on a CCP teleconference in Beijing hosted by the senior 
party leadership in 2013 “to kick-start a clean-up campaign to reinforce the ‘mass line’ of its 80 million 
members . . . Xi, who became party leader seven months ago, said the year-long campaign would be a 
‘thorough clean-up’ of undesirable work styles such as formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and 
extravagance.”).   
310 XIANFA preamble (1982) (China). 
311 Id. at art. 1 (stating that “[t]he People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the people's 
democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.”). 
312 Id. at art. 2. 
313 Id.  Here the contrast with the language of Article 2 of the 1954 Constitution (stating “the organs 
through which the people exercise power are. . .”) is telling.  Likewise the 1982 State Constitution provides 
only that “[c]itizens have the right to make to relevant state organs complaints and charges against, or 
exposures of, violation of the law or dereliction of duty by any state organ or functionary.”  Id. at art. 41.  
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for the assignment and constraints on the political authority, the constitution 
itself points elsewhere—to the CCP,314 to the ideological framework within 
which both political and administrative power must be exercised,315 if it is to 
be exercised legitimately, and to the documents that organize that political 
authority.316   
As such, the leadership of the CCP, as the party in power, is not itself 
constrained by the State Constitution.  While Party cadres as individuals 
must adhere to lawful conduct as specified in the State Constitution, the CCP 
as an institution is not limited by the rules imposed on the State through the 
State Constitution.  The sources of CCP power lie elsewhere within Chinese 
constitutionalism.  Article 1 of the State Constitution incorporates this notion 
by adhering to the framework of people’s democratic dictatorship (State 
Constitution Article 1 “The People’s Republic of China is a socialist state 
under the people’s democratic dictatorship”).  The idea is bound up both 
with the conception of the constraints on political rights and thus with the 
definition of “the people” for purposes of conferring political authority and 
participatory rights.317  
In a sense, then, the question reminds us that the Three Chinese 
Characteristics (三个至上)318 do not exist apart, but must be understood as 
three parts of a single insight—the socialist road is created by the application 
of socialist ideology through socialist institutions.  A careful reading in 
                                                                                                                                                              
The object is confine popular action against state organs but not with respect to political matters which are 
expressly extra constitutional in scope and vested in the CCP.  Id. at art. 1. 
314 Id. at preamble. 
315 Id. at preamble, arts. 1, 5 (Article 5 specifically provides that “[t]he state upholds the uniformity 
and dignity of the socialist legal system.”). 
316 Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party] 
(Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012) GEN. 
PROGRAM (China). 
317 This was famously expressed by Mao Zedong at the time of the founding of the People’s Republic.  
He stated, “[y]ou are dictatorial.  My dear sirs, what you say is correct.  That is just what we are.  All the 
experiences of the Chinese people, accumulated in the course of successive decades, tell us to carry out a 
people's democratic dictatorship. . . .  These two things, democracy for the people and dictatorship for the 
reactionaries, when combined, constitute the people's democratic dictatorship.  Why must things be done in 
this way?  Everyone is very clear on this point.  If things were not done like this, revolution would fail, the 
people would suffer and the state would perish.”  Mao Zedong, The People’s Democratic Dictatorship 
(June 30, 1949), available at  http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1949mao.html (last visited Mar. 6, 
2014). 
318 Hu Jintao introduced the concept of the Three Chinese characteristics or the Three Supremes (San 
ge Zhishang, 三个至) in 2007.  The Three Supremes include: “Supremacy of the business of the CCP” 
(Dang de shiye zhishang, 党的事业至上); “Supremacy of the interests of the people” (Renmin liyi zhishang 人
民利益至上); “Supremacy of constitutional law” (Xianfa falü zhishang, 宪法法律至上).  It was met with a 
mixed reaction.  CHINA MEDIA PROJECT, THREE SUPREMES, http://cmp.hku.hk/2010/11/12/6603/ (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
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context makes clear that coordination rather than separation are stressed:  the 
business of the CCP is supreme precisely because it furthers the supremacy 
of the interests of the people, which are expressed through the constitution 
and laws.  To view these as adversarial rather than complementary, then, 
seeks to import a Western construct of constitutionalism on a system within 
which the mediation of such tensions are not the basis for political 
organization.319  The key to the relationship of the State and the Party, then, 
should be coordination rather than separation; harmonious society principles 
suggest that it is more preferable to make improvements based on the 
existing framework rather than drastically altering the entire system.320  So, 
the Constitution is the Communist Party line!321  If the State Constitution is 
the CCP Line, then adherence to the principles of the State Constitution is 
not merely compatible with CCP practices, but an affirmation of the official 
expression of the CCP line as translated into the administrative sphere.  As 
such, all CCP cadres are bound to follow the State Constitution as an integral 
part of their Party work.  This follows not because the State Constitution 
requires it, but because the political authorities do, consistent with the 
political foundations of the state.  It is in the form of the State Constitution, 
that the CCP’s fundamental political policies can be framed for the people 
and implemented through the administrative organs.322  It is in this sense that 
rule of law with Chinese characteristics becomes evident.  The state organs 
are subject to the State Constitution and the laws because they have been 
bound to this rule under the leadership of the CCP in enacting the State 
Constitution.  For administrative organs to disregard the law or the 
constitution is the same as rejecting the core expression of the CCP line.  But 
the CCP is bound by constitutional principles precisely because they reflect 
the basic thrust of the CCP line it has embraced.  In both cases, the State 
                                                      
319  Cf. Jerome A. Cohen, Body Blow for the Judiciary, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 18, 
2008), http://www.cfr.org/china/body-blow-judiciary/p17565 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (reporting that 
many Chinese judges are “confused and unhappy about this apparent return to the past, to the use of law as 
an instrument of ‘proletarian dictatorship’ implemented through the ‘mass line’ in the guise of 
‘democratisation.’  How to reconcile the newly propagated ‘mass line’ with legal norms and procedures 
must be a particular challenge for SPC vice-presidents and provincial high court chiefs.”).  Please note that 
Cohen’s report reflects a reading of Chinese constitutional development that singularly focuses on the 
events that occurred after the fall of the Gang of Four while severing the rest of the Chinese constitutional 
history. Such view is grounded upon the premise that the courts must inexorably move to a position where 
they would be the arbiters not just of administrative implementation of constitution and law (which they 
ought to be duty bound to do), but that this authority and the State Constitution on which it is based, would 
then invert the political relationship between CCP and courts as an instrument of the state apparatus.   
320  Backer, supra note 138. 
321  Id.; Backer, supra  note 12, at 12. 
322  Backer, supra note 21. 
314 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 2 
 
Constitution and constitutional principles represent the expression of the will 
of the people through the exercise of the people’s democratic dictatorship.   
This essential nature of socialist rule of law is sometimes 
misunderstood by some who seek to substitute Western notions of the rule of 
law, applicable to the facts of their organization, to the Chinese situation.323  
In particular, it is important to note that socialist rule of law does not suggest 
the inferiority of the CCP or the people to an unbending law system.  Nor 
does it reject rule of law as a basic normative framework of the 
constitutional order.  What makes the system socialist is both the focus on 
the State’s duty to develop the productive capacity of China 324  and the 
separation of powers framework understood as the constitutionalization of 
the Four Cardinal Principles.325  
The supremacy of the State Constitution and law means that these 
collective expressions of norms developed under CCP leadership can never 
be inferior to the rule of any person or the arbitrary conduct of any small 
group of individuals.  The law serves the people by ensuring that rules and 
not individual will serves as the basis for the construction of socialist 
democracy in China.  As Hu Jintao stressed in his 2012 speech before the 
Eighteenth Party Congress, “[p]arty organizations at all levels and all Party 
members and officials, especially principal leading officials, must willingly 
abide by the Party Constitution as well as its organizational principles and 
guiding principles for its political activities; and no one is allowed to place 
oneself above the Party organization.”326  Of course, in many instances, the 
functional result of the application of administrative or political systems will 
be quite similar and the operational rules will have to tend to operate 
harmoniously.  That is a necessary consequence of the constraints of the 
substantive framework within which both systems must operate.  Yet, 
similarity in approach does not mean that the source of their authority is the 
same nor does it suggest that one must defer to the other.  It is precisely 
because, as Yang Xiaoqing argues, the supremacy of the people’s interest 
permits the CCP to develop rules for the discipline of its own members in 
the discharge of the heavy obligation of CCP leadership, that shuanggui is a 
                                                      
323 Yang Xiaoqing, supra note 15.   
324  Deng Xiaoping, We Review the Past to Open Up a Path to the Future, THE SELECTED WORKS OF 
DENG XIAOPING (Sept. 5, 1988), http://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/we-review-the-past-
to-open-up-a-new-path-to-the-future/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (observing that “the focus of our work 
should be shifted from class struggle to developing the productive forces and modernizing the country”).  
This idea is also captured in the notion of socialist modernization in the CCP Constitution general program. 
325  Deng Xiaoping, supra note 137.  
326  Hu Jintao, supra note 24. 
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legitimate expression of power.327  As Hu has pointed out, “[w]hen the Party 
maintains its strength and close ties with the people, China enjoys prosperity 
and stability and the Chinese people live in peace and happiness.”328 
It is precisely because the CCP is also bound to follow its own line, to 
remain true to the revolutionary principles on which the state was 
established in 1949, that principles expressed in the State Constitution must 
also be applied as applicable to the particular circumstances of the 
shuanggui system.  The CCP retains its leadership authority as it remains 
true to the principles on which it was founded and scientifically develops 
them for the welfare of the people.  The Constitution and the Party, the 
administrative units of the government and the political organization under 
the leadership of the CCP, produce constitutional unity in a way that is 
consonant with the political premises under which the Chinese state is 
organized. 
Yet for all of the elegance of the theory elaborated in this section, it is 
necessary to confront an important substantive criticism:  the failure to 
appear to deal directly with a seeming contradiction within the constitutional 
order itself.  The core of that contradiction centers on what might be argued 
to be the inherent ambiguity of the CCP and State constitutional language.  
This is particularly acute where the Chinese State Constitution appears in 
places to claim to be governing both administrative and political orders329 
and similarly where ambiguous claims of the CCP appear to suggest that it is 
simultaneously above or outside the Constitution and also within and 
subservient to it.330  It is plausible, though, to argue that the language of the 
constitutional documents can lend themselves to diverse interpretation—
aided in part by the rich foundational materials of pre-packaged ideological 
                                                      
327  Liu Zhigang, supra note 261, at 11-14. 
328  Hu Jintao, supra note 24.  
329 See, e.g., XIANFA art. 5 (1982) (China) (stating that “[n]o organization or individual may enjoy the 
privilege of being above the Constitution and the law. The People's Republic of China practices ruling the 
country in accordance with the law and building a socialist country of law.”).  If the CCP is an 
“organization” is it not subject to the State Constitution?  See id. art. 28 (stating that “[t]he state maintains 
public order and suppresses treasonable and other counter- revolutionary activities; it penalizes actions that 
endanger public security and disrupt the socialist economy and other criminal activities, and punishes and 
reforms criminals.”).  If the State is assigned this task, then does that include overseeing the internal affairs 
of the CCP?  Lastly, if the CCP is an “organization” for purposes of the State Constitution, then is it subject 
to the constraints of Articles 1 and 5, which provide the State with the authority to constrain its unlawful or 
subversive activities?  We have suggested that a closer reading of these provisions with an emphasis of the 
differences between state activities and political activities changes the meaning of these provisions. 
330  See, e.g., Xi Jinping Vows "Power Within Cage of Regulations," XINHUA (Jan. 22, 2013), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-01/22/c_132120363.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) 
(reporting that “[d]uring a CCP disciplinary watchdog meeting . . . Xi ordered enhanced restraint and 
supervision on the use of power, [Xi] said, ‘[p]ower should be restricted by the cage of regulations.’”). 
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approaches ready made for that purpose.  Indeed, both Western and 
European Soviet perspectives have been applied to stretch the ambiguities of 
the extant language of the Chinese Constitution in multiple directions.331   
There is ambiguity nonetheless.  On the one hand, Article 1 speaks to 
the construction of a socialist state under the people’s democratic 
dictatorship.  On the other, Article 5 declares that no organization or 
individual may enjoy the privilege of being above the Constitution and the 
law.  The 1999 revision to Article 5 added, “[t]he People’s Republic of 
China practices ruling the country in accordance with the law and building a 
socialist country of law.”  If one reads these two provisions as each having 
independent legal significance, then it might be possible to suggest that 
Article 5 modifies Article 1.  If that is accepted then it might suggest that the 
CCP is also not above the Constitution in a literal sense (that is that the CCP 
in its constitutional role is within rather than beyond the State Constitution). 
But a better and more coherent reading of the constitutional provisions 
would start by understanding that, with the adoption of a people’s 
democratic dictatorship as the basis of the form of constitutional governance 
in China, then necessarily, the role of the CCP cannot be understood as 
falling within it.  The concept of the people’s democratic dictatorship, 
central to the understanding of the construction of the Chinese constitutional 
order, then, must be read into Article 5 to avoid constitutional incoherence.  
Admittedly the people’s democratic dictatorship is under-theorized.  
Moreover as a constitutional doctrine, it has become more than a mere 
reflection of the initial iteration by Mao Zedung in 1949, which is no longer 
sufficient, standing alone, to explain the concept or its constitutional 
significance. 332   But at its core, the concept of people’s democratic 
dictatorship makes clear that the Constitution serves both as a superstructure 
over the state and as an expression of the power of the people expressed 
through the CCP, which remains both beyond the specific law of the 
constitution, and yet embraces its principles as the concrete expression of its 
democratic dictatorship.333  The people’s democratic dictatorship speaks not 
to individuals, but to the leadership role of a representative body of the 
people themselves—the CCP—of the body politic. That body politic is 
                                                      
331 See generally, Backer supra note 5. 
332 This is a deficiency we expect to help remedy in future work. 
333  See Mao Zedong, supra note 116, at 411-23 (wherein Mao described people’s democratic 
dictatorship as a system “under the leadership of the working class [through the Communist Party] and 
based upon the alliance of workers and peasants. This dictatorship must unite as one with the international 
revolutionary forces. This is our formula, our principal experience, our main programme.”). 
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above the Constitution and the law, as articulated in Article 5, but not above 
its own principles. 
One approach out of that ambiguity is to avoid foreign ideological 
error and instead apply a Chinese Marxist approach to the Chinese Marxist 
Constitutional order, one that is committed both to its coherence and to a 
democratic ideal, the seeds of which are embedded in the current structure of 
the Chinese political order.  The key to that approach may be in the 
Constitutional preamble—the most frequently modified portion of the 
Chinese constitution,334 and in the general program of the Constitution of the 
CCP. The Constitution of the CCP translates the people’s democratic 
dictatorship into more elaborate language: 
 
The Communist Party of China leads the people in promoting 
socialist democracy.  It integrates its leadership, the position of 
the people as masters of the country, and the rule of law, takes 
the path of political development under socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, expands socialist democracy, improves the 
socialist legal system, builds a socialist country under the rule 
of law, consolidates the people’s democratic dictatorship, and 
builds socialist political civilization.335 
The Preamble to the State Constitution amplifies this concept.  Paragraph 2 
of the Constitution sets the template:  “[t]he people’s democratic dictatorship 
led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants, 
which is in essence the dictatorship of the proletariat, has been consolidated 
and developed.”336  Paragraph 7 of the Preamble provides the structures of 
the roadmap within which the parameters of the Constitution are drawn:   
Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the 
guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought, Deng 
Xiaoping theory and the important thought of “Three 
Represents,” the Chinese people of all nationalities will 
continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and 
follow the socialist road, steadily improve socialist institutions, 
develop socialist democracy, improve the socialist legal system 
                                                      
334 See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA (1982) for a listing of amendments in 2004, 1999, 
1993 and 1988. 
335 See Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist 
Party] (Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), GEN. 
PROGRAM (China). 
336 XIANFA preamble, para. 2 (1982) (China). 
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and work hard and self-reliantly to modernize industry, 
agriculture, national defense and science and technology step 
by step to turn China into a socialist country with a high level 
of culture and democracy.337 
Here, one can see both the interaction of state and Party Constitution and 
their consonance with respect to the place of the CCP as something both 
above the law it makes for the administrative organs of the state and the 
protection of the people, yet also deeply embedded within constitutional 
principle. The CCP must adhere to its own principles and apply them 
internally as its own law because to fail to do so betrays the essence of the 
people’s democratic dictatorship on which the legitimacy of both state and 
Party are grounded.338  Indeed, the CCP Constitution itself makes clear that 
“The Party must conduct its activities within the framework of the 
Constitution and laws of the country.”339  But within the framework does not 
mean subject to.  Rather, it relates to the means by which Party leadership is 
undertaken, under rule and principle rather than under the will of 
individuals. 
Still, what may strike some critics as a particularly strong weakness is 
that the expression of the actual constitutional order  presented here cannot 
be readily extracted from the original sources.  The article is unable to point 
to any single statement in any single document that clearly and 
authoritatively says what is suggested here—that is, no PRC document or 
leader has ever directly and simply said:  administrative power is vested in 
the government and political power is vested in the CCP.  Therefore, it might 
be argued that if our insights have any relation to reality then surely the State 
Constitution, the Party Constitution, or Party leaders could have said as 
much.  Yet both documents and individuals are silent on this point or 
unusually opaque.  Because they do not speak directly, as we have noted, the 
principal issue in Chinese constitutionalism is the relationship of the Party 
and the state.  A more definitive official pronouncement remains to be 
delivered.  
                                                      
337 See id. 
338 The General Program of the CCP emphasizes that in order to lead the people of all ethnic groups in 
China in attaining the great goal of socialist modernization, the Communist Party of China must adhere to 
its basic line, strengthen its governance capability and vanguard nature, and comprehensively carry forward 
the great new undertaking to build itself in a spirit of reform and innovation.  Zhongguo Gongchandang 
Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party] (Promulgated by the Eighteenth 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), GEN. PROGRAM (China). 
339 Id. 
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The dearth of documentation and clarity may also be explained to 
some extent, though the explanation may ultimately prove unsatisfying.  The 
Chinese understand their constitutional order as a moving target—that is, the 
CCP itself has been undergoing structural changes within the broad 
understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory that has made the likelihood of 
excavating an unchanging approach to constitutional conception difficult at 
best. 340  That understanding is inherent in the concept of “socialist 
modernization” referenced in both State and CCP constitutions.  
In a sense, modern Chinese constitutionalism began at the end of a 
revolutionary period that extended through the adoption of the 1982 
Constitution.  The Chinese themselves might suggest that one ought to 
understand the foundations of Chinese constitutionalism as a system from 
that point.341  While drawing heavily from the Revolutionary (through 1949) 
and post-Revolutionary period (1949-1982) for foundations,342 the system 
and its current ideological foundations can be understood in its stable form 
after the current governance settlement was attained in 1982.343  But that 
progress and the fairly recent movement from post-Revolutionary 
foundations to the institutionalization of the governing ideology of a Party in 
Power have left substantial lacunae and surface contradictions that have not 
yet been fully addressed.  Yet to point to tensions between these three 
distinct periods of Chinese governance ought not necessarily to suggest 
contradiction.  Rather they might suggest development, a point made 
repeatedly in the constituting documents of the Chinese State and Party.  
Development appears to be at the heart of the ideological foundations of the 
state and CCP, but development within a clearly delineated set of ideological 
constraints.344  Those foundations are apparent in the Constitution itself—
                                                      
340  See BENNY TAI, XIANZHENG‧ZHONGGUO: CONG XIANDAIHUA JI WENHUA ZHUANBIAN KAN 
ZHONG GUO XIANZHENG FAZHAN (憲政‧中國: 從現代化及文化轉變看中國憲政發展) [CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
CHINA: EXAMINING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE CONSTITUTIONALISM THROUGH THE LENSES OF 
MODERNIZATION AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION] (2011) (author expresses similar ideals in his book 
about the development of Chinese constitutionalism). 
341  Cheng Yunjie et al.,  Xinhua Insight: CCP Constitution Enshrines Scientific Outlook on 
Development as part of Action Guide, XINHUA (Nov. 14, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com 
/english/special/18CCPnc/2012-11/14/c_131974409.htm (noting that “[s]ince the current Constitution was 
endorsed in 1982, the Party has made six revisions in accordance with the country's changing conditions 
and the Party's latest achievements in adapting Marxism to China's practical situation.”). 
342  See BENNY TAI, supra note 340. 
343 For an interesting commentary on this point, see Guevara Dilemma and Transformation of the 
Chinese Communist Party, INFORMATION SECURITY INDUSTRY NEWS WATCH (Aug. 21, 2013),  
http://news.securemymind.com/17897.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (author is identified as  a professor at 
the National Defense University). 
344 These constraints remain well marked by the Four Cardinal Principles, which were explicitly 
incorporated into both the CCP and State Constitutions—to keep to the socialist road, to uphold the 
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and the changes therein are well tracked in the changes to the Constitution’s 
Preamble, a part of the Constitution whose effects tend to be 
underestimated.345   
This paper agrees that the complexity of this explanation supports the 
criticism of opaqueness and therefore of our constitutional argument.  
Indeed, our review of the literature within China 346  suggests that the 
ambiguities have permitted substantial variation in approaches to 
constitutional analysis within China that has aided the “legitimacy” debate 
among constitutional scholars outside of China.   One might suspect that part 
of the reason is historical—the constitutional system is still developing 
towards the theoretical structures we have outlined here, and its tensions 
with conceptions of the Pre- and Post-Revolutionary period suggest areas of 
substantial contestation. 347   This paper also concedes that both this 
complexity and the ambiguities it spawns could serve as a veil behind which 
anti-constitutional practices may be masked.348  But one might also suspect, 
as the next section illustrates, that the difficulty of clarity also lies in the 
tensions inherent not in theory, but in the difficulties of conforming practice 
to theory in a constitutional system that has only recently emerged as 
something of a coherent and institutionalizable whole.   
As the next section illustrates, the sometimes substantial gulf between 
the way the system might be theorized and the way it works suggests that 
any theory of a coherent and distinctly Chinese socialist constitutional order 
necessarily abstracts away from a more complicated historical, political, and 
legal reality that proves the difficulties of “integrating the basic tenets of 
                                                                                                                                                              
people’s democratic dictatorship, to uphold the leadership by the Communist Party of China, and to uphold 
the Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought—are the foundation on which to build the country. For 
more information on the Four Cardinal Principles, see Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen  
(中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party] (Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012) GEN. PROGRAM (China).  
345 See supra Part IV. 
346  See supra Part III.B. 
347 A subject that we acknowledge but leave for elaboration in future work. 
348 That is a danger that the Chinese themselves have conceded since the time immediately before the 
promulgation of the current State Constitution, in pointing, for example, to the errors of Mao Zedong 
during the cultural revolution.  See Randy Shipp, China Blames ‘Mao’s Mistakes,’ CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Dec. 23, 1980), http://www.csmonitor.com/1980/1223/122319.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).  
(pointing to cult of personality, the official party newspaper People’s Daily commented that “[c]omrade 
Mao Tse-tung committed mistakes which brought the party and the people great misfortunes in his last 
years, especially when he personally started and led the 'Great Cultural Revolution.'”). See also, Mao 
Zedung, Biography, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 7, 2007), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/200707/10/ 
content_6142547.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (stating “[i]t is true that Mao Zedong made gross mistakes 
in his later years, but when his life is judged as a whole, his indisputable contributions to the Chinese 
revolution far outweigh his mistakes, and his merits are primary and his errors secondary.”). 
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Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.”349  
Yet this is an important concession that strengthens legitimacy—it may 
suggest that, like the contradictions between a United States Constitution 
that proclaimed democracy and protected the structures of slavery and was 
founded on equality but deprived women of substantial political and 
economic rights, the sometimes wide gulf between theory and practice 
points to the ordinary work of constitutional development common even to 
the most advanced constitutional states.  It is to the some of the specifics of 
that constitutional development, to the task of integrating theory with 
practice within Chinese constitutionalism, that this paper would turn next.  
V. SHUANGGUI—FROM CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY TO OPERATIONAL 
ISSUES 
Understanding shuanggui as a legitimate expression of CCP authority 
over its own members leaves open an important question—has shuanggui 
been scientifically developed and implemented in line with the CCP line?  
Beyond the issue of constitutional legitimacy, that question forms the most 
important element for the study of shuanggui in China today.  It is a question 
that has been taken up at the highest levels of the CCP.350   The theoretical 
legitimacy of a power to act, developed in the preceding section, can only be 
the starting point of analysis.  It is then necessary to determine whether 
shuanggui in fact remains true to the CCP line as it is applied or whether it 
requires development and reform.  It is to this latter point that this article 
now turns.  This issue requires an analysis of the implementation of 
shuanggui in light of the CCP line and its reflection in the principles 
embedded in the State Constitution as the clearest expression of the CCP 
line. The CCP line can be understood in the Western context as the 
foundational normative principles that bind CCP and its cadres; to have 
effect, it must bind in a way that law binds ordinary citizens.  
The starting point is a description of shuanggui as currently 
constituted.  The article then considers the possible ways in which the 
                                                      
349 Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party] 
(Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), GEN. 
PROGRAM (China). 
350  See Keith Zhai, Communist Party Seeks to Reform its ‘Shuanggui’ Anti-Corruption Investigations, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1361851/ 
communist-party-seeks-reform-anti-corruption-investigations (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (reporting that 
“[t]he nation’s top prosecutions body invited several anti-corruption experts to give advice on reform of the 
shuanggui interrogation system on the same day the party’s top leaders finished their third plenum meeting 
that mapped out a series of political and economic reforms.”).  
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current implementation of shuanggui itself conforms to the CCP line, 
especially as it has been elaborated through the principles of the Chinese 
Constitution, as appropriately applied to the political work of the CCP itself. 
The article notes, however, that because the distinction between 
administration and politics is never as explicitly or clearly drawn in practice 
as it is in theory, ultimately our justifications for shuanggui are weakened in 
practice—that is, because our justifications are grounded on this different 
logic (different spheres of legitimacy and authority), our argument is only as 
strong as the distinction.  It is thus to practice, as Deng Xiaoping 
consistently suggested,351 that the strength of the CCP’s political project, and 
its legitimacy, may be tested, and where necessary, reformed to better 
conform to the CCP line. 
A. Shuanggui Procedures 
Having considered the legal framework of shuanggui, the following 
section will examine the procedural aspects of shuanggui to better consider 
its compatibility with Chinese constitutional constraints.  At a general level, 
the procedures constituting shuanggui have been substantially routinized.  
All investigations at the CCDI or CDI levels are supposed to be conducted in 
accordance with procedures and regulations promulgated at both levels.  
Investigations are generally commenced by a preliminary verification.  
There is a difference between shuanggui investigation and shuanggui 
measurement.  The point is that shuanggui measurement, which restricts 
people’s freedom, is an option during the shuanggui investigation under 
specific circumstances.  Not every party member who violates a discipline 
will be subject to the investigation of shuanggui.352  Shuanggui measurement 
applies to CCP members under two circumstances.  First, shuanggui applies 
to individuals who may be subject to the punishment of suspension or who 
are likely to flee, fabricate, destroy evidence, or otherwise obstruct the 
                                                      
351 See Deng Xiaoping, supra note 137.  
352  See Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
of the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), art. 14(2), translation by Keren Wang, 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited March 
6, 2014) (providing that “[f]or those minor violations that do not need to be punished under the Party 
discipline, the relevant Party organization should be advised to take appropriate action on the violation.”). 
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investigation.353  Second, it applies to individuals who hold positions above 
the county or section level.354  
Generally, at the provincial level, shuanggui is not to be used unless 
the CCDI or CDI already possesses some solid evidence that there is a 
violation of CCP or administrative discipline. 355   Accordingly, a certain 
amount of investigative work usually precedes the start of a formal 
shuanggui proceeding.  The preliminary verification process commences 
with the filing of a complaint.356  Information is usually gathered from the 
time a complaint is lodged until a decision is made whether to proceed.357  
CCDI or CDI can accept complaints and reports produced internally that 
involve the members of central committee or members of CCDI or CDI at 
the same level; each organization can also receive preliminary matter that 
involves party officials and lower level party organizations.358    
Once preliminary verification is completed, a case can be filed.359  
The shuanggui investigation itself will start if the person subject to the 
preliminary verification is believed to have any serious violations.360  Even 
at this stage, the CDI has discretion to transfer the investigation to the 
People’s Procuratorate (“PP”) or police if the CDI believes there may be 
criminal activity involved.  The manner of filing depends on the position of 
                                                      
353 Jiekai “Shuanggui” De Menglong Miansha (揭开“双规”的朦胧面纱) [Lifting the Secretive Veil of 
“Shuanggui”], CHINA.COM (Aug. 27, 2003), http://www.china.com.cn/chinese /2003/Aug/392945.htm, 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
354Id.  It used to be commonly the case that officers of a university or a college who possess 
administrative titles were not subject to shuanggui investigation, but that has changed.   
355 See Yanpeng Feng, Tebie Quanli Guanxi Lilun Shijiao Xia De Dangnei “Shuanggui” Zhidu (特别
权力关系理论视角下的党内"双规"制度) [The Intra-Party “Shuanggui” System Under the Theoretical Lens of 
Special Power Relations], 23 LEGAL SYS. & SOC’Y 199, 199-200 (2009). 
356 Id. at 199. 
357 After receiving the complaint or report, CCDI or CDI may conduct a preliminary verification not to 
exceed two months. If it believes that there are facts of violation, it shall file the case.  If necessary, the 
verification can be extended for an additional month.  For complex and important matters, further 
extensions are permitted at the discretion of the local CDI office.  Id. 
358  Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of 
the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), art. 10, translation by Keren Wang, 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited March 
6, 2014). 
359 See Larry C. Backer, Central CCP Inspection Tour Working Process—Developing Mechanisms for 
Supervision and Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Efforts in China, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Nov. 22, 
2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/central-CCP-inspection-tour-working.html (last visited 
March 6, 2014); see also Zhong Jiwei Wangzhan Gongbu Jijian Jiancha Jiguan Xinfang Jubao, Chaban 
Anjian Deng Gongzuo Chengxu, (中纪委网站公布纪检监察机关信访举报、查办案件等工作程序) [CCDI Website 
Reported Discipline Inspection Organs Petition, Investigating Cases and Other Procedures], COMMUNIST 
PARTY OF CHINA NEWS (Sept. 2, 2013), http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n/2013/0902/c64371-22773604.html 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
360  See Backer, supra note 359.  
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the individual under investigation within the CCP.  For members of the CCP 
or CDI standing committee, such as the chief and the deputy secretary, the 
decision to file a case shall be made by CDI’s next higher level.361  Before 
making such a decision, the relevant CCP committee’s opinion shall be 
considered.  For other CCP members, the decision to file the case can be 
made by opinions of the local CCP committee.362   
The most well-known aspects of shuanggui begin at this stage.  Once 
the investigation commences, the individual is sequestered and notified of 
the investigation in the presence of the CDI’s investigator.363  The individual 
is not permitted to contact the outside world during the investigation without 
CDI’s permission.  During the course of the investigation, the judicial 
departments are expected to cooperate with CDI investigators to provide any 
evidence that is necessary for the investigation.  In addition to the use of the 
judicial authority of the state sector, CDI investigators possess the power of 
search and seizure of any items that may be necessary for the investigation.  
In addition, the CDI may freeze the bank accounts of individuals subject to 
investigation and limit their travel.364  
The period of investigation may not exceed three months.365  When it 
is necessary, and at the behest of the investigating unit, the investigation 
may be extended an additional month.  For important and complex cases, 
further extensions of up to three months are permitted.366  For cases not 
resolved within three months, the CCDI or CDI at the provincial level can 
                                                      
361  See Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
of the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), art. 7, translation by Keren Wang, 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited Mar. 6, 
2014).   
362 Id.  
363  Zhong Jiwei Wangzhan Gongbu Jijian Jiancha Jiguan Xinfang Jubao, Chaban Anjian Deng 
Gongzuo Chengxu (中纪委网站公布纪检监察机关信访举报、查办案件等工作程序) [CCDI Website 
Reported Discipline Inspection Organs Petition, Investigating Cases and Other Procedures], COMMUNIST 
PARTY OF CHINA NEWS (Sept. 2, 2013), http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n/2013/0902/c64371-22773604.html 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
364  See Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
of the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), art. 28, translation by Keren Wang, 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited March 
6, 2014).   
365  Id. at art. 39. 
366  Zhong Jiwei Wangzhan Gongbu Jijian Jiancha Jiguan Xinfang Jubao, Chaban Anjian Deng 
Gongzuo Chengxu (中纪委网站公布纪检监察机关信访举报、查办案件等工作程序) [CCDI Website 
Reported Discipline Inspection Organs Petition, Investigating Cases and Other Procedures], COMMUNIST 
PARTY OF CHINA NEWS (Sept. 2, 2013), http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n/2013/0902/c64371-22773604.html 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
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grant further extension to cases originating from a lower level CDI.367  In the 
absence of special circumstances, the total period of shuanggui investigation 
shall not exceed six months.368  A shuanggui investigation concludes with a 
determination of culpability and an assessment of punishment.   This usually 
occurs within a month of the completion of the investigation.  If the decision 
is made by the CDI above the county level, that CDI is to consider the 
opinion of CCP committee in suspect’s employed organization.369 
CDI officials emphasize that shuanggui is not a criminal investigation, 
that it is not a substitute for a criminal investigation, and that it is not a 
method for depriving a person under investigation of their freedom. 370  
While this is true in theory, in practice the methodologies of shuanggui 
produce a grey zone that raises questions, many of which remain 
substantially unresolved. This lack of resolution is illustrated by the 
methodologies of investigation.  Usually, CDI or CCDI will summon a 
suspect to a specific place for inquiry.  During the investigation, the suspect 
is not allowed to leave the premise or contact the outside world.371  The site 
of the investigation can be a hotel room or a resort.  Usually, the suspect is 
accompanied by the investigators at all times372 and constantly monitored, 
even when he goes to the bathroom.  Although there is no data about the 
specifics of treatment during investigation, reports of suicides during this 
phase of shuanggui have appeared, as well as reports of excessive tactics 
that might have resulted in death.373  
Punishment, shuangkai, is distinct from the process of investigation 
leading to punishment, shuanggui.  People frequently incorrectly use the 
                                                      
367 Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Guifan Banan Gongzuo De Yijian (中共中央关
于进一步加强规范办案工作的意见 ) [Opinions on Central Commission on Discipline Inspection 
Regarding to Further Strengthening the Standard of Investigation] (Mar. 19, 2009), 
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/ 128d8725ccbff121dd368329.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
368 Id. 
369 Id. 
370 Id. 
371 Id. 
372 Id. 
373  Some of these reports are published in the Western media.  In April, the death of Yu Qiyi, a chief 
engineer at the state-owned Wenzhou Industry Investment Group who was detained and interrogated upon 
suspicions of receiving a RMB 2 million bribe (about USD 320,000) from a local company CEO, caused 
shock online when pictures emerged of his bruised and swollen body.  Just a few weeks later, Jia Jiuxiang, 
a Henan court official who had found himself caught up in a property-related graft investigation, also died 
whilst in the custody of shuanggui.  Official claims that Jia died of a heart attack were rejected by his 
family, who stated that he had no history of heart problems.  See Natalie Thomas, How the Communist 
Party Weeds Out its Deliquents, THE ATLANTIC (June 21, 2013) http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
china/archive/2013/06/how-the-communist-party-weeds-out-its-delinquents/277116/ (last visited Mar. 1, 
2014); Policing the Party, supra note 178. 
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terms interchangeably.  According to the Article 10 of CCP’s regulation on 
discipline, there are five different kinds of punishments, including:  1) 
warning; 2) severe warning; 3) removal from CCP posts; 4) probation within 
the CCP; and 5) expulsion from the Party.374  Usually two of the possible 
punishments, removal from the party posts (kai chu dang nei zhi wu 开除党
内职务) and expulsion from the party (kai chu dang ji 开除党籍) draw the 
most widespread media attention.  
Generally, any disciplinary measure to be taken against a CCP 
member must be discussed and approved by the general membership of the 
CCP branch concerned, and reported for approval to the primary Party 
committee concerned.375  If the case is relatively important or complicated, 
or involves the expulsion of a member, it is reported to a Party CDI at or 
above the county level for review, examination, and approval.376  Under 
special circumstances, a CCP committee or a CDI at or above the county 
level has the authority to decide directly which disciplinary measures will be 
taken against a Party member.377 
The punishment of removal from CCP posts is subject to a number of 
rules and practices.378  First, there are rules for determining what constitutes 
a CCP post from which a person can be removed. 379   Second, the 
                                                      
374  Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of 
the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), at art. 10, translation by Keren Wang, 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited Mar. 6, 
2014).   
375  Any decision to remove a member or alternate member of the Central Committee or a local 
committee at any level from his or her posts within the Party, to place such a person on probation within the 
Party or to expel such a person from the Party must be approved by a two thirds majority vote at a plenary 
meeting of the Party committee to which he or she belongs. In special circumstances, the decision may be 
taken first by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee or the standing 
committee of a local Party committee, pending confirmation at the plenary meeting of the Party committee. 
Such a disciplinary measure against a member or alternate member of a local Party committee is subject to 
approval by the higher Party committee. For more information, see Backer, Communist Party and State 
Discipline in China Part II, supra note 28.   
376 Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of 
the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), at art. 17, translation by Keren Wang, 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited March 
6, 2014).   
377  Id. at art. 42. 
378  Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangchen (中国共产党章程) [Constitution of the Communist Party] 
(Promulgated by the Eighteenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 14, 2012, effective Nov. 14, 2012), at art. 39-
40 (China). 
379  Party’s posts are generally considered to mean leader positions that are subject to either election or 
appointment.  Such leader positions include:  CCP committee member in all levels, CCP standing 
committee member, secretary, deputy secretary and members of CDI at all levels, members of CDI 
committee, the secretary or deputy secretary. This punishment is necessary for members who’s malpractice 
is serious enough to cease his party duty but not serious enough for a period of probation within the party. 
See Backer, supra note 375. 
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punishment determination must be specific as to which posts are affected by 
the removal order.  Where an individual is appointed to multiple posts, the 
decision shall clearly state whether all the positions or one of the positions 
should be subject to the order of removal.  Third, where the individual holds 
multiple posts, removal decisions must start with the highest level post and 
then proceed down to the most modest post held by the individual.  Fourth, 
in addition, the CCP can also suggest that a non-CCP institution also remove 
the person from his post. 380  This usually applies to the affected individual’s 
posts within the state apparatus or an SOE.  Removal has long-term effects 
as well.  Within two years of the punishment, that person may not get any 
recommendations or take a position that is higher or equal to the one from 
which he was removed.   
Expulsion is the ultimate Party disciplinary measure.  The CCP 
disciplinary inspection working regulations suggest that this punishment be 
invoked sparingly. 381   In deciding on or approving an expulsion, Party 
organizations at all levels are required to study all the relevant facts and 
opinions and exercise extreme caution.382  People are usually subject to the 
punishment of expulsion from the Party when it is shown that the CCP 
member intentionally violated criminal law;383 was deprived of a political 
right by the courts; or committed a negligent or involuntary crime for which 
the CCP member was sentenced to more than three years imprisonment.  
After being expelled from the Party, that person cannot rejoin the Party for 
five years.  If there are other punishments imposed, those must be carried out 
as well.  
                                                      
380 See Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
of the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), translation by Keren Wang, 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited March 
6, 2014).   
381 Id. at arts. 26 and 27, (providing that expulsion is the ultimate Party disciplinary measure. In 
deciding on or approving an expulsion, Party organizations should study all the relevant facts and opinions 
and exercise extreme caution.). 
382 Id. at art. 38 (stipulating that “[a]fter the end of the investigation, the investigation team shall 
review the workand shall assist the Party organization where the violation originated to sum up the 
experience and lessons.”).  Article 34 also provides that “[i]f there is significant disagreement within the 
investigation team on the nature of the disciplinary violation, the liability of the relevant personnel, or on 
the attitude of the party under investigation on his or her violation, and if consensus cannot be reached after 
the discussion, the investigation report shall be drafted in accordance with the opinion of the investigation 
team captain.”).  Id. 
383 Id. at art. 36. For example, a member or alternate member of the Central Committee who has 
seriously violated the criminal law shall be expelled from the Party on decision by the Political Bureau of 
the Central Committee; a member or alternate member of a local Party committee who has seriously 
violated the criminal law shall be expelled from the Party on decision by the standing committee of the 
Party committee at the corresponding level.  
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It is at this point that shuanggui becomes especially interesting from a 
constitutional point of view.  Once the investigation is completed and 
punishment assessed, there is another decision that is sometimes made—a 
decision to transfer the person to the State for prosecution.384  In practice, the 
central organs of the CCP only have a very general rule about the transfer.  
In fact, each province may have its own detailed rules regarding the 
procedural of transferring.385  Yet that transfer implicates the separation of 
powers between the administrative state and CCP, and the application of the 
State constitution as principle and as law.386  
These forms and tensions are illustrated here by the practices of 
Shandong province.387  Transfer has been built into a program of cooperation 
that involves the CCP of Shandong, PP, DPS, CDI, the Department of 
Organization of Shandong, and the Auditing office of Shandong.  The 
program is designed for the cooperation between the different organs of the 
government in fighting the violation of the party or administrative 
discipline.388  Transferring a case between different organs is subject to the 
rules of this program, one which appears to blend the authority of the Party 
over its cadres with the authority of the state over its citizens.389 
The cooperation program is run through a central unified office, 
whose leader is a member of CDI’s standing committee in charge of the 
investigation reviewing and examining.390  Other members are come from 
other affiliate government organs and are in charge of the external 
cooperation in those organs.391  Each member organization is expected to set 
up its own internal organs as a channel of cooperation.  This organizational 
                                                      
384 Id. at art. 44. 
385  See Fujian Sheng Xingzheng Jiancha Anjian Yicong Guiding (福建省行政监察案件移送规定 ) 
[Regulations on the Transfer of Administrative Supervision Cases for Fujian Province] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Of Fujian People’s Cong., July 30, 2010) (China), http://www.fjcdi. 
gov.cn/html/sfgzd/20131120/1641429.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
386 Id. 
387  Shandong Sheng Jiwei, Sheng Wei Zuzhi Bu, Sheng Fayuan, Sheng Gonganting, Sheng 
Jianchating, Sheng Shenjiting Guanyu Zai Chachu Weijiweifa Anjian Zhong Jiaqiang Xiezuo Peihe De 
Banfa (山东省纪委, 省委组织部, 省法院, 省检察院, 省公安厅, 省监察厅, 省审计厅关于在查处违纪违法案件中加强协
作配合的办法) [Shandong Province Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Provincial Organization 
Department, the Provincial Court, The Provincial Procuratorate, the Provincial Public Security Bureau, the 
Provincial Supervision Department: Ways to Strengthen Coordination and Cooperation in the Investigation 
and Discipline Violation Cases] (2011) [hereinafter Shandong] (China). 
388  Id. 
389  Id. 
390  Id. 
391   Id. at art. 6. 
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structure permits transfers of cases in any direction and from any of the 
participants to others. 392 
In Shandong, if CDI investigates and, believes the suspect committed 
a crime, CDI forwards the written statement of the case to the police or PP in 
accordance with the rule of jurisdiction.393  The brief should be submitted 
within fifteen days of the suspect’s admission of any substantial criminal 
evidence.394  Within one month after CDI’s standing committee discusses the 
case, CDI transfers the case to PP or the police.395  Similar rules apply to 
transfers to or from judicial bodies.  The court is required to notify the 
relevant CDI during the first instance and second instance of the trail if the 
defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of CDI or MOS.  Courts are required 
to notify CDI about any decision and deliver the written judgment within 
fifteen days.396 
Functionally, if in the course of a criminal investigation the prosecutor 
or police find that a CCP member involved in the matter might be subject to 
any discipline punishments, they are required to transfer the case to CDI or 
CCDI with jurisdiction in the matter.397  For cases under PP investigation in 
Shandong, the relevant CDI or CCP committee makes the decision to file a 
case if the suspect is a CCP official at the county, city, or province level.398  
If the suspect is a party member or subject to administrative discipline, PP is 
required to transfer the case file within one month after the end of the 
investigation and allow the relevant CDI to decide whether to prosecute, 
whether PP withdraws the prosecution or not.399  For cases under criminal 
investigation by public security, if the suspect is a party member or subject 
to administrative discipline, the investigator shall transfer the case file within 
fifteen days of initial detention.  The investigator shall also notify the 
relevant CDI and CCP committees within one month of the decision of the 
decision to withdraw.400 
                                                      
392  See Fujian Sheng Fagu (福建省法规) [Fujian Province Transfer Regulation] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Of Fujian People’s Cong., July 30, 2010) (China), http://www.fjcdi.gov.cn/html/sfgzd 
/20131120 /1641429.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
393  Shandong, supra note 387, at art. 9. 
394  Id. at art. 10. 
395  Id. at art. 9. 
396  Id. at art. 12. 
397  Id. at art. 3. 
398  Id. at art. 8-10. 
399  Id. at art. 10. 
400  Id. at art. 11. 
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The extent of discretion exercised by CDI, PP, and judicial officials is 
thought to be great.401  The failure to report or explain the way discretion is 
exercised can at times produce popular criticism that can damage the 
reputation of the CCP.402  A recent example of such criticism is the Xiamen 
Yuanhua case.403  Although there was no confirmation from the authorities, 
there were widespread rumors swirling around the Xiamen Yuanhua 
smuggling case.  Some of these rumors suggested that the entire 
administrative apparatus attached to the Xiamen export port was involved in 
some way in the smuggling.  Due to the scale of corruption, the CDI at that 
time made a decision not to transfer suspects to the PP as long as they 
returned their bribes or their bribes did not exceed a certain amount.  
Consequently, shuanggui reflects the contradictions of conceptual clarity and 
operational imperfection.   
B. Scientific Development of the Operation of Shuanggui 
The description of shuanggui procedures suggests both the tensions 
between a theory of constitutionalism within which shuanggui might be 
defended as legitimate, and its practice, some aspects of which might 
themselves fall outside the constraints and expectations of that theory.  To 
paraphrase Fu Hualing’s recent conclusions about the fight against 
corruption in China, shuanggui is a double edged sword:  “[p]rosecution 
legitimizes the CCP by demonstrating its political will to fight corruption, 
but it also has potential to undermine the legitimacy of the CCP by showing 
to the world that its institutions have rotted their roots.”404  This section 
suggests that there is merit in the “gap thesis” relating to corruption in 
China.405 
The CCP has been moving from its revolutionary and early 
institutional structures to the institutionalization of its post-revolutionary 
                                                      
401  Fu Hualing, The Upward and Downward Spirals in China’s Anti-Corruption Enforcement, in 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA 409 (2013). 
402  Id.   
403 The People’s Daily described the August 1999 probe into the case of the Lai Changxing smuggling 
group, noting that “[t]he investigation found out what the group and others had smuggled was mainly 
refined oil, vegetable oil, cars and cigarettes with a worth of CNY 53 billion (approximately USD 6.4 
billion) and a customs-duty evasion up to CNY 27 billion since 1996.”  Huang Ying, An Actual Record—
“Xiamen Yuanhua Smuggling Case,” PEOPLE’S DAILY (Apr. 29, 2001), http://english.people.com. 
cn/200104/29/eng20010429_68943.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
404  Fu Hualing, supra note 401, at 409.  
405  Id. at 391. The gap between legal and political norms and practices can be narrowed through 
enhanced disciplinary action and institutional innovation.  Id. at 391-92.  
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governance structures.406  That development is harder than it sounds.  To 
succeed, it must avoid the errors of European Marxist Leninist states, 
principally those now understood as embodied in the personality cult of 
Stalinism, while retaining its fidelity to first principles that look toward a 
time of widespread democratic organization exercised within the political 
framework of Marxism.  The CCP, no longer an outside force, has set for 
itself the task of scientifically developing those structures to ensure the 
movement toward deepening socialist democracy. The decision nearly a 
decade ago to expand membership in the CCP indicated a willingness to 
transform the CCP from a revolutionary Party to a vanguard party 
representing all the people. 407  But the CCP still has some way to go before 
it can fulfill this obligation that it has imposed on itself. 408   
Modern political theory, grounded in notions of popular 
sovereignty,409 suggests that the government has to win the support of the 
people by democracy and rule of law. 410  Thus, it is useful to capitalize on 
popular support for the objectives of shuanggui by greater efforts to 
eliminate the negative part and optimize the positive part of shuanggui.411  
Officials have emphasized that “there are stringent regulations governing 
‘double designation’ procedures which must be pre-approved.”412  Corporal 
punishment is banned, a Party member’s dignity must be respected 
throughout the questioning, and the CCP takes a more active role in policing 
violation of these rules.413  During “double designations,” the relevant Party 
members are still regarded as comrades as they have not proven to have 
violated laws.”414  
Yet in his Report to the Eighteenth Party Congress, Hu Jintao noted:  
 
All Party members must heighten their sense of urgency and 
sense of responsibility and focus on strengthening the Party’s 
governance capacity, advanced nature and purity.  We should 
continue to free up our minds and carry out reform and 
                                                      
406  Cf. Backer, supra note 12.  
407  Backer, supra note 138. 
408  Id. 
409  See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 23  (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1990) (noting that enlightenment ideals of “popular sovereignty and 
representative government” are the general principles of “republicanism”). 
410  Yang Tao, supra note 219. 
411  Cf. Ye Zhusheng, supra note 166. 
412  Id. 
413  See Xiao Qiang, supra note 195. 
414  Id.  
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innovation, and uphold the principle that the Party should 
supervise its own conduct and run itself with strict discipline.415   
 
This point applies with some strength to the review of the actual 
implementation of shuanggui. 416   This section begins a brief review of 
potential areas where the implementation or practice of shuanggui may be 
improved.  These are framed around two principal areas—the first touching 
on how to optimize the execution of shuanggui, the second focusing on how 
to minimize the contradiction between state statute and relevant shuanggui 
legislation. Just as Deng suggested, “[t]he point is that the Party must 
provide good leadership; only through constant improvement can its 
leadership be strengthened.”417  
With these foundational ordering premises in mind, the article 
considers very briefly two broad categories of areas where the practice of 
shuanggui might be modified to better conform to the CCP line.  The first 
suggests methods for optimizing shuanggui.  The second suggests 
approaches for identifying and minimizing the contradictions between the 
constitutional theory of shuanggui and shuanggui in practice.  
 
1. Optimizing Shuanggui 
 
Having suggested the contradictions of operational imperfection, is it 
possible to suggest reform that conforms to both the CCP line and the logic 
of shuanggui within Chinese constitutionalism.  This sub section posits four 
potential areas of reform.  The first considers the need to develop rule of law 
structures within CCP governance.  The second considers the possibility of 
incorporating process regularity in system administration.  The third goes 
toward administrative coordination between CCP and state corruption 
systems.  The last considers transparency as an important element is building 
up the legitimacy of shuanggui.   
                                                      
415  See infra Part XII; Hu Jintao, supra note 24. 
416  See Tong Zhiwei, supra note 305. 
417 Deng Xiaoping, On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership, Address before the 
Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Aug. 18, 1980), endorsed by 
the Political Bureau (Aug. 31, 1980), available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengx 
p/vol2/text/b1460.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
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a.  Developing rule of law structures within CCP governance 
One of the areas that merit attention centers on developing rule of law 
structures within CCP governance and managing the exercise of discretion 
by officials participating in shuanggui. Critical to the operation of the 
shuanggui system in line with the CCP line is the continued scientific 
development of rule of law processes for operating the system.  That 
development has two principal components.  The first relates to the way in 
which shuanggui rules are adopted, and the second relates to the manner in 
which these rules are implemented by the appropriate CCP officials. 
With respect to the first, on May 27, 2013, CCP’s Central Committee 
adopted two documents to regulate the rule-making process within the 
CCP.418  The two newly-published regulations are the first formal documents 
to regulate intra-CCP legislation since the founding of the CCP nearly a 
century ago. 419   One document, “Regulation on Drafting Intra-CCP 
Legislations,”420 provides the appropriate party organs that are authorized to 
draft, approve, publish, amend, and abolish party regulations and the 
procedures those party organs should follow.  The other document, titled 
“Regulation on Filing Intra-CCP Legislative and Normative Documents,”421 
provides the rules on how intra-Party regulations should be filed, recorded, 
reviewed, amended, and abolished.  
The official news agency was quoted as describing these regulations 
as “the first formal documents to regulate the formation of CCP rules since 
the founding of the CCP in 1921.”422  They will affect more than 82 million 
members and four million CCP organs.423  The newly published regulations 
are based on a temporary regulation on the formation of party rules issued in 
1990.424  The two pieces of regulations are collectively referred to as the 
                                                      
418  Zhang Qian & Yao Chun, CPC to Sharpen Intra-Party Management, XINHUA (May 28, 2013), 
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-05/28/content_16538335.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
419  Id.  
420  Zhongguo Gongchandang Dangnei Fagui Zhiding Tiaoli (中国共产党党内法规制定条例) [Regulation 
on Drafting Intra-CCP Legislations], COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA NEWS (May 28, 2013) 
http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n/2013/0528/c117092-21635860.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
421  Zhongguo Gongchandang Dangnei Fagui He Guifanxing Wenjian Beian Guiding (中国共产党党内
法规和规范性文件备案规定 ) [Regulation on Filing Intra-CCP Legislative and Normative Documents], 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA NEWS (May 28, 2013) http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n/2013/0528/c117092-
21635861.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
422  Zhang Qian & Yao Chun, supra note 418. 
423  Id. 
424  Guo Junkui (郭俊奎), Zhonggong Shouci Yongyou Dangnei “Lifafa” Youhe Zhongda Yiyi? (中共
首次拥有党内“立法法”有何重大意义?) [What is the Significance of the CCP’s First Intra-Party “Legislation 
Law?”], COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA NEWS, (May 28, 2013), http://CCP.people.com.cn/ 
pinglun/n/2013/0528/c241220-21641845.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
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“intra-Party legislation law” by the official CCP news-outlet,425 and their 
adoption is considered an important step towards augmenting the CCP’s 
internal management and sharpen intra-Party supervision.426 
This move advances the CCP line by applying its constitutional 
principles, which are also embedded in their own way within the 
administrative structures of the government through the State Constitution, 
to the rulemaking authority of the CCP with application to its own cadres.  
In the official announcement of the new approach, the scientific 
development of the rule of law was emphasized.427  For example, Professor 
Jiang Ming‘an, Law School of Peking University, told Xinhua news agency 
that an “important aspect of the rule of law in China” is reflected through the 
efforts by the new CCP leadership to formalize intra-party management and 
strengthen party rules against power abuses.428 
With respect to the second, in the discussion about the Zeng case, one 
of the biggest issues spotlighted the application of discretion and the secrecy 
of proceedings.  As one shuanggui investigator points out, during the past 
few years, CCDI issued new guidance and rules summarizing the positive 
measurements of shuanggui and eliminating the negative parts of it. 429  
These documents set some detailed rules that aim at limiting the 
discretionary power of CDI.430  For example, shuanggui will apply only 
when CDI had possessed a minimum quantum of valid evidence of serious 
violation of CCP discipline; when it is necessary for investigation; and when 
some certain level of CDI has such authority.431  Other requirements include 
written request for shuanggui approval and mandatory filing of approval to 
the province CDI level as a record. 432   Furthermore, it is important to 
maintain the safety of the suspect during shuanggui since creating a less 
aggressive atmosphere for the investigation is important.433  Additionally, 
                                                      
425  Id.  
426  Zhang Qian & Yao Chun, supra note 418. 
427  Id. 
428  Id. 
429  Cheng Zhikui, Jianglan, Shuanggui Zhidu de Fazhan yu Wanshan, Wenyi Shenghuo: Xiaxiong 
Kan 3, 268  (2011). 
430  See Investigation Regulations (promulgated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
of the Communist Party of China, Mar. 25, 1994), translation by Keren Wang, 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/investigation-regulations-for-discipine.html (last visited Mar. 6, 
2014).   
431  Id. 
432  Id. 
433  Cheng Zhikui, Jianglan. “Shuanggui Zhidu de Fazhan yu Wanshan.” Wenyi Shenghuo: Xiaxiong 
Kan 3, 268 (2011). 
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enacting detailed procedural rules such as filling systems and authority 
threshold can limit discretional power.  
b.  Process Regularity   
Due process and other secondary measures might better conform to 
the CCP line as well in a number of respects.  As Hu Jintao has suggested, 
the CCP “should improve the system of discipline supervision and 
inspection, improve the unified management of representative offices of 
Party commissions for discipline inspection, and enable discipline inspectors 
to better play their role of supervision.”434  In “The Major Principle for the 
Anti-Corruption System,” the author emphasizes the importance of the due 
process and transparency against shuanggui abuse.435  It is important to note 
that due process refers to the principle embraced by the CCP, one of the 
applications of which has been expressed in the State Constitution436 not the 
principle incorporated into the operation of the administrative organs of the 
state.  Yet due process might also include transparency. 437   Without 
appropriately framed transparency, it is fairly easy for shuanggui to be 
abused by the authorities. As Chinese constitutional law scholar Tong 
Zhiwei points out, “[b]y only affirming the anti-crime campaign without 
denying or reminding concerned parties to pay attention to the ‘black 
methods’ is likely to encourage the tendency to illegally handle cases, torture 
and other serious violations of the basic civil rights. This tendency must be 
corrected.” 438   Detailed rules can help enforce due process and limit 
discretion, which might reduce the likelihood of the excess that resulted in 
the death of an official undergoing shuanggui in Wenzhou.439  The recent 
adoption of the “CCDI Case Supervision and Management Rules”440 is a 
positive step towards the fulfillment of the due process requirement. It is 
                                                      
434  See Hu Jintao, supra note 24. 
435  Zhou Yezhong, supra note 245.  
436  XIANFA at art. 37 (1982) (China). 
437  See, e.g., Alberto Alemanno, Unpacking the Principle of Openness in EU Law: Transparency, 
Participation and Democracy, EUR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2303644. 
438  Tong Zhiwei, supra note 416.   
439 Josh Chin, Six Indicted in Drowning of Chinese Official, THE WALL STREET J. (Sept. 4, 2013) 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324123004579054822242047370 (last visited Mar. 
6, 2014) (stating that the case “shines a rare light on the Communist Party's murky internal process for 
investigating cadres, known as shuanggui.”).  
440 See Zhongguo Gongchandang Jilü Jiancha Jiguan Anjian Jiandu Guanli Gongzuo Guize (中国共产党
纪律检查机关案件监督管理工作规则 ) [Chinese Communist Party Discipline Inspection Organs Case 
Supervision and Management Rules], adopted Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/flfg/cyfg 
/201307/t20130717_6570.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (giving detailed regulation on the time and 
procedural issue of conducting shuanggui investigation). 
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also important to note that secondary measurements like education, as 
internal democracy construction is critical to the optimization of 
shuanggui.441  These secondary proposals are not new though.  In 2000, the 
scholar Zhou Yezhong proposed that by perfecting the complaint system, 
reporting system, withdrawal system, and anti-corruption education system, 
one could build a firewall of anti-corruption.  Zhou also suggests paying 
attention to the importance of management of government servants and their 
ethical education.442  
c. Coordination among CCP and administrative systems 
 Shuanggui might also better conform to CCP governance principles 
and further socialist democracy and its responsibilities under dictatorship of 
the proletariat principles by adopting measures to improve the quality of 
investigation.  These innovations might usefully target the development of 
coordinated cooperation mechanisms between state and CCP investigative 
units. In practice, some provinces have established coordination between 
local prosecutors and administrative supervision department that enhances 
the quality of investigations.443 Coordination can enhance the transparency 
and efficiency of anti-corruption investigations. The objective of 
coordination is useful, especially in criminal matters.  But once the State 
organs are involved, an individual’s constitutional protections under the 
State Constitution and criminal law must also be respected.  For that reason, 
perhaps, simultaneous investigation ought to be avoided.  
An important institutional reform would have to center on 
implementing the important theory of the separation of CCP and 
administrative organs by creating clearer separation between MOS and 
CCDI operations. To remain true to the separation of administrative and 
political power, it makes some sense to separate the proceedings of an 
agency that is bound by the letter of the State Constitution from a political 
organ that is not.  To combine the two comes dangerously close to the 
amalgamation of State and Party against which Deng Xiaoping warned and 
                                                      
441 Zhu Lianghao, Fanfu Changlian Fagui Zhidu De Jiben Yuanze ( 反腐倡廉法规制度的基本原则) [Basic 
Principles for Anti-Corruption and Anti-Graft Systems], 2010 DANGZHENG LUNTAN 3, 51-53 (2010), 
available at http://info.zjlib.cn/lzwhpdf/xsyj/%E5%8F%8D%E8%85%90%E5%80%A1%E5 
%BB%89%E6%B3%95%E8%A7%84%E5%88%B6%E5%BA%A6%E7%9A%84%E5%9F%BA%E6%9
C%AC%E5%8E%9F%E5%88%99.pdf.  
442 Zhou Yezhong, supra note 245.   
443 Larry C. Backer, Communist Party and State Discipline Part III: Chinese Scholars' Views of 
Shuang Gui Inter Party Discipline System, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY, (Sept. 23, 2011) 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/communist-party-and-state-discipline.html (last visited Mar. 6, 
2014). 
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which was abandoned with the adoption of the State Constitution system in 
1982. 
 
d.   Transparency measures might be useful 
 
In addition, transparency is an important emerging element of Chinese 
rule of law constitutional principles being developed under the leadership of 
the CCP.  The “Intra-Party Legislation Law” described above includes an 
important element of transparency, which requires the CCP to publish all of 
its regulations “except in a few special cases.”444  Professor Zhen Xiaoying, 
with the Central Socialist Academy, was specifically quoted in the official 
reporting of the adoption of the “Intra-Party Legislation Law” as suggesting 
that “more transparency will prevent the CPC from issuing ineffective or 
empty rules and help reduce bureaucracy. The new rules also regulate that 
the CPC should have both annual and five-year plans for drafting and 
amending party rules.”445  The report was careful to tie this enactment to the 
development of the transparency principle as one with constitutional 
principle dimension through reference to Xi Jinping’s approach to CCP 
constitutionalism, which is grounded in the constraint of  rule of law.446  The 
report emphasized that: 
 
The new leadership has promised to ‘lock the power in the cage’ 
so, first of all, the cage of the laws and party regulations should 
be strong enough, said Prof. Ye Duchu, with the Party School of 
the CPC Central Committee. Building the framework of rules 
will affect generations and help safeguard the long-term rule of 
CPC in China, Ye said.447  
 
The embrace of transparency as a foundational element of CCP operation 
has important ramifications not merely for the internal operation of the CCP, 
but it will likely have spillover effects onto constitutional principles 
applicable by the government through the State Constitution.  It will be 
interesting to see how the CCP development and application of transparency 
will affect the administrative organs of the state which will be expected to 
act within the scope of individual jurisdictions. 
                                                      
444 Zhang Qian & Yao Chun, supra note 418.  
445 Id. 
446 Id.; see also Tong Zhiwei, supra note 18. 
447 Zhang Qian & Yao Chun, supra note 418. 
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2. Minimize the Contradictions 
It could be useful to identify and minimize generally the 
contradictions between the constitutional theory of shuanggui and shuanggui 
in practice.  This subsection briefly describes three potential methods.  The 
first looks to regulatory incoherence.  The second looks to strengthening 
equal applicability rules.  The last method reminds that optics are important 
and the CCP must remain careful to avoid reform that appears to contradict 
its leadership role. 
 
a.   Reducing the regulatory incoherence between state organs and CCP  
This might require coordinating shuanggui with the criminal law 
where appropriate, for example, in matters of corruption.  Regulatory 
incoherence has become an important issue in governance throughout the 
world.  Governance scholars and policymakers have begun to understand 
how the failure to coordinate rule systems that apply to individuals could 
weaken enforcement efficiency and respect for the integrity of the system.448  
This has been noted by some Chinese scholars.  They argue, for example, 
that the CCP should address the contradiction between shuanggui’s 
legislation and state law.449  Some argue that such coordination ought to 
maintain the NPC’s exclusive legislation power, avoiding legislation that 
limits or deprives CCP members of their constitutional rights.450  Yet as 
suggested above, this approach suffers from the failure to recognize that the 
CCP is not subject to the State Constitution.  However, the approach has 
embraced this principle, which it has endorsed for inclusion within the State 
Constitution, and applied to the administrative organs of state.  Still, the 
failure to coordinate gives rise to the perception of conflict and poses the 
risk that contradictory positions might be taken by CCP and State officials.  
These incoherent regulatory results can be avoided.  Some have suggested, 
for example, a need to separate different legislation authorities, and to set up 
                                                      
448 The issue of regulatory incoherence, for example, was a central element in the movement toward 
the adoption of the U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights.  It was nicely described by the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Business and Human Rights.  See John G. Ruggie, 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Remarks at the Public Hearings on Business and Human 
Rights Sub-Committee on Human Rights European Parliament, Brussels, (April 16, 2009), 
http://www.corporatejustice.org/IMG/pdf/EP_April_2009Ruggie.pdf (last visited March 1, 2014). 
449 See supra Part IV. 
450 See supra Part III.B. 
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some communication mechanism so that the CCP’s legislation can 
coordinate with the national statutes.  Furthermore, some have pointed to the 
need to incorporate intra-party disciplinary rules within national law and 
eliminate the specialness of shuanggui.451  Incorporation into national law is 
constitutionally unnecessary, but coordination between the political and 
national systems is useful and avoids contradiction between law and CCP 
systems. 
At the same time, it is important to note that the functions of the 
criminal law and the CCP’s disciplinary systems are distinct.  To that end, 
there should be no effort to aggregate both into a single system.  Rather, 
where they might overlap, coordination is important.  But the preservation of 
the distinctive functions of administrative organs and the political work of 
the CCP requires the development of distinct approaches to many activities 
that may be deemed dangerous to the state, including those centering on 
corruption.   
b.   Procedure should be developed that ensures that all CCP cadres, 
whatever their position, are equally subject to discipline 
 Hu Jintao noted, “[w]e must ensure that all are equal before 
discipline, that nobody has the privilege of not observing it and that no 
exception should be made in its enforcement.”452  The current system of 
shuanggui does not necessarily result in equal treatment for Party officials 
who are subject to discipline equally.  To that end, it is likely that systems of 
review might have to develop that ensure that all discipline cases are heard 
by CCP committees unconnected to the officials charged.  Two reforms are 
of particular importance.  The first is the adoption of strong conflict of 
interest rules.  The second is to ensure that lower level officials are always 
investigated by officials at a higher level, but in a different province. 
                                                      
451 See Cao Shenbing, Dangnei Fagui Yu Guojia Falv Xietiao Lujing Tantao (党内法规与国家法律
协调路径探讨) [Investigating Various Approaches of Harmonizing Party Rules with National Law], 
Tansuo 2, 34-37 (2010), available at http://mall.cnki.net/magazine/Article/SUTA201002010.htm 
(providing that the CCP “shall establish regular communication and cooperation working mechanism 
between the legislature department of NPC and CCP.  Through this working mechanism, each department 
can discuss, clarify and solve the contradiction between different authorities.”). 
451  This practice is later proved to be a good example of the cooperation between CCDI and other 
legislatures. 
452 See Hu Jintao, supra note 24. 
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c.   The integrity of the shuanggui system requires implementation that 
avoids the appearance of systemic corruption  
One of the great criticisms of shuanggui is that it could simply be 
used as a tool of factional political partisanship and retribution.  Along these 
lines are the structural criticisms of shuanggui, like the fact that the CCP 
places the CDI under the CCP leadership at the same level.  As such, the 
CDI is dependent and cannot supervise the party committee to which it is 
responsible.  CDI effectiveness therefore depends on the support of the local 
CCP chief.  If the local CCP unit or its leader is corrupt, shuanggui will at 
best only institutionalize the corruption, and at worst be used to silence 
whistleblowers.  How can this be managed? 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The key to understanding rule of law in China hinges on an 
appropriate understanding of the way separation of powers is applied as a 
constitutional matter.  In the United States, all popular power is vested in the 
government and that power is divided by function:  legislative, executive, 
and judicial.  The constitution represents the organization of the entire power 
of the people now vested in the state apparatus.  As a consequence, the 
separation of powers within government becomes a central issue of 
constitutional legitimacy.    
In China, popular power is divided differently.  Administrative power 
is vested in the government and political power is vested in the CCP.  In 
contrast to the American system of division of authority between legislature, 
executive, and judicial branches, the Chinese constitutional system divides 
authority between the State Council/NPC organs and the CCP and its organs.  
A document that organizes the administrative apparatus of the state cannot 
be understood the same way in China as in the United States.  The State 
Constitution does not organize the entirety of sovereign power in China—it 
organizes only the administrative apparatus.  The CCP is the institutional 
form of the expression of popular power that expresses its will under the 
State Constitution’s recognition (Article I) of the people’s democratic 
dictatorship. As a consequence, the separation of powers between 
government and Party becomes a central issue of constitutional legitimacy.  
In China, that relationship is constrained by the ideological structures within 
which the People’s Republic was created—the mass line and Marxist-
Leninist theory scientifically developed through the CCP. 
The harsh measures institutionalized into the two unique disciplinary 
systems—laojiao, a state based political disciplinary system, and shuanggui, 
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CCP’s internal party discipline system—provide a useful context in which 
the form and operation of legitimate Chinese constitutionalism can be 
understood, and the policy behind these institutions can be legitimately 
debated.  While both laojiao and shuanggui bypass formal judicial process, 
shuanggui is a narrowly-applicable CCP internal discipline system that only 
targets Communist Party cadres; laojiao targets all citizens with an almost 
unbounded discretion vested in the police administration.  With a better 
understanding of the fundamental organization of Chinese constitutionalism, 
the analytical basis for testing the legitimacy of laojiao and shuanggui under 
general principles of constitutionalism, naturalized within the Chinese 
constitutional system, becomes clear.  Laojiao has become illegitimate in the 
post-revolutionary period precisely because the CCP and government have 
progressed to the point where socialist rule of law has come to be understood 
as application of the rules expressed in the State Constitution, and through it, 
under the laws created by government organs.   
Extra-constitutional measures exercised by state organs are effectively 
beyond the powers of the state organs.  On the other hand, shuanggui 
focuses on the powers of the CCP to organize itself and to protect its 
integrity in accordance with its own logic.  Shuanggui goes to the protection 
of the legitimacy of the people’s democratic dictatorship itself.  As a 
consequence, the basis of the legitimacy of the shuanggui system is not to be 
found in the State constitution, but rather in the constitution of the CCP.  But 
to understand shuanggui as a legitimate expression of Party power is not to 
accept its implementation in every form.  The CCP itself is constrained by 
the mass line, which has been expressed clearly by the CCP itself through 
the principles it has adopted and applied to the State Constitution.  Those 
principles, together with core, scientifically developed principles of Party 
objectives, mark the framework within which a legitimate system of 
shuanggui must be further developed. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
